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Abstract
The number of social and economic activities on digital plat-
forms has been increasing since the last two decades, and es-
pecially in the last decade. Several such platforms also pro-
vide opportunities for interactions among participating users,
either as a part of the primary activities on such platforms
or as a secondary feature. Such interactions form the basis
of the emergence of collective behaviour on individual plat-
forms, wherein users’ interactions affect the aggregate state of
the platform and at the same time the aggregate state of plat-
form feeds into how users interact among themselves. Digital
platforms turn into digital societies by providing many ways
to conduct users’ interactions driven activities, that were tra-
ditionally conducted in the physical world, in efficient and
scalable ways. Apparently, these two societies – digital and
real world – exist simultaneously and have feedback effects
in shaping outcomes in both the societies on various factors
including behaviour, beliefs, opinions, and others. This thesis
contains three essays including (1) peer influence on creation
of new projects in the learning environment Scratch, (2) polar-
ization of climate change beliefs due to homophily in interac-
tions on the social media Twitter, and (3) effects on collective
attention due to political framing of climate change by the
news media Guardian. Particular emphasis is laid on statis-
tical inference of the effects and hypothesizing mechanisms
behinds such effects.
The production and consumption of projects in the Scratch
community, a digital platform developed by MIT Media Lab
where users, usually young children, learn to program by cre-
ating and sharing projects, is analysed using the data for the
xviii
first five years after its launch. In particular, investigation
is done to discover if users are influenced by the popularity
of their peers’ projects and their peers’ preferences for con-
suming specific baskets of projects. The major challenges in
this type of analysis is to provide parsimonious models for
complexities of interactions on the platform and to disentan-
gle peer influence from homophily in the vast network of be-
haviours and friendships. Homophily is a term widely used
in social networks studies to describe friendship or tie for-
mations that arise due to similarities in behaviours or com-
mon attributes between participating agents in the formation
of such ties. The analysis reveals that while Scratchers’ con-
sumption preference is not influenced by their peers, the pop-
ularity of their projects is significantly influenced by their
peers in short and long terms. A large proportion of the influ-
ence from peers is mediated via Scratchers’ creation of new
projects, which highlights Scratchers’ subsequent decisions
in response to existing popularity of peers’ projects. These
insights can potentially help in incorporation of behaviour-
driven designs in future educational technologies.
Producer-consumer business models is at the heart of several
social networking sites. Activities on such sites range from
meeting friends, exchanging messages, propagating messages,
advertisements, and others. Lack of regulations on informa-
tion posting and limitations of computer-assisted informa-
tion checks therefore provide opportunities for people’s be-
liefs to be polarized due to the spread of fake information in
such social networks. Homophily in communication creates
groups of people or agents with bounded beliefs about the
reality, and hence can polarize a society. Such homophily in
digital media has been termed as echo chambers which in-
tuitively promotes the notion that people hear nothing more
than what they already believe. Using evidence from 11 years
of Twitter conversations on the climate change topic, an em-
xix
pirical analysis is conducted on the effect of homophily in
communication patterns on the polarization of beliefs about
the reality of climate change. The analysis reveals a counter-
intuitive result that increasing levels of homophily in com-
munication predicts decreasing levels of polarization in be-
liefs in the long run. To understand better the mechanism of
the effect of homophily on polarization, a model is developed
that shows how polarization can emerge due to the joint ef-
fects of precision of misinformation propagating in a social
network and homophily in communication among agents in
the social network with differing beliefs. Credibility of fake
news, modelled as precision of misinformation, circulating in
the social network can lead to acceptance of the fake news
(depending on agents’ susceptibility to it), thereby changing
beliefs and creating polarization. The model shows that fake
news can not polarize the society unless it has a minimal
level of credibility, irrespective of the level of homophily in
communication patterns. This throws a light on perhaps the
most intuitive but usually the forgotten factor of information
– credibility. While the results show that the climate change
sceptic exchanges of messages on the social media Twitter do
not carry enough credibility to create large scale polarization
in society, they also provide useful indications to directly or
indirectly quantify the emergence of credibility of informa-
tion in digital platforms, and also to shift attention of tech-
nology from detecting fake stories to detecting fake stories
which the society might find them to be credible.
Digital news platforms have become outlets for engaging dis-
cussions. They provide journalists and publishers with sev-
eral dimensions to gauge the acceptance of their articles and
at the same time provides readers with simple tools to par-
ticipate in discussions. It has been long acknowledged that
news media frame their articles. As an instance of political
framing, to understand how the politicization climate change
xx
articles influences the collective attention and discussion on
such articles, articles published in the Guardian until 2018 are
used to examine whether and how politicization influences
readers’ collective discussion. The results suggest that (un-
known) factors of perception associated to an article when it
is categorized in ‘Politics’ section positively impacts the col-
lective attention and engagement received on articles. Esti-
mates also suggest that mentions of political inclinations of
the entities within an article impact such collective attention.
In particular, a large proportion of such participation is found
to be mediated by discussions becoming politicized by past
contextual entities related to the article but strictly absent in
the article, thereby suggesting a temporal effect of perception.
In addition, a large proportion of the impact of political men-
tions on users’ engagement is mediated by users who join dis-
cussion being influenced by past politically oriented contex-
tual entities. Although no evidence is found to support that
authors or journalists might be enjoying increasing marginal
benefits from collective attention to their articles that result
from their choices about mentions of political entities within
the main texts of climate change articles, the results highlight
that their choices do impact the readers’ perceptions and par-
ticipations (and potentially the intensity of climate change ac-
tion in real world).
Overall, this series of research has contributed to improving
how collective behaviour is shaped in digital societies in rela-
tion to peer influence in educational media, polarization of
beliefs in social media, and political framing of articles in
news media. Hopefully, these results would be of interest to
general audience and researchers in fields of social sciences,
economics, marketing, media and communications, and ap-
plied data science.
xxi
Chapter 1
Introduction
Collective behaviour in a given society is an emergent process or a global
pattern which exists as a result of individual activities in the society,
but may not be fully explained without taking into account the inter-
actions among individuals, the motives of participation, and the intelli-
gence/perception that emerges or is shaped within each individual due
to such interactions. In this thesis we will see three studies on collective
behaviour with an aim to investigate some of the important contempo-
rary issues on three different digital platforms.
(1) Whether people are aware about it or not, social influence exists in
varying intensities across various interactive platforms. The intensities
can be explained on a range between random clicks to clicks with known
causes and consequences. Social influence on digital platforms forms
that dimension of collective behaviour where users’ cognitive states are
affected by the feedbacks from the state of affairs of the society and in-
duce changes in how users behave on the platforms.
(2) Beliefs form the units of blocks based on which people decide
whether to act and how to act. In the digital age, there are several for-
mal and informal sources of information. Social media platforms have
become a place for the spread of news and information, whose validity
is subject to various factors. Fake information not only creates wrong be-
liefs in individuals but also across the population which can make each
1
individual be convinced about his or her belief just because everybody
beliefs it. While the fake notion of information may not be exclusive to
digital platforms, the notion that you know what others might be be-
lieving as well creates a common society-wide perception. These abil-
ities, before the age of online social networks, were concentrated with
mass media outlets in forms of newspapers and news on the television.
However the digital generation has empowered every individual and
organization with equal abilities to influence mass perceptions. Hence,
propagation of misinformation is an important issue in the digital era.
(3) Public opinion on important issues like politics is largely shaped
by news media. Public opinions in turn shape social and economic poli-
cies for the future democracy. Mass media communications therefore
play a big role in the feedback between democratic policies and public
opinion. Digital news media create a different environment for readers
when compared to newspaper readership or social media. Digital media
put published articles’ reputation in the hands of the public to assess the
reliability of the content and also to drive further discussion.
1.1 Minds & Collective Behaviour
Collective behaviour refers to the observed behavioural patterns of a
group that emerges due to the ways individuals or agents in the group
acquire and process information, interact and communicate with other
agents in the group, and reasons or motivations behind their actions. An
important and distinct aspect of collective behaviour is that it can not
be understood by studying patterns of individual behaviours alone, and
feedbacks exist between individual agents and group-level outcomes.
Such global outcomes that emerge from complex interactions among
individual agents of the society may or may not be intuitive, with trace-
able or untraceable mechanisms. The term ‘agent’ has a meaning with
respect to the units of participants in a given society, which is not limited
just to human societies. Collective behaviour in several circumstances
consists of simultaneous feedbacks between the global state of the given
society and the states of its participating units. Collective behaviour can
2
result in consequences undesirable for the society in spite of seemingly
harmless activities performed by individuals. It can be the other way
around as well: collective outcomes desirable by a society can emerge
from individual actions which were not guided by a desire for such out-
comes.
1.1.1 Information, Intellect & Decisions
Every action by a social agent is an outcome of information accumulated
from various sources, the ways in which the agent processes such infor-
mation to form beliefs, and deciding to act based on the final beliefs. Col-
lective behaviour is an aggregate manifestation of heterogeneous atom-
istic information, belief formations, and decisions of individuals with
varying abilities. Each of these components at individual levels can vary
enormously especially when individual social agents are human beings
unlike other animals. For instance it is rare to see human dynamics sim-
ilar to a flock of birds flying together, and bird dynamics similar to a
mob protesting for a purpose. Comparing humans with birds shows a
clear pattern that these two social agents have extremely varying abili-
ties in information acquisition, processing, and decision making. While
these abilities seem to be almost homogeneous across all birds of a given
species, the same can not be said about human beings due to their differ-
ences in cognitive capabilities and their differences in control over han-
dling the mental faculties. Cognitive actions can occur at multiple levels
composed of agents with varying identities and outcomes at each level
can receive or give feedbacks to other levels. In this thesis, we do model
(or describe) information sources, belief updates, and decision-making
of agents wherever possible in the course of investigating research ques-
tions.
1.1.2 Role of Social Networks
Connectedness is an inherent characteristic of social agents, and this is
perhaps what makes each agent a social agent. There different kinds of
interactions that individuals can have between each other – friendships,
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communications, mentoring, etc. – with different intensities and dura-
tions. A social network, conceptually, describes the composition of so-
cial agents with heterogeneous characteristics or behaviours and interac-
tions among them. Interactions in social networks form the substrate on
which information, opinions or beliefs, and decisions about behaviours
or adoptions spread between agents. Such interactions result in vari-
ous outcomes or processes such as copying, learning, innovating to im-
prove, innovating to differentiate, and others. The aggregate outcomes
of a group, conceived as a social network, therefore not only depend on
behaviours of individual agents, but also on the nature and dynamics of
interactions among the agents. In this thesis, we do model the various
interactions among agents as required by the nature of research question
to be studied.
1.1.3 Creator of Complexity: Kahneman or Tirole?
In this section, description is made about the importance of motivation
behind human actions, and how differences in motivations can result
in emergence of different collective behaviours and social or economic
outcomes.
Economy is a method of efficiently organizing the aspects of social
beings, and particularly in case of human beings, which are related to
sustained survival with limited resources. Several traditional assump-
tions to model economy usually incorporate maximizing self-interests or
monetary profits as the primary objective of actions made by individ-
uals and firms (composed of groups of individuals and resources). At
the same time, individuals also engage in helping others and firms also
engage in non-monetary motives like building open-source software.
The complexities of social interactions among different kinds of agents
(individuals, groups, firms, governments, etc.) and organizational struc-
tures (e.g., economic markets, cultures, religions, institutions, nations,
etc.) are largely motivated due to heterogeneous reasons. Broadly, such
motivations can be categorized as competition (as a way of trying to be
exclusive) and co-operation (as a way of trying to be inclusive). While
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firms in the same economic market may compete for profits and co-
operate with other markets for developing supply chains, individuals
identified with one culture or religion may co-operate among themselves
but compete or exclude individuals with different identities. At the end
of the day, the collective behaviour that emerges in different conceptual
layers of societies is essentially a combination of social and economic
activities, with consequences on the environment which sustains these
activities. This shows that human beings have heterogeneous motiva-
tions for various activities and this must be understood as a part of the
observed emergence of collective behaviour. However irrational and ra-
tional behaviours of human beings and firms (containing human beings)
can be meaningful only if they are described conditional on certain pre-
conceived assumptions about their expected optimal behaviour in vari-
ous situations. Let us look at an example. Two birds released from the
same cage flew in east and west directions, one in each direction. Which
one do you think is rational? In this thesis, we do not model motivations
or optimal actions of interacting agents in a collective environment. The
results can be considered naive observations by looking at the data. (Be-
havioural assumptions, wherever made, have been kept to minimum.)
1.1.4 Importance in Society, Environment & Economy
Collective behaviour is observed in different circumstances of grouping
like crowds, social movements, and other voluntary activities. Under-
standing collective behaviour can provide insights into initiating and
organizing required changes in society, especially the unfavourable as-
pects of aggregate outcomes. It can also provide insights into prescrib-
ing norms for individual behaviour during emergence of spontaneous
situations like panics, mass hysteria, clashes between social groups with
differeing ideologies, and others. Modeling collective behavior has the
potential to deliver effective and efficient ways to predict and control
collective outcomes. Understanding trends of collective behaviour in so-
cial media platforms can provide insights into various matters that need
prescriptions, including emergency situations like management activi-
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ties during natural disasters.
Social and economic activities affect the environment. While driv-
ing a new car does not seem to create global warming, the same action
when done by many people deciding individually for themselves can
have large explanatory power to explain rising temperatures in cities.
In matters that concern the environment, the public understanding may
not develop until there is a real experience. Public understanding is con-
founded by several factors – fake information, lack of perception of the
role of individual activities, self-reinforcing and biased beliefs, incentives
of government agents and institutions in the society, and others. Regu-
lating industries and imposing taxes on firms may create perpetual loop-
holes if the collective demand for sustainable products and services is not
in place. On the other hand, creating social awareness and behavioural
changes can actually have long lasting impacts both from demand and
supply perspectives.
In economic and corporate management activities, there are increas-
ing adoptions of business models and developments of algorithms that
can harness collective behaviour. Facebook, for instance, has a business
model that revolves around insights from collective and interactions, ac-
tivities, and interests. Algorithms for recommender systems, which have
been shown to be of value at Amazon, are examples that use digital trails
of collective behaviour. Product developments in firms happen due to
co-operative interactions among employees. Linux is well known to have
features that emerged beyond what it was originally intended for. A mar-
ket emerges due to collective behaviour comprising competitive interac-
tions among suppliers of innovations and budget constrained choosers
of friend-recommended or expert-recommended innovations. Collective
behaviour in form of co-operation emerges to create efficient, valuable,
and robust supply chains.
1.1.5 Various Perspectives for Analysing Behaviour
There has been an upsurge of data and methods to understand collec-
tive behaviour, due to increase in capacity to store and process big data.
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Various disciplines including social sciences and humanities, sociology,
economics, marketing, mathematics, computer science, physics, psychol-
ogy, and others have contributed to the understanding of collective be-
haviour. Current research on various issues and methods are largely or-
ganized in computational social science which shares similarities with
research in digital societies, behavioural economics, processes on and
of networks, agent based models, social computing, complex networks,
and cyber-emotions. New types of data are being analyzed which in-
clude phone traces, social networks data, web blogs and video, sens-
ing of face-to-face interactions, crowdsourcing, and others. Methods for
analysis of networks and text data emerged as the major contributors in
making such analysis possible.
1.2 Technology & Digital Platforms
Digital avenues have generated increasing attention for various activi-
ties. Several platforms provide services that include mass participation.
1.2.1 Digital Economies
Although this thesis does not analyse digital economies, its narration will
probably provide a better context to understand the information value
contained in digital societies, which is discussed in the next section.
With rise in information and communication technology, several goods
and services are traded on digital platforms. Examples include e-commerce,
music download, software, etc. Most businesses from the early years
were platform services. They were incorporated with several features to
help customers choose informed products. Most of these features mim-
icked sellers trying to compete for visibility and reputation of their prod-
ucts within the platform. Platforms like eBay and Amazon attracted have
attracted increasing traffic. Very soon, customers were able to get in-
volved in the platform apart from transactions due to facilities for likes
and reviews. Next product recommendations and personalized experi-
ences became popular tools on platforms that attract huge traffic. Digital
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platforms have also become hot-spots for marketing activities compared
to traditional methods due to ease of use. Fintech has produced vari-
ous innovative products providing standalone services like currency ex-
changes or integrated services like retail payments. An increasing num-
ber of startups in recent years are seeking customer attention through
user experience designs and marketing efforts.
However, the overall trend in these types of platforms have minimal
notions of societies because they tend to be largely transactional. Also
facilities like review systems where large number of users can leave re-
views does not really translate into a concept of societies because a partic-
ular user does not have incentives for repeating such activities once the
product is bought. In a physical shop, this translates to leaving behind
feedbacks, which do not incorporate active and sustained interactions
among customers.
1.2.2 Digital Societies
Digital societies are for-profit or non-profit digital platforms, usually with
large number of participating users, whose services provide social expe-
riences to the users rather than benefits of only economic transactions as
in digital economies. Examples of such platforms with pre-defined set
of activities include those like Wikipedia, Github, Linkedin, news media
and opinion blogs, while general social platforms for a range of activities
include Youtube, Facebook and Twitter. It is very clear that the examples
of digital platforms mentioned above are much different in nature from
various digital economies mentioned in previous section. Clearly, these
platforms provide social value beyond economic transactions.
What factors turn these platforms into societies? First, repeated and
active interactions among participants is the key element in all the above
examples of digital societies. Second, most of such platforms are based
on prosumer models where users both produce and consume content on
such platforms. Examples of prosumer models with separable bound-
aries between producers and consumers would include platforms like
online courses and news media outlets.
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Digital societies offer various services and interactions ranging from
non-profit oriented collaborative activities as in Wikipedia and Github to
profit-oriented platforms as in Facebook and Reddit. Activities include
social networking, information propagation, job searching, building soft-
ware, information organization, discussions, and many others. Digital
platforms are composed of users, users’ interactions among themselves,
and the primary activities for which they are on the platform. In some
platforms, the later two may not be distinguishable. Users’ behaviour on
digital platforms are subject to similar judgements and issues as they face
in real-world interactions. For example. when two people interact in a
social gathering due to shared interests also interact in similar way when
online. What differentiates users’ experiences in digital societies from
physical real-world societies include (1) scale and efficiency of participa-
tion, and (2) the emergence of collective behaviour. While the former is
driven by innovative technology, the later is strictly a social dimension.
How can information in digital societies help to create better societies,
or what can we learn by investigating such platforms? Digital economies
exploit collective intelligence to design new products or improve existing
products. As well-known examples, Google uses information about link-
ages among web pages in its page rank algorithm to build useful search
engine, and Amazon uses big data on users’ collective interests and buy-
ing patterns to drive growth in business by building recommendation
engines. Such things make digital platforms unique in terms of data
sources for harnessing collective intelligence, since such data may not
be easily available in physical shops. In an analogous way, digital soci-
eties not only contain traces of economic preferences wherever possible,
but also a rich and diverse set of information on other aspects of indi-
vidual and collective behaviour. Analysing such behaviour can provide
fundamental insights into how people behave in digital spaces and real
world. This is because the fundamental nature of human and collective
behaviour is reflected in digital spaces due to the scale of participation
and complex interactions.
Above, there is no argument made to suggest that digital societies are
right or wrong in any way. What is being said is that it reflects fundamen-
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tal nature of human social behaviour which would otherwise be difficult
to infer in real world due to lack of large scale data. So if there is certain
section of society to spread misinformation and another section with cer-
tain characteristics is susceptible to it, we would expect such behaviour
to exist in digital societies as well. In that sense, existence of online echo
chambers reveals the nature of communications within communities of
people with exposure to self reinforcing beliefs. Understanding such na-
ture can help policy-makers develop better policies to build the society
and economy in a sustainable way, and also to engage citizens actively
in important issues.
Studying digital societies would therefore help to understand demo-
graphic preferences and behaviour at granular levels, to promote democ-
racy and participation of citizens, to identify social agents and issues
that threaten democracy, to make the traditional media more transpar-
ent, to develop public understanding on global issues and propose policy
changes, to build better educational and social platforms in future, and
to create opportunities for cultural integration and better integrations.
1.3 Research Questions, Analysis of Effects &
Mechanisms
1.3.1 Are digital learners influenced by their peers?
We study peer influence of production and consumption of projects in
the Scratch community, an online platform developed by MIT Media
Lab and targeted for young children, where users collectively learn pro-
gramming by creating and sharing projects. We investigate if Scratchers
are influenced by the popularity of their peers’ projects and their peers’
preferences for consuming from specific baskets of projects.
To estimate peer influence of a behaviour,1 we use exact matching
1This is in reference to the following published work:
Samantray A., Riccaboni M. (2019) “Peer Influence in Large Dynamic Network: Quasi-
experimental Evidence from Scratch.” In: Aiello L., Cherifi C., Cherifi H., Lambiotte R.,
Lió P., Rocha L. (eds) Complex Networks and Their Applications VII. COMPLEX NETWORKS
2018. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 813. Springer, Cham
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strategy to justify a random assignment of the peers’ behaviour across
experimental and control groups such that Scratchers in the experimental
group have peers with higher degree of the behaviour under study. Next,
conditional on interactions on the platform upto a given time, we mea-
sure peer influence as the difference in Scratchers’ future behavioural
changes across the two groups. This method ensures that peer influence
is captured after controlling for alternative mechanisms (like homophily)
that may lead to observed behavioural clustering in the followers net-
work.
We find2 that the popularity of Scratchers’ projects is significantly in-
fluenced by the production popularity of their peers. Testing for hetero-
geneity in influence, we find that Scratchers are not influenced by specific
peers who might have highly popular projects, instead it seems that they
are influenced by just the aggregate popularity of all peers. We find that
Scratchers who have a minimum activity of one month on the platform
are more susceptible to peer influence. Scratchers with high tendency
to create projects by rebuilding on existing projects on the platform tend
to have significant improvements in their future production popularity
(due to influence from peers’ production popularity) only in the short
term and not in the long run. We also disentangle a self decision making
mechanism from other mechanisms that might explain the channel of in-
fluence: we find that a significant proportion of the estimated influence
from peers is mediated via Scratchers’ decision to create new projects.
This highlights Scratchers’ subsequent behavioural decisions in response
to existing popularity of peers’ projects.
We find evidence of polarized consumption patterns on the platform,
i.e., there are certain groups of projects (discovered in an unsupervised
manner based on co-consumption patterns) for which Scratchers have
high specificity. We do not make claims about how such groups form
on the platform - for example, whether it is a conscious choice or is a
result of the way the platform is organized. However, we find that such
2This is in reference to the following published work:
Samantray A., Riccaboni M. (2020) “Peer influence of production and consumption be-
haviour in an online social network of collective learning.” Online Social Networks and Media
18, 100088
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polarization is not a consequence of Scratchers being influenced by their
peers’ consumption patterns.
1.3.2 When does homophily increase polarization?
We investigate how people’s beliefs can be polarized due to the spread
of fake information in social networks. In particular, we model how the
emergence of polarization can occur due to (i) precision or credibility of
fake information during its inception into the society, and (ii) homophily
in communication among people with differing beliefs. Homophily in
communication creates groups of people with bounded beliefs about re-
ality, and hence can polarize a society. Credibility of fake news circulat-
ing in the social network can lead to acceptance of the news (depending
on agents’ susceptibility to it), thereby changing beliefs and creating po-
larization. Hence both these factors, homophily in communication pat-
terns and credibility of information, are important determinants of po-
larization.
We conduct an empirical investigation3 of the effect of homophily in
communication patterns on the level of polarization. For this, we use evi-
dence from 11 years of Twitter conversations on the climate change topic.
There are two important findings. (i) Homophily and polarization are
entangled in a long run equilibrium, i.e., they are co-integrated, and they
both mean-revert to deviations away from equilibrium. (ii) Homophily
negatively affects polarization (Granger-causality sense), and the effect
holds only in the long run.
To understand better the mechanism behind the negative effect of ho-
mophily on polarization, a parsimonious mathematical model is devel-
oped that shows how polarization can emerge due to the joint effects
of precision of misinformation propagating in a social network and ho-
mophily in communication among agents in the social network with dif-
fering beliefs. Credibility of information contained in a message is mod-
elled as the precision (or inverse of variance) of the distribution of beliefs
3This is in reference to the following published work:
Samantray, A., Pin, P. (2019) “Credibility of climate change denial in social media.” Palgrave
Communications 5, 127
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from which the message can be considered as a random outcome. Es-
sentially, a particular communicated message says something about its
underlying belief and how precise the belief is. The model predicts that
fake news can not polarize the society unless it has a minimal level of
credibility, irrespective of the level of homophily.
Based on above analyses, we infer that anti-climate tweets do not
carry enough credibility to polarize the society.
1.3.3 Does politicization of news affect participation?
Do choices made by news media to politicize articles related to climate
change influence the collective discussion on such articles? Using arti-
cles published in the Guardian until 2018, we examine whether and how
politicization influences readers’ collective discussion.
We find a positive impact of politicization on readers’ participation
and response to the articles. We analysed impacts originating from (i)
macro attributes: (unknown) factors of perception associated to an article
when it is categorized in ‘Politics’ section, and (ii) micro attributes of
politicization: political inclinations of the entities within an article. We
find that the positive impact would be significant, in a counter-factual
scenario, if an article positioned in any section other than ’Politics’ were
to be repositioned in ‘Politics’ section.
The estimates suggest that micro attributes of an article affect the
number of users in its discussion, in particular, with at least 65% of such
participation being mediated by discussions becoming politicized by con-
textual entities related to the article but strictly absent in the article, thereby
suggesting a temporal effect of perception. We also find that the im-
pact of micro attributes on total comments, social feedbacks, and users’
engagement in discussion mediates with a high proportion (of at least
40%) through users who join discussion being influenced by politically
oriented contextual entities not mentioned in the article.
We investigate the risk preference of authors to politicize the content
of climate change articles. We do not find evidence that authors might
have increasing marginal benefits from collective attention to their arti-
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cles that result from their choices about micro attributes of politicization.
1.4 Implications of Research Findings
Today various online educational platforms facilitate collective ways of
learning. The literature on peer influence on educational outcomes presents
mixed evidences, i.e., both positive and negative influences. Since learn-
ing via educational platforms is gaining increasing interest, it is impor-
tant for future policy designs to know the real effect of peers’ activities
on the choices and educational outcomes of users. On the Scratch plat-
form which is targeted for young children to learn programming, we find
that users are influenced by the production popularity of their peers, but
not by their peers’ consumption patterns. We believe that understanding
such behavioural nature would be very helpful to design platforms in
future or improve technical components in existing platforms such that
the collective educational outcome can be greatly enhanced.
Polarization of beliefs is increasing in modern societies due to spread
of fake information in digital media, even on issues like climate change
which have extensive scientific documentation. In social networks, po-
larization may be confused with homophily in communication (commu-
nication among people having same beliefs) because they are highly cor-
related: polarization can cause homophily because it is a source of differ-
entiation, and homophily can cause polarization via echo chamber effect
where individual beliefs get reinforced. In the Twittersphere of climate
change conversations during 2007-2017, only homophily causes polar-
ization and not vice-versa. Also, the effect of homophily on polarization
is negative, which is surprising. We are able to explain this using a mech-
anism where the updating of beliefs accounts for the relative credibility
of fake information. The results potentially indicate that although detect-
ing fake news is important, detection and prevention of “credible fake
news” can be more helpful for the society at large. Probably, credibility
of information is one of the least quantitatively explored areas of how
people process information in various places (digital and physical) and
in various contexts (social, environmental, economic) despite its major
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significance.
Politicization of climate change in news media has the potential to
alter people’s perception about the climate change issue and hence the
gravity for climate action. How people perceive an issue can drive fu-
ture policies. We believe climate change action by the public pre- cedes
correct and neutral judgement about the issue both individually and col-
lectively. It is therefore important that journalists and authors of news
articles on climate change be aware about the impact they have on their
audience regarding an issue as sensitive as climate change. It is equally
important for the public to be aware about the fact that other people with
whom they might be interacting or discussing about climate change may
carry political inclinations from the articles they might have learnt about
on the web or elsewhere. The findings show that the public should en-
gage in some forms of scientific reading in order to gauge whether the
perceptions and beliefs formed by reading news articles are in line with
scientific evidences, or other forms of expert evidences and suggestions.
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Chapter 2
Peer Influence in Scratch,
an Educational Platform
2.1 Introduction
Today1 various online platforms facilitate learning by means of collective
activities. Peers’ behaviour can play an important role in various aspects
of one’s learning process [3]. Peers’ behaviour can play an important
role in various aspects of one’s learning process [3]. Knowing the real
impact of peers activities on the choices and performance outcomes of
users in learning environments is therefore important for business and
economic policy designers. For instance, knowledge of such behavioural
nature would be useful to design better platforms where the collective
educational outcome is maximized.
How co-learners influence educational and social outcomes has been
studied extensively in physical contexts like schools and universities [4,
1This chapter is based on the following two published works:
1. Samantray A., Riccaboni M. (2019) “Peer Influence in Large Dynamic Network: Quasi-
experimental Evidence from Scratch.” In: Aiello L., Cherifi C., Cherifi H., Lambiotte R.,
Lió P., Rocha L. (eds) Complex Networks and Their Applications VII. COMPLEX NETWORKS
2018. Studies in Computational Intelligence, vol 813. Springer, Cham [1],
2. Samantray A., Riccaboni M. (2020) “Peer influence of production and consumption be-
haviour in an online social network of collective learning.” Online Social Networks and Media
18, 100088 [2].
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5]. With the advent of various online education media and many users
joining such sites, it is important to study peer influence in digital plat-
forms as well. Such platforms usually encourage learning by various
forms of collective interactions such as discussions in forums, building
collaborative projects, private communications, and others [6]. A pos-
sibility of peer influence arises since users are usually aware of others’
shared activities. In this study, we investigate peer influence in the Scratch
platform which has a structure of learning through collective activities.
Scratch, made public in 2007, is an online community designed by the
MIT Media Lab for young people to learn programming. Scratchers pro-
duce and share visual projects built using programming codes. Scratch-
ers consume others’ projects in different ways which include viewing,
commenting, loving, downloading, etc. Scratchers can know about the
activities of their peers, other users whom they “follow” on the platform,
via activity feeds and also by manual visits to their project pages. This
creates a potential channel of influence on various behaviours. In the first
five years of Scratch’s public activities [7], during which about 1 million
users joined the platform and about 2 million projects were created, we
investigate peer influence on two behaviours – one relates to production
of projects, and the other relates to consumption of projects. In partic-
ular we investigate (i) how the popularity of peers’ projects influences
Scratchers’ future behaviour and production popularity, and (ii) how
peers’ consumption preference/specificity influences Scratchers’ prefer-
ences to consume similar projects.
Understanding of peer influence estimation has been shaped by con-
tributions from academics and practitioners in various fields including
marketing, sociology, and economics. To infer peer influence, the most
ideal situation would be to impute peers’ behaviour at random and mea-
sure its average effect on Scratchers’ behaviour. Marketing scientists
have used such behavioural imputations in various online platforms to
measure peer influence [8, 9]. However such experimental situations are
usually not feasible, especially in non-artificial circumstances, for sev-
eral reasons including ethics and permissions to perform such exper-
iments [10, 11, 12]. In non-experimental settings, obtaining unbiased
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estimates of peer influence is a challenging task because both individ-
uals and their peers can affect each others’ behaviour (reflection prob-
lem [13]), and so observed clustering of behaviour in networks is often
a result of the following effects: own tendency for the behaviour, peers’
influence on behaviour, and exogenous and endogenous network for-
mation processes (homophily, selection, reciprocity, etc.) that lead to ob-
served peers’ behaviour. Dynamic observations help to separate changes
in individual behaviour due to peers’ influence from effects arising due
to alternative mechanisms. Sociologists have used agent-based models
[14, 15, 16, 17, 18] to explain the coevolution of network and behaviour.
However, the state-of-the-art implementation of this method is compu-
tationally inefficient for the case when network is populated by a large
number of agents. Economists have used estimation strategies that usu-
ally require strong assumptions [19, 20] and are specific to the structural
models employed [21]. Sometimes exogenous component of peer influ-
ence (arising from past) is not estimated separately from the contempo-
raneous effect arising due to simultaneous determination of network for-
mation and behavioural influence [22].
Figure 1: PEER INFLUENCE MECHANISM (PRODUCTION POPULARITY)
Peers' Production Popularity Production Popularity in Future
Projects Created in Future
Popularity of peers’ projects affects the popularity of Scratchers’ projects in future (solid
path). A significant proportion of such peer influence on production popularity is mediated
via Scratchers’ creation of new projects in future (dotted path).
We employ a quasi-experimental method to identify peer influence.
We assume Scratchers have a Markov nature of decision making, i.e.,
their decisions about future actions (e.g., whom to follow, what to pro-
duce and consume) are based solely on the current state of activities on
18
the platform. Conditional on all activities upto a given time t, we esti-
mate peer influence at t on a future time t + j as the effect of peers’ be-
havioural state at t on Scratchers’ subsequent change in behaviour upto
t+ j. The quasi-experiment consists of observations at two time periods
– t, t + j – and treatment status is assigned at t based on the intensity
of peers’ behaviour (high or low) at t2. The treated group has Scratchers
whose peers have high degree of behaviour under study. To conceptu-
alize the treatment status as a random assignment, the control group is
adjusted by matching exactly on personal and peers’ characteristics of
Scratchers in the treated group such that all confounding factors are bal-
anced across the two groups. Below are the main results and contribu-
tions of our investigation:
• If peers’ projects are popular (as measured by accumulated ‘loves’
on the projects) at t, the popularity of Scratchers’ projects increases
in future periods. This effect is persistent, and the marginal ef-
fect tends to decrease over time. We provide robustness checks for
this finding to ensure that the estimates are not sensitive to certain
threshold values chosen for the analysis.
• We find several evidences of susceptibility of Scratchers to peer in-
fluence. For example, a minimum engagement of about a month on
the platform makes Scratchers more susceptible to such influence,
however higher engagement does not necessarily increase the sus-
ceptibility.
• Remixing is a key property of the Scratch platform – users can build
projects on top of existing projects by modifying or introducing
new elements. Developers, users whose projects tend to be mostly
remixed and not new projects, are highly susceptible to peers’ per-
formance in the short term. Free-style producers, Scratchers who
create new and remixed projects in similar proportions, tend to be
influenced in later periods only and not in the immediate period.
2The definition of treatment follows directly from the Markovian nature of decision
making by Scratchers. The treatment, peers’ behavioural state at t, is a measure that sum-
marizes peers’ behaviour upto t. It captures only the cumulative information of peers’
behaviour upto t and neglects the historical pattern of its evolution.
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• As documented in Fig. 1, we investigate if the observed peer influ-
ence in production popularity is caused due to production-related
decisions made by Scratchers. A large fraction of the total effect of
peers’ production quality on Scratchers’ future production popu-
larity is mediated via their creation of new projects in future. This
channel emphasizes the role of decision-making under influence
of peers’ behaviour. We provide details of using causal mediation
analysis [23] to obtain this finding. We conduct robustness checks
to ensure validity of the finding.
• Aggregate consumption patterns of Scratchers is highly polarized.
They tend to consume projects from specific communities only. The
‘specific communities’ used are identified by us using unsuper-
vised techniques, and signify ‘consumption baskets’.3 However,
we find that consumption polarization is not a result of peer in-
fluence. Scratchers are not influenced by their peers’ consumption
patterns – if peers tend to ‘favorite’ projects from a specific commu-
nity of projects, it does not influence Scratchers to develop a similar
preference in future.
• For peer influence analysis and validations conducted above, we
use exact matching to obtain control or counter-factual group where
Scratchers are similar to those in the treated group except for the
peers’ behaviour under study; this helps to minimize bias to a large
extent, compared to using propensity score matching [24]. By en-
suring balance of peers’ characteristics (in addition to individual
characteristics) we control not only for homophily [24], but also for
other confounding effects including selection and endogenous pro-
cesses involved in network formation [16], and own behavioural
tendencies.
In the next section (Section 2.2), we describe the Scratch platform and
the data we analyze in more details. We also describe the measures used
for peer influence analysis here. This is followed by, in Section 2.3, a
3The intuition is similar to clustering products in a supermarket: products that are often
consumed together are classified into the same group.
20
Figure 2: PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION PERSPECTIVES OF A PROJECT
IN SCRATCH 2.0
(a) A project is produced by composing various sprites that have codes, images, and
sound associated to them. (b) A shared project is available to other users for consumption
activities like viewing, downloading, loving, and commenting.
detailed description of the methods we use to identify peer influence
and the results of peer influence analysis. In Section 2.4, we investigate
the causal mediating mechanism of peer influence, i.e., how Scratchers’
react in response to peers’ production popularity which enhances their
own popularity in future. Finally, in Section 2.5, we make a discussion
based on our findings, and provide suggestions for further research.
2.2 Data: Scratch Community
Data from March 2007 to March 2012 was provided by the MIT Media
Lab under the Scratch Research Data Sharing Agreement [7]. It consists
of various metadata, corresponding to the descriptions below, of all users
and their friendship formations, and of all the projects created during
this period. Hence this forms a complete data set of time-stamped users’
friendship network and production and consumption of projects for the
first 5 years.
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We analyze users’ behaviour in the Scratch community.4 Users come
from various countries. The platform, designed for children in schools,
serves as an educational media to collectively learn programming by cre-
ating and sharing interactive objects. An interactive object created on
the platform is called a project, which is usually an animation, game,
or simulation created using the Scratch programming language (SPL)
[25]. Projects are composed from animated objects called sprites. SPL
employs drag-and-drop programming method to create projects, using
Scratch Authoring Environment (SAE), by assembling basic visual ele-
ments called blocks. The online platform was created in March 2007. SPL
has had two major development versions - Scratch 1.x (1.0 to 1.4) and
Scratch 2.0 (released in May 2013). To build or edit a project in 1.x ver-
sions, users had to download the Scratch editor software (offline version)
to access the SAE. Users could then (optionally) share the projects in the
online community. In version 2.0, which replaced 1.x, users can access
SAE both online and offline.
In the Scratch community users can (i) produce projects, (ii) consume
projects, (iii) follow other users as friends, and (iv) create and comment
on galleries. Such collective action in Scratch community is analogous
to activities in the social media platform Facebook where contents (posts
or status updates) are produced and consumed by the platform users,
and users can also follow each other. Projects created (Fig. 2(a)) on the
Scratch platform can be of two types - new, and remix. A new project, as is
suggestive, is a fresh project created by a user and shared on the website.
A remix project shared by a user is a project that is created by modifying
an already existing project (new/remix) on the platform. After a project
is shared by a user, it can be consumed (Fig. 2(b)) by other users on the
platform. Consumption of a project on the Scratch website refers to the
following interactions with the project by logged-in users: viewing, down-
loading, loving, commenting, and favoriting. Each form of consumption of
a project by a user is recorded only once - the first time the user inter-
acts with it. Views, downloads, and loves of a project are anonymous
4Scratch (https://scratch.mit.edu) is an online educational platform created and main-
tained by the Lifelong Kindergarten Group at MIT Media Lab.
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records, i.e, the names of the users who interacted with the project by
such forms are not recorded. Friendships represent unidirectional rela-
tionships between users. A user can choose to follow any other user on
the platform. Once logged in, a user can see the latest projects of the
users he is following in a dedicated section. Users can also create gal-
leries which are collections of projects. Users can view and comment on
galleries. Projects and galleries can also be tagged by their creators. Tag
names are not pre-defined on the platform, and new tag names are cre-
ated when users tag projects and galleries with non-existing tag names.
Projects and galleries can have common tags names.
Additionally, selected projects are displayed in the front page of the
Scratch website due to various criteria (most remixed, most viewed, etc.).
This selection is automated. Within each category, the three most recently
added projects are displayed at any given point. There is a section on the
front page for featured projects (three projects at a given time); projects in
this section are manually added by users who are Scratch website admin-
istrators based on popularity and appeal of projects. For galleries, there
are two sections on the front page, one is a section called featured gal-
leries, and the other is called studio design. Addition of galleries to these
sections are controlled by administrators. A user can at some point be as-
signed as a curator by administrator. The curator selects projects for the
Scratch website’s front page section labelled ‘Curated By’. This section
displays three recent projects selected by the curator. There is only one
active curator at a time.
The dedicated section where Scratchers can see the activities of their
peers in real-time is called ‘What’s Happening?’ [26]. Here Scratchers can
see the following recent activities of their peers – sharing (creation) of
projects, remixing, love-its, favorites, following (users, studios). This is
an important channel of information about peers’ activities; if a Scratcher
is following many others, he would most likely be influenced by activi-
ties of those which appear frequently via this feed. It is important to note
that a Scratcher can know which projects his peers are favoriting via ac-
tivity feed, however the projects which receive the favorite clicks do not
show such counts on the project page. We see in Fig. 2(b) that favorites
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Figure 3: JOINING OF USERS AND CREATION OF PROJECTS
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Panel A shows the joining of 1,056,950 users during each year from March 2007 to March
2012. The evolution is grouped into major clusters of countries. Panel B shows the number
of projects created daily upto March 2012. A total of 1,928,699 projects were created
during the period.
(star symbol) count are visible, however this is for the latest version of
Scratch. During the period 2007-12 for which data is available, SPL ver-
sions 1.x were in place, and favorites count was not visible on the project
page. The love-it counts (and all other forms of consumption except fa-
vorites) on the other hand are shown on the project pages, and is public
information; this forms the difference between favorites and love-its.
A schematic representation of interactions on the platform as dis-
cussed above is shown in Fig. 23. Technical details about data quality
(missing data, possibly spurious data) are documented in [7]. Wherever
required for this study, we discuss the data quality during our analysis.
2.2.1 Users, Projects
1,056,950 users joined the Scratch community in the first 5 years (Fig.
3A) and 1,928,699 projects were created during this period (Fig. 3B). The
clusters in Fig. 3A are obtained using K-means clustering with five clus-
ters; Taiwan Group is a set of nine countries. The most distinguishing
24
trends are born by US and UK, and there was a spike in the number of
users from Thailand during 2010. We mention some statistics to describe
active users on the platform. (i) There are 427,110 users with at least one
non-anonymous activity. Since anonymous records include only certain
forms of consumption of projects (views, downloads, loves), a large frac-
tion of users in the data are pure consumers. (ii) There are 195,649 users
who have interacted (at least one kind of recorded activity) in more than
one month (months need not be consecutive). This value does not in-
clude users who might have interacted more than one month, but their
interactions each month is not recorded (i.e., they only viewed, down-
loaded, or loved projects). (iii) There are 304,793 users (28%) who created
at least one project. This is the sub-population that contributed to the 2
million projects during the five years.
2.2.2 Measures used for analysis
We mention the measures used for production popularity and consump-
tion preference.
Production Popularity There are various observable measures that con-
vey information about popularity of a project. These include counts of
love-its, downloads, and comments. (These measures for a project are
highly likely to be determined at a narrow time interval, most likely af-
ter a user has viewed and interacted with the project.) Favorites count is
not observable as a consumption statistic on project page, multiple com-
ments can be made on a project by a single consumer, and downloads
count has data issues (the count is supposed to be one per user, but mul-
tiple count was found for some users). So we choose love-it as our mea-
sure of pouplarity; one consumer can love a project once only. Although
there is no platform-specific measure for a project’s quality, the love-its
received on a project supposedly captures the quality of the project, as
assessed by consumers who viewed the project.
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Consumption Specificity For consumption preference of a Scratcher,
we look at the consumption source (a group of projects) from which he
consumes (favorites) the most. We identify several consumption sources
using unsupervised learning from the networkPfavorites, where the nodes
represent projects and an edge between two nodes represents the num-
ber of users who have favorited both the nodes. The choice of algorithm
to detect consumption sources does not affect the nature of our results,
as presented in Section 2.3. We use the five big communities detected in
Pfavorites as the set of all sources. A.2 contains details about consump-
tion sources and about consumption behaviour, in general, on Scratch
platform.
2.2.3 Assortativity in Behaviour
A friendship network is formed by Scratchers following each other on
the platform. This can lead to observations of behavioural similarities
among Scratchers and their neighbours. We look at how two attributes
– production popularity and consumption preference – are clustered in
the network.
We measure clustering in behaviour using the assortative mixing co-
efficients [27], considering numeric and categorical values for production
and consumption behaviours respectively. The evolution of the assor-
tativity values are shown in Fig. 4. The coefficients are significant at
1% level, tested using null model obtained by random shuffling of all
edges in the friendship network. (As a comparative reference, the evo-
lution of clustering based on similarity of Scratchers’ countries is also
shown.) There is no trend for clustering according to production popu-
larity and there is high clustering based on consumption preference. Fig.
4 also shows subsets of the network in December 2010. Edges of the sub-
graph for production popularity are not shown (for clarity of visualiza-
tion); snapshots are plotted using ForceAtlas2 algorithm [28], so nodes
in closer vicinity represent closer neighbours. Scratchers having same
consumption sources are clustered and the pattern is dense. Scratchers
with similar production popularity are however not clustered – since the
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Figure 4: ASSORTATIVE MIXING IN FRIENDSHIP NETWORK
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The evolution of assortativity coefficients for production popularity and consumption
source. For a given month, assortativity is calculated using all edges in the network upto
that month. Assortativity for country attribute is shown as a reference. The evolution
pattern seems to be stable after November 2008. Insets show subsets of the network at
December 2010 to visualize the assortativity values.
measure has many values, we rescaled the colors to have more weight
on high values – users with high values of popularity are not clustered
and are distributed throughout.
Observations of behavioural clustering in network (Fig. 4) can arise
due to several mechanisms, including peer influence. To identify if peer
influence actually exists, other mechanisms that induce clustering in be-
haviour need to be controlled [29, 30]. We investigate this in the follow-
ing section.
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2.3 Peer Influence Analysis
Here we study the effect of Scratchers’ friendship network on their pro-
duction and consumption of projects.
For production behaviour, we study the popularity effect – whether
the popularity of projects created by a Scratcher increases (or decreases) if
his peers’ projects are popular. For consumption behaviour, we study the
preference effect – if peers of a Scratcher consume (by favoriting) projects
from a certain source, does the Scratcher tend to consume projects from
the same source in future?
We first describe our methodology, and next we present the results.
2.3.1 Methods
Potential Issues To set the terminology, the focal node or focal actor in
a network is called the ego and ego’s immediate neighbours are called
alters or peers. We want to infer if peers’ behaviour influences ego’s
behaviour. Individuals in a dynamic social network may interact due
to many reasons, leading to a simultaneous evolution of network and
behaviour of individuals. Some of these reasons established in the lit-
erature include [31, 32, 33, 34, 16] exogenous network formation due to
homophily and selection, endogenous network formation due to reci-
procity and transitivity, peer influence on behaviour, own influence on
behaviour, and contexts that lead to certain network-behaviour dynam-
ics. Therefore estimating peer influence using a cross-sectional obser-
vation is prone to effects coming from other unwanted reasons, some
of which can be of confounding nature. In estimating peers’ influence
on behaviour, confounding factors are those factors that affect both the
ego’s behaviour and the peers’ behaviour under study. All reasons men-
tioned above are potentially confounding. An unbiased estimation of
peer influence therefore requires control over such confounding factors.
Dynamic observations facilitate the separation of co-evolution issues -
for example, homophily and influence.
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Scenario & Assumptions A Scratcher’s primary activities are produc-
ing and consuming projects and galleries. The Scratcher (ego) has the
option to follow the creators (peers) of projects – which he likes during
random browsing, which he likes in galleries, or interesting projects that
appear on the front page of the website. Through activity feeds, the ego
knows about consumption (love-its, favorites) and production (projects
sharing, remixing) activities of his peers. So we can expect that the ego’s
activities might be influenced by his peers, in addition to his own tenden-
cies to produce and consume projects. At a given time, the ego can also
browse through the projects of his peers to see the production and con-
sumption statistics. These statistics, like comments count on a project,
are the aggregate comments the project has received till this moment. So
at a given time, we can assume that the Scratcher has knowledge about
his peers and aggregate statistics of their activities (total projects, total
loves received, etc.).
In measuring peer influence at a given time, we assume that the Scratcher
is influenced only by the aggregate activities of his peers upto this time
and not by the history of such activities. It is very unlikely that a Scratcher
remembers the exact history of his peers’ activities. For example, con-
sider a Scratcher with just one peer, and we are interested to investigate
the peer influence of projects count: we assume that the total projects
produced by the peer upto a given time influences the Scratcher on how
many projects he produces next, and he is not particularly influenced
by the exact number of projects his peer produced during the last week
(or any particular historical period in general). This behaviour is termed
mathematically as Markovian. Markov nature of decision making is a
very plausible assumption in the scenario of Scratch community. This
property has been widely adopted in the social networks literature - for
example, in stochastic actor oriented models [14], future decision of net-
work or behaviour change made by an actor is conditioned on the net-
work and behaviour in the present state. Essentially, under Markov as-
sumption all variables of interest are represented as state variables at the
time peer influence is evaluated.
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Quasi-experiment We define peer influence of a behaviour bpeers at a
time t on ego’s behaviour bego at time t+ j (j = 1, 2, ..) as the exogenous
influence of peers’ state of behaviour (known to ego) at t, btpeers, on ego’s
state of behaviour at t+j, bt+jego . State variables at t summarize behaviours
upto time t and form the basis of ego’s decisions at t (Markov nature). To
measure peer influence, treatment status is assigned using a binary vari-
able Trt which is based on a threshold value of btpeers. All Scratchers (en-
tire population) at t are distributed into two groups: treated and control;
Scratchers in the treated group (Trt = 1) have high values of btpeers, and
those in the control group (Trt = 0) have low values of btpeers and serve as
the counterfactual. At this point, treatment is likely to be correlated with
several confounding variables, and so treatment effect estimates would
be biased. So we obtain a subset of the population at t, by matching ex-
actly on confounding variables, such that treatment can be justified to be
randomly assigned across treated and control groups in the subset. In
this sub-sample, having controlled for possible confounding effects, we
capture the effect of treatment on change in behaviour of treated group
(∆bt→t+jego = b
t+j
ego − btego | Trt = 1) and compare it with the counterfactual
effect (∆bt→t+jego | Trt = 0). Peer influence at t is thus measured as the dif-
ference of the future changes in behaviour bego across treated and control
groups. This forms the basis for peer influence estimation under a quasi-
experimental setting. Below we present the empirical implementation
and discuss the validity of our method.
Implementation We employ an ego-centric regression framework to
assess, at time t, the effect of being treated on ego’s future change in
behaviour.
∆bt→t+ji = α
j + βjpeer Tr
t
i
+ βj1N
t
i + β
j
2X
t
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
confounders are
balanced across Trt∈{0,1}
+ εt→t+ji , j = {1, 2, 3, ...}
(2.1)
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∆bt→t+ji is the change in behaviour b of ego i from time t to t + j. All
explanatory variables represent behavioural state at t, measured as an
aggregate operation on observed behaviour upto t. For example, to rep-
resent the comments behaviour of ego at t, we use the total comments
made by the ego upto t as the state variable at t. Trti is the treatment
variable – the variable of interest that represents peers’ behaviour at t. It
is a binary variable – values 1 and 0 are assigned to egos in the treated
and control groups respectively. Under absence of selection bias, βjpeer
represents the average treatment effect on change in future behaviour.
Treatment status Trti for ego i can change over time (i.e., a Scratcher who
is in the treated group today can be in the control group at another time)
because the ego is assigned to either treated or control group based on
peers’ behavioural state at t. Hence estimates βjpeer are conditional on
time t. N ti represents ego’s network variables at time t. In general, it
can incorporate information of the entire network of ego upto neigh-
bours at any distance. However, for practical purpose it is sufficient
to include characteristics of ego’s local network (immediate neighbours)
only – structural properties of ego’s network (e.g., out-degree, in-degree,
reciprocity), various behaviours of peers (excluding the behaviour rep-
resented by the treatment variable), and structural properties of peers’
local network. Xti represents various characteristics of the ego at time
t. It includes the dependent behaviour b under study as well to capture
auto-correlation of behaviour, or in other words, ego’s own tendency. In
this study we use monthly windows – t is the time at a month’s end,
t + 1 is the time at the end of next month, t + 2 is the time at the end
of 2 subsequent months from t, and so on. We have included all poten-
tial confounders in the sets of covariates Xt and N t which could be ob-
served in the available data. Potential confounders consist of those vari-
ables which, conceptually,5 can affect both Trti and ∆b
t→t+j
i , and hence
neglecting such variables can bias the peer influence estimates.
5For example, ego’s own behaviour at time t is conceptually a determining factor of his
peers’ behaviour at t (possibly due to homophily), and also his future behaviour. Hence
neglecting such a variable in Xt can bias the peer influence estimates upwards. However
it is noteworthy that, in the data, all conceptual confounders need not be statistically sig-
nificant.
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Preprocessing for covariates balance Exact matching is used as a pre-
processing step prior to estimating (2.1) in order to achieve balance in
confounding variables across treated and control groups. Regression
analysis following the matching step leads to statistically consistent es-
timates [35]. We implement one-to-many exact matching, in which each
treated unit is matched to multiple units in the control group having ex-
actly the same values of the matched variables [36, 35]. Each matched
control unit has weight proportional to the number of treatment units
to which it is matched, and the sum of the control weights is equal to
the number of uniquely matched control units. Unmatched units have
weights equal to 0, and matched treated units have weight 1. The regres-
sion analysis that follows matching uses weights corresponding to each
unit produced during matching stage [35]. Exact matching costs data, so
we exploit high correlations among variables to obtain balanced samples
by matching only on subsets of (important) confounders. Eventually, for
regression analysis, we use samples which produces the best balance (re-
duces bias in regression estimates), and also retains a good sample size
(reduces variance of regression estimates). Variables which remain un-
balanced are included at the regression stage as controls. Balance in mo-
del variables in (2.1) is assessed by difference in weighted means of vari-
ables across treated and control groups. Balance is assessed on all mo-
del variables, including those that are excluded from matching analysis.
For a given matched sample, with a good balance of the post-matched
variables across treated and control groups, regression estimates are not
supposed to change dramatically across different models.
Summary of steps involved We summarize the practical steps involved
in estimating peer influence using the method presented above. (i) de-
termine model variables, i.e., all potential confounders (ii) dichotomize
treatment, if needed (iii) determine selection into treatment, i.e., statisti-
cally significant confounders (iv) match exactly on (subset of) confounders
to achieve balance (v) estimate model using OLS.
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Figure 5: ACCUMULATION OF LOVE-ITS
(Popularity)
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The pathways leading to accumulation of love-its. After creation and sharing of a project,
love-its on the project can accumulate from views by (1) followers of its creator, (2) users
who view it when it appears on the front page (after it becomes popular due to various
factors), (3) followers of shared creators of a gallery where the project appears, and (4)
random views on the project due to users’ browsing.
Internal Validity We want to obtain unbiased estimates βjpeer of the
treatment effect in (2.1). Since we do not expect reverse-causality issues,
selection bias is the most important source of bias. This arises due to con-
founding factors that affect both the treatment and future change in ego’s
behaviour, and are not affected by the treatment itself or by anticipation
of treatment. Same intensity of selection bias across treated and control
groups can justify a random assignment of treatment, and minimize al-
ternative mechanisms. (a) Exact matching as a preprocessing step and
including controls in the regression stage help to minimize selection bias
due to observable factors. We control for exogenous network formation
processes, homophily and selection, by accounting for balance in ego’s
characteristics and peers’ characteristics [16]. Endogenous network for-
mation processes like general tendency to follow Scratchers (out-degree)
and tendency to follow one’s followers (reciprocity) can be confounding,
so we control for such factors as well. Change in future behaviour can
also depend on the level of behaviour at t, and this is a major confounder
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because Scratchers in the treated group are more likely to have higher
behavioural levels because of correlation between peers’ behaviour and
ego’s behaviour. We therefore always include this factor in all matching
analysis; the sub-samples have exact levels of behaviour across treated
and control groups before the onset of change in behaviour. (b) Com-
parison of future change in ego’s behaviour with a counterfactual group
takes care of selection into treatment due to unobservable factors, as
long as such factors are time-invariant. (c) The treatment variable is di-
chotomized [35] before matching analysis according to certain thresholds
that suggest high or low levels of behaviour. We conduct analysis for var-
ious thresholds to ensure that peer influence estimates are not extremely
sensitive to such choices of thresholds.
2.3.2 Results
For estimating peer influence on production popularity and consump-
tion specificity, we follow the steps mentioned in previous section (Meth-
ods). We found presence of statistically significant peer influence only
for production behaviour. In the remaining part of this section, we pro-
vide empirical details of peer influence for production behaviour and an
outline of the empirical study for consumption behaviour.
Production Popularity
A Scratcher accumulates love-its on a project he created when another
Scratcher (consumer), either his follower or a random user, who views
the project finds it interesting (most likely due to project quality) and
clicks the love-it button. If the project receives a lot of attention (as in-
ferred by love-its, comments, downloads, etc.), it can be selected to ap-
pear on the front page. This selection can be system-based or by admins.
The project can also appear in some galleries. These would most likely
increase viewership for the project, and the project is subject to more
love-its. Fig. 5 shows a schematic diagram of the process of accumula-
tion of love-its. All factors that affect the quantity and quality of projects
created by a Scratcher, and the total views on all his projects are predic-
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Figure 6: PEER INFLUENCE ONE MONTH AHEAD
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Estimates of regression (2.1) for t = Dec 2010 and j = 1 using samples obtained by
matching on (a) X variables and (b) both X and N variables. In (a) and (b), Model 1
includes only peers’ attributes (N ), and not egos’s attributes (X), as controls. The effect of
peers’ production popularity (Peers Love-its) on Scratchers’ change in production
popularity next month, β1peer , is significant at 1% level. See Table 8 for variables
description, Table 11 for details of matched samples, and Table 12 for details of estimates.
tive of his popularity (measured as total love-its). In reference to model
(2.1), these factors are of types Xti (ego’s attributes) and N
t
i (ego’s local
network structure, peers’ observable characteristics, peers’ local network
structure), and are selected acording to the criteria mentioned in previ-
ous section (Methods). The measures of covariates Xti and N
t
i represent
the respective behavioural states at the time t of peer influence evalua-
tion (see Table 8).
The treatment variable of interest is popularity of peers’ projects at t
(Trti); since it is not a binary measure, we dichotomize as
Trti =
{
1 PQti ∈ (cmin, cmax]
0 PQti ∈ [0, cmin),
(2.2)
where PQti, the sum of all love-its on all projects upto t of all peers of i, is
the measure for peers’ popularity for ego i at time t, and cmin and cmax
are self-chosen values representing minimum and maximum threshold
values respectively. (We shall see later how the chosen thresholds affect
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the results.) Our dependent variables of interest are future changes in
production popularity of ego i:
∆bt→t+ji = b
t+j
i − b
t
i, j = 1, 2, ..,
where bsi represents the total love-its accumulated by all projects of ego
i upto time s. Peer influence estimation is conditional on time t; to have
sufficient observations, we begin by analyzing in the stable period of the
data: the month of December, 2010. (t represents the end of Dec, 2010
and t + 1 is the end of Jan, 2011.) We use the median value of peers’
popularity at t as cmin and the maximum value of PQt as cmax.
Figure 7: ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR PEER INFLUENCE ONE MONTH AHEAD
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Effect of varying threshold values of cmin and cmax on estimates evaluated on samples
obtained by matching on (a) X variables, and (b) both X and N variables. (t = Dec 2010,
j = 1) Panels A: Estimate of βpeer , controlling for both X and N variables in the
regression. Panels B: Ratio of average of future changes in production popularity of
treated and control groups.
In Table 10 (columns 1,2), we see that almost all variables (included
in model as potential confounders) are valid model variables. To learn
which of the potential confounders are important, i.e., affect treatment
36
variable and hence can lead to selection bias, we perform logistic regres-
sions of treatment Trti on covariates X
t
i and N
t
i . As shown in columns
3 and 4 of Table 10, we perform two such regressions: first with only
Xti variables and next with all variables. Having determined the sig-
nificant confounders from this analysis, we perform exact matching on
(all or subset of) such confounders across treated (Trti = 1) and control
(Trti = 0) groups with an immediate goal to have balance of all vari-
ables – includes all potential confounders, irrespective of their statistical
significance in logistic regression – across both groups. Balance is deter-
mined by the difference in weighted average values of the variables in
each group. We obtain two reduced datasets:
1. sample obtained by exact matching only on allXti variables that are
significant (Table 10, col. 3). This is done to (i) compare our method
with Aral [24], which matches on all individual (ego) characteris-
tics, and (ii) show that our results are robust to matching strategies
that produce good balance,
2. sample obtained by exact matching on a subset of all (Xti and N
t
i )
variables that are significant (Table 10, col. 4). Matching exactly,
especially with N ti variables was found to be very costly, and so
only few variables were used. Among all combinations of variables
we investigated, we present the one with best balance. This sample
is less biased than the one in (a), and also has more observations
because matching is performed on less covariates.
We show balance for all variables (difference in averages of variables
by treatment groups) in Table 11. Although we do not use, we show
balance produced by matching via propensity score method, as used by
[24]; this method produced almost no improvement (as compared with
the original imbalance in the full sample) in covariates balance. Having
balanced samples, we can assume we are in a scenario where treatment
(high popularity of peers) has been randomly assigned to each Scratcher
(ego). The quantitatively small imbalances that still remain for some co-
variates are controlled during the regression stage.
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Figure 8: PERSISTENCE OF PEER INFLUENCE
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(a) Estimates of βjpeer , the effect of peers’ production popularity at t = Dec 2010 on
production popularity at future periods t+ j, for varying j. Inset shows the ratio of future
changes in production popularity of treated and control groups. Sample in Table 11(a)
obtained by matching egos’ characteristics Xt is used for evaluation. (b) Same estimators
as in (a), using sample in Table 11(b) obtained by matching individual and peers’
characteristics. (c) A general persitence curve, showing the average βjpeer during July-Dec
2010, i.e., for each j-periods ahead influence, the plot shows its average value calculated
for each month during July-Dec 2010. Error bars are scaled standard deviations of βjpeer .
Inset shows the ratio of mean future changes in production popularity of treated and
control groups. Sample in Table 11(b) is used.
Fig. 6 shows the estimated coefficients for (2.1) with j = 1, i.e., the
effect of peers’ production popularity on Scratchers’ production popu-
larity the next period. Estimates are shown separately for two cases, cor-
responding to the two reduced datasets. For each matched sample, we
see that the estimated model coefficients are stable across various specifi-
cations and the peer influence coefficient βj=1peer is positive. In both cases,
β1peer is significant at 1% level. Details of regressions corresponding to (a)
and (b) in Fig. 6 are available in Table 12. The identification of β1peer re-
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lies on random assignment of observations to treated and control groups.
Achieving a good balance of covariates across both groups and including
covariates as controls in regressions minimizes selection bias to a large
extent. However, another source of non-random treatment assignment
lies in the definition of Trti variable which depends on the chosen val-
ues of cmin and cmax. The results in Fig. 6 use one pair of values; so we
need to check whether peer influence estimate remains significant and
how it varies when threshold values cmin and cmax change. Fig. 7 shows
this robustness analysis. Since β1peer is the primary coefficient of our in-
terest (peer influence), we plot these estimates for changing threshold
values, as shown in panels labelled A. All estimates of β1peer are postive
and significant at 1% level. For each value of cmin, peer influence es-
timate tends to decrease with increase in cmax. Panels labelled B show
the ratio of weighted means of outcome ∆bt→t+1 variables in treated and
control groups, a measure of relative comparision of outcomes without
any post-matching adjustment for confounders.
Above, we provided details of the peer effect of production popular-
ity in the immediate period (j = 1) using the network existing at the end
of December 2010 (t). Popularity of peers’ projects at time t might influ-
ence the popularity of a Scratcher’s (ego) projects in subsequent periods
as well; in model (2.1) this corresponds to values of j as 2, 3, and so on.
To see if there is persistence of peer influence in subsequent periods, we
estimate βjpeer for various j by changing the dependent variables in (2.1).
Since we are looking at the effect of peers’ popularity at time t on pe-
riod t+ j, the treatment assignment Trti , and hence the reduced datasets
obtained by exact matching, remains the same as in the analysis for Fig.
6 and Fig. 7. The results for persistence of peer effect are shown in Fig.
8(a) and Fig. 8(b) . The effect of peers’ popularity at t on Scratchers’ (ego)
production popularity at a future period t+ j increases with subsequent
periods. The rate of increase tends to steep up during the middle term
and tends to flatten out in the long term, thereby creating a S-shape for
the structure of persistence curve. This shape is more prominent in Fig.
8(b), compared to 8(a), where the balance in underlying matched sample
is better (Table 11).
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Persistence curves at two different times are ideally not comparable
because treatment assignment on Scratchers (ego) can vary from one pe-
riod to another. So performing peer influence analysis at a time t̃ different
from the one we have used in above analysis (t = Dec, 2010) requires ob-
taining a balanced, preferably the least biased, sample at t̃ (by matching
exactly on confounders that are significant at t̃, which may differ from
those at t). However, assuming that the users’ behaviour to be stable
over the last six months of 2010, we can assume that the selection into
treatment in each of these months (t) follows a similar pattern as we saw
above. So we create reduced samples by exactly matching on the same
set of variables as in column (b) of Table 11. We expect that the imbal-
ances in other months would be more than that in Table 11 (which corre-
sponds to month of December); however controls in the regressions help
to reduce bias. Now we look at the persistence curves βjpeer(j = 1, ..., 14)
for each of the last six months (t = July 2010, ...,Dec 2010); the average
of these curves is shown in Fig. 8(c). For each j, we plot the average of
βjpeer estimates obtained in six different models (2.1) corresponding to six
different values of t.
We saw earlier that the assortativity coefficient for projects popularity
is near zero, which means that there is no observed clustering based on
popularity of the projects, and this is consistent over time. However, we
do find positive short term and long term peer influence, which means
that a positive measure of clustering can be expected at a future time
when the effect of influence has taken place. Of several probable mecha-
nisms that might explain this, we provide a qualitative example to illus-
trate the main idea. Consider a situation, at time t, where an ego has four
outgoing friendships, two of which have higher production popularity
than him and the other two have lower popularity than him. This sug-
gests that ego’s local network is not assortative based on this behaviour.
During time t to t + 1, the ego receives a small increase in its projects’
popularity due to influence of his peers. However since his friends also
undergo similar change (by influence from their peers), the relative val-
ues of popularity in ego’s local network at t + 1 remains the same as in
time t – two friends have better popularity and other two have lower
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popularity, suggesting a zero value for assortative mixing once again.
Next we study if particular Scratchers, due to their own nature or lo-
cal network characteristics, are more susceptible to influence from their
peers compared to other identical Scratchers. For this, we use an interac-
tion term (of the desired attribute) with the treatment variable in regres-
sion model (2.1), controlling for all confounders as before. The results are
shown in Table 1; in each tuple, the first, second, and last elements cor-
respond respectively to the estimated coefficients of treatment variable,
desired attribute, and the interaction of treatment and attribute. The first
attribute is a network characteristic: variance of peers’ production pop-
ularity; we see that the interaction term is not significant, i.e., an ego in
the treated group with two peers having average production populari-
ties will be influenced in the same way if one of his peers had a high
popularity and the other had a low popularity. So a treated Scratcher is
not influenced by specific peers (in general), rather the influence stems
from the overall production popularity of his local environment. Not
shown here, we tested for several other attributes of peers (total remixes,
favorites, projects in front page, etc.) and found no evidence of influence
heterogeneity. So, peers’ behaviour does not seem to create extra sus-
ceptibility, which seems intuitive, because incorporating more influence
in comparison to identical others should arise out of individual traits.
We see that active Scratchers are influenced more than if not active, and
the effect on future periods is increasing. (Active users are those who
have interacted on the platform for at least one month. Non-active users
can be of two types – those who joined much before but interacted less
than one month, and those joined just one month prior to t, i.e., dur-
ing December 2010.) Further activity frequency does not have a sig-
nificant effect among treated Scratchers, as seen from the coefficient of
age. So it seems that, on average, a minimal duration of interaction (one
month), either initially or somewhere during the lifetime, on the platform
makes Scratchers more susceptible to the production popularity of their
peers. Remixing is an important characteristic in the learning process
in Scratch community. Based on an individual Scratcher’s preference to
create remixed projects more frequently than creating original projects,
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we have segmented Scratchers into 3 types: innovators, free-style users,
and developers, in increasing order of preference to produce remixed
projects. The group of users who tend to produce remixed projects most
often are termed developers. We do not consider innovators in subse-
quent analysis because there is a possibility for a remixed project to be
presented as an original project on the Scratch platform. (See A.1 for de-
tails on segmenting users based on the type of projects they produce.)
We see in Table 1 that developers are more susceptible to be influenced
in the very immediate period, but not in the medium or long term, com-
pared to other producers whose peers have high production popularity
but they are either free-style producers or innovators. Most probably, it
is by the nature of remixing – if a developer sees popular projects of his
peers, he builds on top of it to have new projects in the next period and
gain popularity, but he is not influenced by today’s production of peers
to create projects in the subsequent periods. On the other hand, influence
of peers’ popularity on free-style producers takes effect in the medium to
long term and is very significant. So having traits of innovation, i.e., cre-
ating new projects, leads to additional influence from production popu-
larity of peers in the long run.
Consumption Preference
The next behaviour that we examine for peer influence relates to con-
sumption. In Fig. 4 we saw that Scratchers having the same source of
consumption tend to cluster in the friendship network. We investigate
to what extent this can be explained by influence from peers, i.e., if peers
tend to favorite (consume) projects from certain source, does the ego also
tend to increase consumption from the same source?6 This investigation
is relevant because the ego knows about his peers’ favoriting patterns
via activity feeds (comments made are not visible to followers via activ-
ity feeds), but does not know the ‘source’ of consumption because the
sources have been identified by us by clustering projects over the ob-
served data of the entire duration. (We suggest readers to refer to Section
6We use favorites to understand consumption because peers’ favorites are visible as
activity feeds.
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2.2.2 for the measure of consumption specificity and A.2 for further de-
tails.) Evidence of peer influence in this case would imply that tastes or
preferences for consumption of ego are not static and can be affected by
peers’ preferences.
We consider the group of projects in c2, the biggest community in the
Pfavorites network. We examine whether ego increases his consumption
of projects from c2 group if his peers mostly consume projects from c2
group. In terms of model (2.1), ∆bt→t+ji is the change in consumption of
c2 projects from t to t + j, and Trti for ego i is 1 only if more than 50%
of his peers have consumed projects from c2 group the maximum time
(upto t). Controlling for various confounding factors, we did not find
significant coefficient for βjpeer. So we can not conclude that Scratchers
are influenced by their peers’ consumption interests. The most likely
reasons for the observed clustering in Fig. 4 therefore seems to arise out
of contextual friendship formation among the users, context being the
position in the network after initial interactions on the platform, which is
followed by consuming projects within large communities locally. Since
each consumption basket/source contains projects of similar themes (as
described in A.2), it probably explains why Scratchers are not influenced
by the consumption patterns (favorites) of their peers.
2.4 Mechanism of Peer Influence
In the previous section we saw that production popularity of peers has a
positive effect on the outcome of Scratchers’ future production popular-
ity (Fig. 8). However this finding does not suggest how this effect mediates
to outcome – especially, whether any particular changes in activities made
by Scratchers in subsequent periods due to popularity of peers’ projects
affects their future production popularity. The aggregate love-its accu-
mulated by a Scratcher upto a certain time t depends on the projects cre-
ated by him and the views received on his projects upto that time. The
change in production popularity in next periods, i.e., during t and future
times t+ j, can therefore arise due to:
• (Channel 1) change in the number of projects created in next peri-
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ods, which leads to new views and the possibility to have more
love-its, and
• (Channel 2) change in the number of views in next periods on projects
already created by time t, which can lead to more love-its.
Figure 9: PEER INFLUENCE CHANNEL FOR PRODUCTION POPULARITY:
CREATION OF PROJECTS
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(A) The proportion of peer influence in production popularity, as estimated in Fig. 8(b),
which is mediated via Scratchers’ creation of new projects in future periods j. 95% CIs are
shown for each estimate, except at j = 1, 10 where the upper boundary is more than 1.25.
(B, C) The decomposition of the total average effect of peer influence (ATE) into the
primary channel of creation of new projects (ACME), and secondary channel which
includes all other pathways (ADE). 95% CIs are shown for ACME and ADE estimates.
Of these two (major) mechanisms of peer influence, the outcome (change
in popularity next period) caused via creation of new projects is partic-
ularly noteworthy. This mechanism gives better insight into the Markov
decision-making nature of Scratchers – upon having popular peers, they
are influenced to create more projects (and possibly of better quality)
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which enhances their popularity in future periods. We denote bti, Tr
t
i ,
and M ti as the production popularity, treatment assignment, and total
projects respectively at time t for Scratcher i. Our goal is to disentangle
the effect mediated via creation of new projects (channel 1):
Trti
peers’ popularity
decision−−−−→ ∆jMi
new projects
views−−−→ ∆bt→t+ji (Tr
t
i ,∆
jMi)
gain in popularity
from other mechanisms of treatment effect (channel 2), where
∆jMi ≡ ∆jMi(Trti) := ∆M
t→t+j
i (Tr
t
i) = M
t+j
i (Tr
t
i)−M ti
is the total projects created by Scratcher i during t and t+j (the mediating
variable of interest), and is a function of peers’ production popularity at
t (Trti).
To do so, we employ model-based causal mediation analysis [23] where
the treatment variable Trti is randomized, conditional on the confounders
Xti and N
t
i (quasi-experimental setting), and the mediating ∆M
t→t+j
i
and outcome ∆bt→t+ji variables are observed without interventions. Es-
timates of βj in regression (2.1) is the total average treatment effect ATE(j)
7, and is the sum of average effects of treatment at t on gain in production
popularity from t to t + j via all possible mediating channels. ATE(j) is
decomposed into two components:8
• ACME(j): the component of ATE(j) mediated via creation of new
projects (Channel 1) is called the average causal mediation effect and
is defined as:
δ̄j(Trt) = Ei[ ∆bt→t+ji
(
Trt,∆jMi(1)
)
−∆bt→t+ji
(
Trt,∆jMi(0)
)
],
7βj in regression (2.1) estimates the average treatment effect on the treated group
(Trt = 1) and is equal to the average treatment effect (ATE), for the population, when
Trt is randomly assigned.
8Note that ACME(j) and ADE(j) are defined using potential outcomes framework and
hence contain counterfactual values. For example, for a Scratcher with Trti = 1, ∆Mi(0)
is not observed because it is the number of projects he would have created from t to t + j
if he were assigned Trti = 0. Counterfactual values are estimated from the data during the
estimations of ACME(j) and ADE(j).
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• ADE(j): the component of ATE(j) mediated via all other mecha-
nisms (Channel 2) is called the average direct effect and is defined
as:
ξ̄j(Trt) = Ei[ ∆bt→t+ji
(
1,∆jMi(Tr
t)
)
−∆bt→t+ji
(
0,∆jMi(Tr
t)
)
].
To contrast our investigation with the previous results, we fix t at
December, 2010 and vary j from 1 to 12. Following [23, 37], we estimate
ACME(j) and ADE(j) in the reduced dataset obtained by matching all
variable types (Table 11(b)). Linear models (2.3) and (2.4) are used for
mediating and outcome variables respectively:
∆M t→t+ji = γ
j
0 + γ
j
1 Tr
t
i + γ
j
2 N
t
i + γ
j
3 X
t
i + εM
t→t+j
i (2.3)
∆bt→t+ji = β
j
0 + β
j
1 Tr
t
i + β
j
2 ∆M
t→t+j
i + β
j
3 N
t
i + β
j
4 X
t
i + εb
t→t+j
i
(2.4)
ρj = Corr(εM
t→t+j , εb
t→t+j), (2.5)
where ρj is the correlation between the error terms, and Xt, N t are the
same confounding variables as used in model (2.1), for estimating peer
influence on production popularity, to ensure a random assignment of
treatment. The estimates and their confidence intervals are obtained us-
ing non-parametric bootstrap with percentile method.
Fig. 9 shows the estimates of ACME(j) and ADE(j) in panels B and C
respectively. We see that both estimates are positive and increasing for
all j. Both the effects tend to increase at a decreasing rate, and so we
observe a similar additive effect for ATE(j). Also, the S-shape for ATE(j)
seems to arise from ADE(j). The ATE curve in Fig. 9 (obtained here us-
ing non-parametric bootstrap estimation) is identical to the curve in Fig.
8(b). We performed a heterogeneity test [37] with the null hypothesis
δ̄j(1) − δ̄j(0) = 0 and concluded that δ̄j(1) and δ̄j(0) are statistically not
different (high p-values ∀j); so the ACME(j) curve in Fig. 9(B) holds for
treated and control groups, i.e., the average mediating effect does not
depend on treatment status and hence is the same for all Scratchers. For
an alternate interpretation, Fig. 9(A) shows the estimated values and
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Figure 10: ROBUSTNESS CHECK FOR PEER INFLUENCE CHANNEL
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The variation of ACME(j = 9), along with 95% confidence intervals of the estimate, with
change in the sensitivity parameter ρj=9 (see (2.5)). (Plots of variation for other values of j
are identical to that shown here, for j = 9.) The parameter ρj is sensitive to the presence
of confounding effects. ρj = 0 corresponds to validity of the sequential ignorability
assumption.
confidence intervals for the proportion of ATE(j) that is mediated via cre-
ation of new projects, given by δ̄
j(1)
δ̄j(1)+ξ̄j(1)
. Almost 40− 50% of the effect
of peers’ popularity on Scratchers’ future production popularity is ex-
plained by the creation of new projects in all future periods subsequent
to the treatment at t.
We perform robustness check for the estimates obtained in Fig. 9.
Identification of estimates δ̄j and ξ̄j assumes sequential ignorability, a
set of following assumptions: (i) exogeneity of Trt in models (2.1) and
(2.3) conditional on Xt, N t, and (ii) exogeneity of ∆M t→t+j conditional
on Trt and Xt, N t. Assumption (ii) can be violated, even if Trt is ran-
domly assigned, by post-treatment variables that affect both mediating
and outcome variables in (2.4). Since this is an untestable assumption, a
sensitivity analysis [23] is used to gauge the reliability of the estimates δ̄j
and ξ̄j in Fig. 9. For this ρj in (2.5) is used as the sensitivity parameter
since variables that violate assumption (ii) will be present in both models
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(2.3) and (2.4). The estimates in Fig. 9 are obtained by assuming sequen-
tial ignorability, i.e., ρj = 0,∀j. Sensitivity of ACME(j) estimate to other
values of ρj is shown in Fig. 10. The sensitivity is shown for j = 9, and
for other values of j the shape and values are the same as shown in Fig.
10 for j = 9. It would require an extremely high degree of confounding
to violate sequential ignorability in our sample because the estimates of
ACME(j) will turn 0 only when ρ is 0.6, which is a very high value (given
the nature of our sample).
Figure 11: PEER INFLUENCE CHANNEL IS VALID IN GENERAL
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ATE: The average j-period ahead peer influence effect during July-Dec 2010. This curve is
the same as in Fig. 8(c). ACME: The average j-period ahead peer influence effect
mediated via Channel 1 (creation of new projects) during July-Dec 2010. Error bars are
scaled standard deviations of j-period ahead influence estimates.
There is an alternative interpretation [38] for the sensitivity test: ρ2 is
the product of unexplained R2 values of models (2.3) and (2.4). So the
value of ρj2 for which ACME(j) estimates will turn 0 is 0.36, i.e., ACME(j)
estimates in Fig. 9 can be refuted if ρj2 in our sample is 0.36. Let us
consider the case of j = 1. In our estimated models, the R2 values for
(2.3) and (2.4) are 0.028 and 0.43 respectively. R2 = 0.051 in model (2.1)
(Table 12(b), Model 2) increases to R2 = 0.43 in (2.4) when the mediating
variable is introduced for analysis of the causal pathway of treatment
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effect. To obtain a product value of 0.36, for instance, with a confounder
explaining about 60% of the unexplainedR2 of 0.972 in (2.3), it still needs
to explain about 0.62 (108%) in (2.4) which is well above the maximum
R2 value of 100%.
So based on above sensitivity tests, we can not claim that the sequen-
tial ignorability assumption is violated in our empirical analysis. The
estimates obtained in Fig. 9 are therefore valid, and provide a causal in-
terpretation of the mediation of peer influence in production popularity
via the creation of new projects by Scratchers. Finally we present a gen-
eral validity of the peer influence channel. For this we estimate ACME(j)
curve for each of the last six months of 2010 (to allow a direct correspon-
dence to Fig. 8(c)). The average values of the ATE(j) curves and ACME(j)
curves during this period are shown in Fig. 11. This plot confirms that
creating new projects in future forms an important channel due to which
the production popularity of Scratchers increases in future periods, in
response to existing production popularity of their peers.
2.5 Discussion
We analyzed peer influence in the feature-rich Scratch community under
a quasi-experimental setting. Our method accounts for peer influence af-
ter controlling for various other mechanisms that can lead to clustering of
behaviour in friendship network, i.e., Scratchers and their peers having
similar or dissimilar behaviours. We saw how peer influence affects be-
haviours (creation of new projects, consuming similar projects) and out-
comes (production popularity) in the collective learning environment,
Scratch. We found a persistent effect of peers’ production popularity on
Scratchers’ future production popularity, and that a large proportion of
this effect is mediated by Scratchers’ decision to create new projects. We
also saw that users who specialize in creating “remixed” projects are sus-
ceptible to peers’ production popularity more in the short run than in the
long run. For consumption behaviour, we found that Scratchers are not
influenced by their peers. In particular, we saw that the tendency of users
to consume projects from specific sources can not be attributed due to in-
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fluence from their peers. Although the primary aim of this study has
been to understand the role of peer influence in the production and con-
sumption of projects on the Scratch platform, the study has also provided
several methodological insights that can inform future work. In retro-
spect, we believe our results are surprising, especially because produc-
tion popularity of peers (resulting from the likes of several other users)
influences self-decision making to create new projects which would not
have been created in absence of such popularity of peers’ projects. New
projects created due to peer influence attain higher popularity in future
compared to projects which are created by users who do not follow “pop-
ular friends”. (The Scratch platform that provides such a collective shar-
ing and exchange of ideas on a digital platform is therefore valuable be-
cause peer influence may not exist if users were to create projects without
such a wide exposure to others’ projects.) Our study contributes to the lit-
erature on production and consumption behaviour [39, 40, 41, 42, 43] (in-
cluding peer influence [44, 45]) in various knowledge sharing platforms
[46, 47, 48, 5]. We believe our results are relevant for a broad audience
including network science researchers and practitioners and designers of
future educational platforms [49, 50, 51, 52].
2.5.1 Limitations stemming from data
It would be definitely better if we could have data on several more factors
to ensure a higher reduction in bias. (Unfortunately, such fine details are
not available in the dataset we have.) So here we discuss some potential
limitations of our analysis from a context of the data available to conduct
the analysis. First is the representativeness of the sample, i.e., we only an-
alyze users who actually joined the platform and interacted in some ways
depending on how well they liked the platform under situations existing
at the time of their joining. Since the study includes users coming from
various countries, we expect that the results hold true in general. Sec-
ond, comparing changes in future behaviour across treated and control
groups does not eliminate bias arising out of unobserved confounders
that are heterogeneous across the groups – for instance, it may be the
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case that the general ability of users to operate on the platform might be
more in the treated group, and so they are able to find better peers and
also can produce more projects. Such confounding effects arising out of
ability are however low in our study because we found a significant per-
sistence effect when Scratchers were matched on all their personal char-
acteristics (Table 11(a)) – since this includes various attributes, we expect
it also captures the ability of Scratchers which is unobserved. Also, we
do not have a priori reasons or information to predict why unobserved
variables (like ability) might be distributed differently across experimen-
tal and control group, especially in presence of a well balanced matched
sample. Third, there is an implicit assumption that a Scratcher follows
another user in order to be informed about the user’s future activities.
However, Scratchers happen to follow users for other unobserved rea-
sons as well. Such reasons include help received in a project, social con-
tact in real life, received friendly comment on a project, and joining a
particular gallery [53]. Although we account for selection mechanisms in
network formation by including peers’ observed confounding attributes,
our estimates do not control for unobserved selection processes as men-
tioned above. Fourth, we do not have additional data (e.g., survey data
[54]) to know exactly the decision making process of Scratchers. Our
assumption about a Markov nature of decision making was motivated
by an intuition of decision making in large social networks in general
(which has also been used in several studies concerning social networks
[14, 55, 56]). Although additional data might have been helpful to vali-
date such an assumption, we believe this assumption is not too strong.
The assumption used for this study is a weak assumption in the sense
that although it does not capture the trend of past behaviour, it captures
a summary of the trend (the aggregate count) which we believe is rea-
sonable. This is because such aggregates (over the entire history) are the
only statistics available when a Scratcher browses another Scratcher’s
profile before following, and when new users who join the platform see
about others’ projects and activities, and decide their future activities. 9
9A strong Markov assumption, on the other hand, would mean that future decisions
are made using information (personal and peers attributes) of aggregate activities from
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Given the vastness of the users and projects, and the complexity of the
existence of several interactions on Scratch platform, we believe that it
is reasonable to assume that the average population (mostly composed
of young children) decides its future activities based on the current state
of activities and not by the heterogeneous trends in the past leading up
to the current state of users’ network and projects characteristics. (We
have previously mentioned the plausibility of such an assumption in the
context of Scratch platform in Section 2.3.)
2.5.2 Validity and interpretation of results
We saw that exact matching produces extremely low bias in treatment
assignment compared to propensity score matching [24] which, if em-
ployed as a tool for analysis, would require a more careful inferential
analysis [57, 58, 59]10, especially in presence of many features or vari-
ables describing the platform (users, projects, users network, various in-
teractions). We believe that the peer influence estimates have low degree
of bias. Although this comes at a cost of more than 50% reduction in
sample size (refer Tables 10 and 12), we expect that there should not be
an abrupt loss of generality of the results when speaking about the en-
tire population of Scratchers. This is because matching procedure has
been performed at different time periods to produce persistence curves
as shown in Fig. 8 (c) and Fig. 11. Despite the fact that the users who
are dropped out of analysis due to constraints of exact matching are ran-
dom and not in control of the researchers, these curves are quite smooth
and have similar patterns and estimated values as in Fig. 8 (b) and Fig.
9 (B) respectively. Hence we believe the results are true for the entire
population of Scratchers at large.
We believe the description of exact matching in Section 2.3 is suffi-
cient for the purpose of our analysis since we achieved both a reasonable
the current month alone. However a weaker assumption allows for future decision to be
based not only on the current month’s statistics, but also on all previous months’ activities
summarized as an aggregated counts.
10Although a balance of propensity scores is necessary for removing selection bias [24],
it is not sufficient – the confounders should also be balanced across treated and control
groups.
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balance of covariates (and much better than propensity score matching),
as shown in Table 11, and a reasonable number of observations for sta-
tistical estimation and hypothesis tests of significance of peer influence
effects, as shown in Table 12. However, we would like to provide ad-
ditional details for interested readers to explain better the role of using
exact matching in causal estimation of the peer influence parameters [35].
We need to note that matching is not an estimation method. The essence
of estimation strategy used in this study is to compare future changes of
Scratchers with peers having higher degree of behaviour (experimental
group) to those Scratchers whose peers have lower degree of behaviour
(control group) in a way which can be argued to be of experimental stan-
dards even if we only have observational data. To achieve this goal, exact
matching has been used as a data preprocessing step and has helped us
in several ways. First, it helped us to create the experimental group when
the treatment (peers’ variable) was continuous. This was achieved by di-
chotomizing the treatment by thresholds, a recommended practice [35],
which were also shown in Fig. 7 to not influence the nature of our con-
clusions. Second, due to its intrinsic property, the exact matching helped
us to create groups to mimic experimental standards by achieving bal-
ance of covariates. Since exact matching on large number of variables
generates loss in data, we always ensured to focus on matching the most
significant confounders first. Understanding which variables might be
important confounders in the data is done by analysing columns (3) and
(4) in Table 10 to understand selection into treatment. Unmatched or
variables with poor balance in matching were always included as a part
of estimation method during regression analysis. Third, it helped us to
remove model dependence from our analysis [35], i.e., the peer influence
estimates are not extremely dependent on the variables chosen for regres-
sion analysis. This is the reason of presenting two different models in Fig.
6 - the estimates are stable. However we use the dataset matched on both
personal and network variables for later analysis because this has the
best balance of covariates. Lastly, we would like to mention that “exact
matching” does not mean having “exactly similar observations” in the
control group for each observation in the experimental group. (In fact,
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such a situation would be impossible, especially in the space of high di-
mensional features.) The resulting dataset produced after exact matching
has the property that all variables representing personal or peers’ charac-
teristics of an ego have the same observed empirical distribution across
experimental and control groups. This is in line with the true meaning
of exact matching and the requirements for avoiding selection bias on
observable variables [35]. We would encourage readers to interpret the
estimated values of peer influence as upper bounds, to allow for decrease
in estimates due to potential (unknown) unobservables which might be
distributed unevenly across experimental and control groups.
Identification of peer influence in our empirical strategy solely re-
lies on the non-existence of confounding latent variables. As mentioned
above in discussing our limitations stemming from data availability, we
do not claim absence of unobserved variables.11 If Scratchers and their
peers exhibit homophily on a latent covariate and this covariate is cor-
related both with peers’ behaviour (e.g., high or low degree of peers’
production popularity) and ego’s future change in behaviour, only then
such a variable is a confounder, conceptually. This is because only in
this case one can claim that the change in future behaviour of ego was
driven by common shocks from the latent variable and not due to peers’
behaviour. We believe that such confounding variables are least likely in
our analysis. First, covariates included in analysis, as shown in Table 8 re-
flect individual preferences for producing projects (e.g., total projects and
remixes), individual preferences for consuming projects (e.g., favorites,
comments), collective preference of platform users to consume an in-
dividual’s projects (e.g., love-its, downloads, favorites, comments), at-
tributes reflecting general statistics of platform usage (e.g., age, activity),
peers’ attributes of all individual properties mentioned above, and char-
acteristics of local network. These variables already reflect a wide range
of individual preferences for behaviour on the platform to create projects
and build peers network. Activity statistics, which is an important rep-
11Peer influence estimates can become less biased if we could have data on further spe-
cific details that reflect individual preferences. However, we believe that the current dataset
already has details of a wide range of features that summarize well the activities on the
platform.
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resentation of how a user understands the platform details, are well bal-
anced for individuals and their peers. Second, as shown in and Fig. 10,
the sensitivity test demands very high values of ρ (0.6) for violation of
sequential ignorability assumption required for mediation analysis con-
ducted in Section 2.4. Given that the variables are well balanced (Table
11), we believe that the likelihood of existence of confounding variables
in our analysis, enough to violate sequential ignorability assumption, is
very remote. Since variables that can violate sequential ignorability as-
sumption are also the ones that pose threat to peer influence estimates,
we believe that latent variables which are of confounding nature are a
least likely case in our study.
2.5.3 Behaviours analysed in this study
While there are several production and consumption behaviours that
may be analysed on Scratch platform, our choices of production pop-
ularity and consumption specificity were guided by the following rea-
sons. (We encourage investigation of other behaviours in Scratch, and
also in other platforms, in future.) First, we wanted to ensure that the
behaviours we investigate are plausibly widely known in the Scratch
community. For example, a Scratcher knows about his peers’ produc-
tion popularity (e.g., when somebody loves one of his peers’ projects)
and consumption patterns (e.g., when one of his peers consumes project
by favoriting it) through activity feeds. Although a user may not assim-
ilate everything that shows up on activity feeds in real time, we believe
that a general knowledge of repetitive behaviour of such peers’ activ-
ities over a certain duration of time might influence the user to adopt
similar behaviour. Second, it seems that popularity is a factor that af-
fects social behaviour in general (outside Scratch) [60]. Popularity may
be indicative to users who are aware about the activities on the Scratch
platform about the popularity-to-quality ratio, i.e., popularity of a project
might be indicative of the project content (e.g., codes, creativity, etc.) and
hence other users might be interested to learn such things. In this sense,
project popularity on the Scratch platform may be seen as a form of col-
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lective assessment of the project and thus an increase in a user’s produc-
tion popularity may correspond to an improvement in his/her (unob-
served) ability to create better projects. So production popularity may
not be as irrational, as a factor to generate influence on self-decisions, as
it may otherwise seem to an individual not using the platform. (In ret-
rospect, we indeed find users’ behaviour being influenced by peers’ pro-
duction popularity.) Third, while peers’ projects may influence a user’s
behaviour, the user might be influenced to a certain extent to consume
projects similar to his peers. While tracking each project for each peer is
an extremely unlikely situation, we believe that a consumption influence
might exist if a Scratcher observes that most of his users tend to con-
sume a “certain group” of projects. While there may exist several ways
to identify such groups of projects, we believe our strategy is feasible on
a large scale [61] and also conveys important meaning. We categorized
consumption baskets/groups in an intuitive fashion (analogous to vari-
ous products in a supermarket): projects that are consumed together by
most users were placed in one category. (In doing so, all projects have
been included in one of the communities and there is no loss of obser-
vations.) Later we found from our analysis that users do not tend to
be influenced if their peers have high specificity for such a consumption
source/category. In retrospect, we investigated and have clearly stated
that such communities do not correspond to themes or topics of projects,
and neither the choice of network algorithm to detect communities affect
our findings. We also believe in retrospection that the inability to dif-
ferentiate such communities by a particular attribute can be a potential
reason why no peer influence exists for consumption patterns. In fact, if
the consumptions baskets are largely similar to each other, the reasons
for switching to peers’ consumption patterns is minimal. (We believe
that specificity of consumption of projects is potentially a result of the
local network to which a user gets associated to during his/her joining
to the platform and formation of initial local friendship network.) In
any case, our choice of analysis of consumption behaviour was largely
guided by general intuition rather than alignment with forward-looking
results. Fourth, a user could have hundreds of peers whom he follows but
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it seems implausible to be influenced by each of them is a heterogeneous
and meaningful way. Therefore we used the aggregate measurements of
each attribute as a potential source of influence. Later, as shown in Table
1, we found that actually there is no effect of variance of peers’ popu-
larity on how users are influenced. In other words, the influence from
production popularity is largely an aggregate effect from the popular-
ity of all projects from all peers of a user and not an effect arising from
specific peers.
2.5.4 Some topics for further investigation
We discuss several studies that may be done in the Scratch platform and
other digital platforms. First is to understand the aspect of “learning”
more precisely. In this study, we saw that Scratchers decide to create
projects (new, remixed) in future due to peers’ influence; some of the
new projects may be totally copied versions without being assigned as
remixed projects. So due to the nature of the available data, we can not
be precise about how much Scratchers actually ‘learn’ during the process
of creating new projects. Second, analysis may be done using other as-
sumptions about users’ behaviour which can lead to new insights. Such
assumptions can be identified from surveys, or observed behaviours on
other platforms. Third, for peer influence analysis, especially with many
attributes as in this study, ways to reduce dimensionality of the attribute
space and their effects on the bias of influence estimates may be con-
ducted. Fourth, new studies may be done to better understand differ-
ences in peer influence in digital contexts (as in Scratch) and physical
contexts (as in classrooms). A key difference between online platforms
and classrooms in formal educational systems is that, in most cases, chil-
dren do not choose to go to schools whereas they usually choose whether
to join a platform. Peer influence investigation in physical settings shows
mixed evidences [4, 5, 62] of positive and negative influences. New stud-
ies can therefore bring clarity into subtle nuances of how children in ed-
ucational environments are influenced by their peers.
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Chapter 3
Polarization in Twitter
Social Media, a Social
Media Platform
3.1 Introduction
Polarization1 of beliefs is about the existence of opposing beliefs within
large sections of the society [64, 65, 66, 67]. In situations, like climate
change action, where unanimous belief can drive the required collective
steps, polarization can be a hurdle and may lead to socially undesired
actions [68, 69, 70, 71]. Public understanding of climate change has re-
mained polarized [72, 73, 74]. Polarization of beliefs can be affected not
only by the nature of users’ tendencies like homophily in communica-
tion about the reality of climate change, but also by certain nature of the
information itself. Credibility of information is one of such properties of
information. We discuss these determinants of polarization below.
Homophily in communication can affect the polarization of beliefs.
Homophily in communication is a key tendency of users in informa-
1This chapter is based on the following published work:
Samantray, A., Pin, P. (2019) “Credibility of climate change denial in social media.” Palgrave
Communications 5, 127 [63].
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tion propagation media like Twitter and other platforms: people tend
to communicate with others who hold similar beliefs [75, 76]. Although
homophily can facilitate the flow of information [77], it can lead to polar-
ization [78] as well and decrease the general ability of the society to learn
the truth [79, 80]. Communicating only with people who share simi-
lar ideology or opinion restricts beliefs and prevents learning the truth
[81, 82, 83]. For example, homophily among liberals and conservatives
in political blogs links [84], i.e., the tendency of liberal and conservative
blogs to link primarily within their separate communities, leads to echo
chambers [85, 86, 87], and hence beliefs can be polarized due to such ex-
posure to selective information [88]. Similarly, homophily in opinion ex-
changes in social media (e.g., via publicly visible replies and mentions in
Twitter) can reinforce beliefs within various sections of the network due
to selective exposure. Previously echo chambers have been observed for
climate change discussions on social media [89, 70]. Such patterns when
repeat themselves in various parts of the network can lead to polariza-
tion of beliefs.
Credibility of information is also an important factor to create polar-
ization, especially in online media where usually there exists information
from several sources [90] that propagate controversial beliefs. Credibil-
ity of information is the precision of information, it signifies how certain
the information is and helps to assign a certain level of trust to the in-
formation [91, 92]. The credibility of information that propagates in a
social network is a critical factor that can shape the beliefs: if incoming
information from a person’s social network carries no credibility, then
it is less likely to be incorporated in to the belief of the person [93, 94].
Hence, negative consequences that may arise due to the spread of fake in-
formation in social networks depend on information credibility, thereby
making it a factor that can induce polarization. The importance of pre-
cision of misinforming signals has also been highlighted recently by All-
cott and Gentzkow [95]. Credibility is a dimension of information which
is independent of veracity of the information. For instance, a particular
(unintended) fake story can be more credible if the information source
is highly reputable (and hence the fake story inherits the credibility of
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the source) compared to the case when the same story comes from a less
credible information source. It is the former case that has the potential
to change beliefs in the society and change the existing levels of polar-
ization concerning the truth of its story. Credibility of information in
social media, generally speaking, may be ascribed due to several fac-
tors including reputation of information source, number of verified facts
cited along with the information, mentioning opinion leaders and others
[96, 97]. Lastly, credibility of a communicated information is indepen-
dent from the preciseness with which the information source believes
the information. For example, a certain propaganda house which be-
lieves strongly about a story need not be able to spread such beliefs in
the society through various communications because such communica-
tions may lack the degree of credibility required to generate substantial
change in beliefs in society.
Twitter has become a modern platform for news dissemination and
opinion exchanges, and is widely adopted by many users worldwide.
We believe discussions and information propagation that happens on
such a platform has potential to shape beliefs at a large scale. Impor-
tant topics like climate change are also discussed on such social media
platforms. With fake information on many topics becoming prevalent
on widely adopted social media platform like Twitter, it is probably not
surprising that there are several tweets both in favour and against the
statement that climate change is a real concern. Fake information re-
garding such an important issue as climate change can pose a collective
hurdle for the society at large if such information becomes highly cred-
ible among users of the platform. In this study, we infer the credibility
of anti-climate change opinions on Twitter using (i) an empirical analysis
that investigates the effect of homophily in communication patterns on
the polarization of beliefs, and (ii) the predictions of a model of polariza-
tion of beliefs that jointly accounts for the roles of information credibility
and homophily in communication. For the empirical analysis, we use
tweets about climate change topic during 2007-2017. We rely on opinion
exchanges among climate change believers and sceptics made via men-
tioning (and replying) others in tweets as the communication pattern.
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(Replies in Twitter tag the user names at the beginning of tweets, while
user mentions can be made anywhere within the text of tweets.) This is
because retweets do not contain new opinions and are mere repetitions
or broadcast of opinions expressed in original tweets, whereas mentions
contain explicit referencing of other users and hence convey exchange of
opinions targeted towards users being mentioned.
3.2 Methods
3.2.1 Data
We use tweets from the online social network site Twitter. Tweets are the
messages posted by users on the platform. Tweets can contain hashtags,
mentions to other users, external links in addition to text. A tweet posted
by a user can be retweeted, replied and liked by other users. The tweets
from 2007 to 2017 were collected based on a search filter that each tweet
contains at least one of the following words: ‘climate change’, ‘#climate-
change’, ‘global warming’, ‘#globalwarming’. The search was performed
via Tweeter’s public advanced search page. This collection of tweets
does not violate any ethical standards and consists of only publicly avail-
able data. The data is complete in the sense that it contains all original
tweets that fulfil the search criteria. Retweets of original tweets are not
included in the data. Each tweet however contains the retweet statistic,
i.e., how many times it has been retweeted. There are a total of 14,353,859
unique tweets (without counting retweets values) and 3,595,205 unique
users in the dataset.
3.2.2 Measuring Sentiment & Opinion
The sentiment of each tweet is computed using VADER [98] model which
is designed to conduct sentiment classification specifically on short texts
like tweets. For each tweet, a score is obtained on the scale -1 (most nega-
tive) to 1 (most positive). A message with a positive sentiment is usually
in favour of the (intended) object in the message. However, the same
62
message may be communicated in a way that contains negative senti-
ment. Therefore sentiment and opinion contained in a message are two
different characteristics of the message. This distinction between senti-
ment and stance has been clarified by previous studies on stance detec-
tion of tweets [99, 100]. From various data used in these previous stud-
ies, we use a subset that is used to annotate whether the tweet is in favor
or against the statement “climate change is a real concern”. This subset
contains manual annotation of whether a tweet is in favor or against the
statement. We use this data as the training data to predict the opinion
expressed in the texts of tweets in our sample.
The tweets were coded as numerical features using the TF-IDF (term
frequency-inverse document frequency) representation and the predic-
tion on the dataset for this study was done using the support vector clas-
sifier, which had the highest predictive power among other classifiers
(logistic regression, decision tree). Each user’s tweets were first clas-
sified into one of the following categories: in favour of the statement,
against the statement, no opinion. (Hence, in the first stage, opinion is
assigned to each tweet.) Next, each user was classified into one of the
above categories based on the category that contains the maximum num-
ber of tweets from the user. Since a user on Twitter usually has a belief
about climate change (in general), the classification algorithm has man-
aged to predict each users’s tweet into a single category only. Only 42
users were classified as having no opinion, and were dropped from the
dataset. Most users had tweets in one category only: either in favor, or
against the statement. This validates the performance of the classifier at
the user level even if the prediction accuracy (at the tweets level) is about
72%.
3.2.3 Measure of Homophily
The notion of homophily in communication is the presence of higher in-
teraction among people who hold the same opinion about climate change.
For instance, the group of users who believe climate change is not real
have a homophily in communication pattern if such users communicate
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more among themselves than with users who believe climate change is
real.
Communication between users can take the forms of retweeting and
mentioning (includes replying) on the Twitter platform. Although retweet-
ing, in general, suggests that users share the same ideology, mentioning
can occur between users with differing ideologies (tweet wars). To what
extent do mentioning patterns in tweets reveal communication among
users having similar ideologies? Previous studies [101, 102] reveal that
homophily of the aggregate network measured using retweeting and
mentioning tend to be same, although mentioning is more volatile at the
group (sub network with a particular ideology) levels. Hence, based on
such studies, we assume that homophily in mentioning patterns reveals
the homophily in retweeting (and following) patterns, for which we do
not have the data. Communication therefore refers to users interacting
via mentioning each other in tweets.
To measure homophily in communication among users with same be-
lief or opinion regarding climate change, we follow the measures used in
previous empirical studies on homophily [103, 104, 105]. Let I be the to-
tal number of users in a given month who either mentioned other users
or received mentions from other users’ tweets. We indicate belief of a
user as b ∈ {a, f}, where a and f correspond to the cases where the user
is against and in favour, respectively, of the climate change statement. a
and f represent two types of belief b. Suppose Ib is the total number of
type b users, then wb = IbI is the fraction of type b users. Let vib be the
number of type b users mentioned by user i. Then sb = 1Ib
∑
i∈Ib vi,b is
the average number of same type users mentioned by type b users, and
db =
1
Ib
∑
i∈Ib vi,−b is the average number of opposite type users men-
tioned by type b users. Using this, homophily of the group of type b users
is defined as Hb = sbsb+db and the homophily of the society is defined as
H =
∑
b∈{a,f}
wbHb.
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3.2.4 Measure of Polarization
A tweet carries an opinion (whether in favour or against climate change
being real), denoted as op, with a certain sentiment, denoted as s. (We en-
code op as 1 if the message in the tweet is against the climate change state-
ment and as −1 if the message is in favour of climate change.) Irrespec-
tive of the opinion, the sentiment can be positive or negative depend-
ing on the way the message is communicated. So we use an emotion-
adjusted measure of belief called EAB that combines these two aspects:
expressed opinion in the message, and emotional content in the message.
For a given tweet with attributes op and s, EAB is defined as op · |s|, the
product of opinion and absolute value of sentiment.
A large number of tweets have neutral or close to neutral sentiment,
thereby increasing the mass around 0 and decreasing the intensity of bi-
modality in the distribution of EAB. (The presence of high volume of
neutral tweets is not uncommon, for example see Kušen and Strembeck
[106].) In this sense, the polarization indicator used during the mathe-
matical analysis in opinion updating model (see Appendix B.3) cannot be
carried to the empirical setting directly. We therefore need another mea-
sure of polarization that is sensitive to the properties (e.g., kurtosis and
skewness) of a distribution and carries the intuition of bi-modality ap-
proach (i.e., the statistic should be sensitive to the degree of bi-modality
of a distribution). To calculate the degree of polarization involved in the
EAB distribution, we use the measure of ideological divergence provided
by Lelkes [107], which characterizes the level of polarization based on bi-
modality of the distribution by being sensitive to kurtosis and skewness
[108, 109]. Using this measure, the polarization of EAB is defined as
s2 + 1
k + 3 (n−1)
2
(n−2)(n−3)
,
where s and k are the skewness and excess kurtosis of the EAB distri-
bution, and n is the sample size. The values of 1 and 0 correspond to
cases when the EAB distribution is perfectly bimodal and perfectly uni-
modal respectively. A value greater than 0.56 is categorized as bimodal.
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Although this threshold may not be reached precisely, approaching this
value is considered coming closer to polarization [107].
The measure of polarization above is calculated at the levels of tweets
and is a stricter measure than when calculated at the level of users. This
is because a user might be slightly heterogeneous in his tweets but aggre-
gating all tweets would reveal one exact ideology. For example, when a
climate change sceptic user writes a tweet, it is most likely to be against
the statement that climate change is real. However a few tweets of his
might fall in favour of the statement. In this sense, polarization is easier
to obtain at an user level than at the content (tweets) level.
It is easy to see that the polarization measure describes a different
phenomenon than the homophily measure. While homophily measure is
constructed using users involved in a mention activity in a given month
(micro level), polarization is measured using all the EAB of all tweets in
the month (macro level). This is in line with Esteban and Ray [110], ac-
cording to whom any reasonable measure of polarization must be global
in nature.
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Negative effect of Homophily on Polarization
The monthly time series of polarization of beliefs and homophily in com-
munication during 2007-2017 are shown in Figure 12. (Measures of ho-
mophily and polarization are described in Methods.) It appears that the
evolutions of the two curves are not independent, and polarization tends
to decrease at times when homophily increases. Augmented Dickey-
Fuller test and Phillips-Ouliaris test suggest that polarization and ho-
mophily are cointegrated, i.e., they are bound in a long term equilib-
rium relationship such that they mean-revert whenever there are devia-
tions away from the equilibrium. (Appendix B.1 contains statistical de-
tails of tests of cointegration.) Hence it becomes natural to model po-
larization and homophily jointly in a vector error correction (VEC) mo-
del [111, 112]. VEC models are a special class of models derived from
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Figure 12: POLARIZATION OF BELIEFS, HOMOPHILY IN COMMUNICATION
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The figure shows monthly evolutions of polarization of beliefs about climate change
(blue) and homophily in communication patterns on Twitter (orange) during 2007-2017.
Time 0 corresponds to Jan 2007. A long-term relationship seems to exist: polarization
decreases whenever homophily increases.
vector autoregression (VAR) models with an additional term, called er-
ror correction term, to account for the cointegration. VEC model allows
to study the lagged effects of homophily on polarization and also the
lagged effects of polarization on homophily. Table 16 in Appendix B.2
contains details of the parameter estimates of VEC model: the lagged ho-
mophily covariates negatively affect polarization in the long term with
high statistical significance and the lagged effects of polarization on ho-
mophily are not significant. These estimates however do not form a con-
clusion about the direction of causality between homophily and polar-
ization. For assessing causality, we perform Granger causality test [113]
with modifications, as suggested by Toda and Yamamoto [114], to adapt
to the non-stationary nature of both time series; the results are shown
in Table 2. (Further statistical details regarding these tests are available
in Appendix B.2.1.) The conclusion that emerges is that only homophily
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Granger-causes polarization with a negative effect, and the causality in
the other direction is absent, i.e., polarization does not Granger cause
homophily. This empirical result that homophily negatively affects po-
larization is counter-intuitive to the discussions made previously about
the nature of homophily and polarization.
Table 2: GRANGER-CAUSALITY TESTS
Null Hypothesis Test statistic
Homophily does not Granger-cause polarization 12.3***
Polarization does not Granger cause homophily 4.0
∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Based on the test statistics,
only the first null hypothesis is rejected.
3.3.2 Joint Effect of Homophily and Credibility
We study a simple model of emergence of polarization in social networks
that highlights the joint effect of credibility of propagating information
and homophily in communication of information to affect polarization.
We model polarization as bi-modality of the population’s distribution of
beliefs and it captures the following basic features, as laid down by Es-
teban and Ray [110], which are necessary for a distribution to be consid-
ered polarized: there must be a high degree of homogeneity within each
group (whose agents hold same belief), a high degree of heterogeneity
across groups, and a small number of significantly sized groups. If the
groups are of insignificant size (e.g., isolated individuals), they do not
contribute to polarization. The beliefs can be emotion-adjusted as well,
as is done in the empirical analysis (see Methods), to include the emo-
tional content of the belief; this does not change the nature of predictions
of our model.
In our model, we consider a social network with each agent receiv-
ing information about a topic (e.g., the reality of climate change) from
the same number, k, of speakers (for simplicity). Speakers of an agent
are other agents in the network from whom he receives information. An
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unobserved fundamental θ, with values in the real line, describes the ac-
curacy of the beliefs: an agent with a higher value is more distant from
the truth. At a given time t, we assume there are two types of agents
- θl, θr - informed and misinformed, and the social network has a ho-
mophily coefficient of hk with respect to this property: h speakers of an
agent of type θi, i ∈ {l, r}, are of the same θi type. We model the prior
beliefs of informed (θl) and misinformed (θr) agents as distributions of θ
over the real line to allow for heterogeneous prior beliefs at time t. We
assume that the prior beliefs of informed and misinformed agents de-
rive from distributions N (θ0, δ−1l ) and N (θ0 + ξ, δ−1r ) respectively with
a strictly positive value for ξ, in order to ensure that the misinformed
type are, on average, farther away from truth compared to the informed
type. The belief of the entire population of the social network at time t, a
density-weighted average of the above distributions, is considered to be
polarized if it has two modes (peaks in the distribution).
We assume each agent communicates a particular realization of his
belief using a message (e.g., via a tweet) during the period between t and
a future time t + 1, and all agents update their prior beliefs at t + 1 after
incorporating beliefs about the fundamental expressed in their speak-
ers’ messages. Mathematically, a message from a speaker is modelled
as an independent noisy signal about the speaker’s realized belief, with
the degree of the noise (or uncertainty) being conditional on the type of
speaker. Since credibility of a communicated message is the precision
of belief expressed in the message, in our model, true and fake informa-
tion about the reality, arising from informed and misinformed speakers
respectively, propagate with different credibilities in the social network.
(We denote the credibilities or precisions of true and fake information
as βl and βr respectively.) We assume that the messages from informed
agents carry a positive credibility. (In our context of the reality about cli-
mate change, this is a reasonable assumption.) It is noteworthy to men-
tion that for a speaker of a given type θi, i ∈ {l, r}, βi is conceptually
different from δi: while δi characterizes the probability with which a par-
ticular random realization will be selected as the belief for the speaker,
βi characterizes how precisely the realized belief is communicated in a
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message. In a Bayesian update of beliefs, how a communicated message
affects the beliefs of listeners of the message depends on the belief ex-
pressed in the communicated message, the precision (or credibility) of
the message, prior beliefs held by individual listeners and the precision
of such prior beliefs of listeners.
Figure 13: BELIEF UPDATING MODEL
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The figure illustrates increase in polarization at time t+ 1 due to increase in homophily
(based on beliefs, e.g., reality of climate change) at time t. There is zero probability for
such an increase if fake information that propagates in the social network has zero
credibility.
We now present the findings of some analyses conducted using the
model discussed above. (Mathematical proofs of the results presented
below are available in Appendix B.3.) We find that in a random commu-
nication network with agents being sufficiently uncertain about the prior
beliefs they hold, polarization can not arise at time t+1, after agents have
incorporated their speakers’ beliefs. This means that, irrespective of the
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precisions with which true and fake information diffuse in the social net-
work, they do not play a role in the emergence of polarization without
the support of non-random topology of the social network and agents’
prior beliefs. We also find that if marginal increase in homophily at time
t does not increase the probability of polarization at t + 1, it can hap-
pen only in the case when the fake signals that propagate in the social
network do not have a minimal level of credibility and carry zero preci-
sion. A visual illustration of this result is shown in Figure 13. We believe
this provides a potential reason for our previous observation that, in the
climate change discussions on Twitter, polarization of beliefs does not
increase when homophily in communication patterns increases.
3.4 Discussion
The online social network Twitter has remained an important media for
rapid spread of opinions. We studied the opinions expressed in Twit-
ter during 2007-2017 regarding the reality of climate change. Below, we
briefly discuss our main findings and their limitations, and suggest di-
rections for future research.
The analysis over a long time period provides insight about the di-
rection of potential causality between homophily and polarization which
would otherwise not have been possible in cross-sectional observations.
In social networks, polarization of beliefs (existence of large groups of
people with opposing beliefs) and homophily in communication (com-
munication among people having same beliefs) tend to be highly corre-
lated. One potential mechanism for such a correlation is that increase
in homophily can reinforce individual beliefs leading to the creation of
echo chambers and hence increase polarization. Another mechanism for
such a correlation is that increase in polarization increases segregation
of a society into different beliefs thereby acting as a natural source to
increase the probability of like-minded communication (homophily). In
the case of Twittersphere of climate change conversations, we performed
Granger causality tests on the evolutions of homophily and polariza-
tion, and found that only homophily Granger-causes polarization and
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not vice-versa, i.e., increasing polarization does not lead to increase in
like-minded communication. It is important to note that Granger cau-
sation of homophily on polarization does not fully establish its causal-
ity. Granger causality is a concept about precedence of the cause (ho-
mophily) before the effect (polarization). It says that the evolution of ho-
mophily significantly helps to predict evolution of polarization in future.
Existence of Granger causality therefore does not exclude the possibil-
ity of an unobserved variable to drive the evolution of both homophily
and polarization. Although the presence of such an unobserved vari-
able is highly unlikely within the framework of our model and the vari-
ables used for empirical analysis, we encourage future research to build
upon the above results to improve the causal nature of the effect of ho-
mophily on polarization - this would require analysing scenarios where
homophily can be argued to be exogenous so that we are better ensured
about effects not being driven by unobserved variables. (Such causal re-
lationship may be investigated for topics other than climate change as
well.)
We also found that the effect of homophily on polarization is nega-
tive, i.e., increase in homophily in communication leads to decrease in
polarization of beliefs in future. This is counter-intuitive because we
would expect an increase in polarization when homophily increases. In-
creasing homophily leads to situations where people are exposed to a
narrow set of beliefs [82, 83] that conforms to their existing beliefs. When
such homophily in communication happens in two large sections of the
society with differing beliefs, it enhances polarization [110].
Polarization of beliefs can be affected not only by homophily in com-
munication among people, but also by the credibility of information that
propagates on Twitter. In this study, we investigated whether credibility
of information source plays a role to increase polarization. We studied
the ‘credibility’ factor because this has received less attention in the liter-
ature and is a very intuitive factor. It is intuitive since information from
a source which is not credible is naturally least likely to affect or change
the belief of an individual. Credibility is a dimension of information in-
dependent of the veracity of information. For example, let us consider
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a certain information (either true or fake) that comes from two different
sources at the same time: one source is a Twitter account of a person who
is not very well known, and another is the Twitter account of BBC News
(as instance) which has a much larger credibility in the society. In this
case the news sent by BBC News has a higher probability to influence
the beliefs of people at a large scale. More so, if the news happens to be
(intentionally or unintentionally) fake, it can possibly affect the beliefs
of a certain section of the society in a wrong direction (since the news is
fake) thereby increasing polarization in the society because a new section
of the society emerges with beliefs much different from what the entire
population believed previously.
We modelled these two determinants of polarization discussed above,
homophily in communication and credibility of information, jointly in a
belief updating model where agents in a networked society receive true
and fake information from their neighbours. We modelled the credibility
of each type of information using the precision or certainty of the infor-
mation. The model predicts that marginal increase in homophily always
leads to increase in polarization expect for the only case when fake in-
formation has no credibility. In the case when fake information is not
credible, the model predicts a negative effect of homophily on polariza-
tion. (This description is illustrated in Figure 13.) Since we observed
a negative effect of homophily on polarization in the empirical analysis
of climate change discussions on the Twitter platform, we conclude that
tweets expressing anti-climate change beliefs are largely not credible to
the broader society.
Our results disentangle the presence of fake information on social me-
dia from its potential negative effect on the society. The spread of fake
information (either as misinformation or disinformation), as has been
prevalent during recent years in online social media [115, 116], has the
potential to pose harm to the society by polarizing the beliefs of people
[115, 116, 117]; for instance, it can influence political election outcomes
[118]. However, does it mean that fake information always has a nega-
tive effect on the society? Based on our results of this study, we can say
that it is not always the case. In the case of reality about climate change,
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although there are many climate-sceptic messages, we showed that such
messages are largely not credible and hence polarization (a negative con-
sequence for society) does not increase when users on the platform com-
municate among themselves. Hence, in general, we believe that the pres-
ence of fake information (on various topics including climate change) in
social media and the web is not a conclusive evidence of its negative ef-
fect on the society at large. This also reaffirms the fact that the negative
effects of echo chambers in social networks, which are known to arise
due to high levels of homophily in communication, might be overstated
[119, 64, 87, 120].
We now discuss some assumptions about agents in our model, and
how alternative assumptions about human behaviour (in real world)
may also explain how increase in homophily can lead to decrease in po-
larization in future. Agents in the model are rational [81] and purely
rely on previously held beliefs and beliefs expressed by neighbours in
their immediate social networks to arrive at new beliefs. Such assump-
tion of Bayesian updating of beliefs dictates that when homophily in-
creases (i.e., agents’ exposure to non-conforming beliefs decreases, or in
other words, cross-attitudinal interactions decreases), the ability of mis-
informed agents to move closer to truth decreases. Human behaviour,
in general, is highly heterogeneous and there may exist different ways
in which people update beliefs in real world. Let us consider a differ-
ent situation where the utility of agents depends not only on the belief
of own type but also on the (opposite) belief held by the other type. In
particular consider a situation where people update beliefs in the follow-
ing manner - when people are exposed to cross ideologies, instead of
gaining higher utility by incorporating and averaging it with own ide-
ologies, they gain higher utility by the fact that they know something
(what they think is supposed to be known) and the opposite party is
misguided and carries the wrong belief. In such a case, if homophily
increases, cross-attitudinal interactions decrease and the misinformed
agents are less convinced about their belief because their exposure to in-
formed type (opposite type) agents decreases. This leads to dilution of
ones’s held beliefs and creates a decrease in polarization. Although such
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a behavioural assumption can lead to an alternative way to explain neg-
ative effect of homophily on polarization, we believe that such assump-
tion may not scale to a wider population. (Especially in the case of reality
about climate change, we believe that informed people would also want
ill-informed sections of the society to know about the reality as they do.)
In this context, we believe that by imposing a Bayesian updating criteria
we have studied the expected outcomes in a baseline model, and is (ide-
ally) representative of the behaviour of a larger population. We consider
the model we analysed in this study to be parsimonious enough to be
able to explain the negative effect of homophily on polarization by high-
lighting the role of information credibility. Future research, depending
on the nature of investigation, may find our analysis as a useful guide.
Individual rumours are being debunked in due time by fact check-
ing measures [121, 122], however, public perception about some issues
like human induced (anthropogenic) climate change have remained con-
troversial for a long time [123]. Such controversy appears to persist
even after several investigations made by the scientific community. Var-
ious factors like exposure to different kind of information on the media
[124, 125], politicization of climate change [126], and exposure to fake in-
formation on social media platforms are potential reasons that can con-
tribute to polarization of beliefs about the reality of climate change. In
this study, we showed that social media messages on platform like Twit-
ter is not a potential concern because although there are many sources
propagating fake beliefs regarding climate change, the collective credi-
bility of such sources is negligible. Future research may contribute to im-
prove our understanding about how public perceives the reality about
climate change. It is better that the society is not polarized on beliefs
about the reality of climate change, so that timely environmental policies
can be implemented with least public resistance. Since credibility of ma-
jor fake information sources about climate change can polarize beliefs on
a large scale, it is important to assess credibility of such sources and their
potential negative effects on society. (In this context, polarization is one
such negative or undesired effect.)
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Chapter 4
Politicization in Guardian,
a News Media Outlet
4.1 Introduction
In democracies, citizens’ opinions play important role in influencing fu-
ture policies, and the mass media has been known to strategically shape
public perception on various issues [127]. Hence what and how media
presents facts plays a critical role in shaping public opinion and poli-
cies. Exposure to news media can cause people to participate in vari-
ous issues, and join national policy conversations [128]. The more media
writes about a certain topic, the more important it becomes it the eyes of
the public [129]. At the same time, the ways media presents news also
has its effects: a negative coverage of an issue can create a negative per-
ception of the issue in the public [129]. So the manner of communication
can have an effect on the public understanding of the issue as well. A
particular instance of the way of presentation, relevant for this study, is
politicization of the news articles. There are several evidences of politi-
cization of important national and international issues [130, 131].
Climate change is an important issue facing the planet with poten-
tial for vast damages [132]. Although industry regulations of activities
leading to global warming is important, change in behaviour of public
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through individual and group efforts and raising voice for the needed
policies is equally important. However public understanding of climate
change has not been unequivocal [133], due to several potential reasons.
Among such reasons in shaping public perception, climate change com-
munication by scientific experts [134, 135, 136] and media [137, 138, 139,
140] play important roles.
The sensitive issue of climate change has also been acknowledged in
the literature to be politicized [141, 142, 143, 144]. The role played in it
by the ways of presenting news in media [145, 146, 147, 148] can affect
how public forms opinions on the issue [149, 150], understands the im-
portance of the issue [151], participates in discussions and taking actions
[152, 153, 154], and thereby shaping future policies [155, 156, 157, 158].
For example, framing a particular discussion on global warming with
mentions of scientific opinions can potentially make various attributes
of the discussion more important and objective than that with mentions
of political figures and party identities. In fact, a recent study [159] shows
that partisanship during communication, even by only the exposure to
the logos of political parties, can affect social learning and increase po-
larization of beliefs about climate change effects. This shows high degree
of susceptibility of the perception about climate change to politicization
of the issue.
News articles contain numerous options to politicize climate change,
let alone the images of political parties’ logos. It is understandable that
mentions of factual content (scientific facts) in an article about climate
change can (and should) objectively influence readers’ perception on the
issue. However, can changes in articles reflecting political positioning or
inclination of an article about climate change really influence the perception
and response patterns of the readers?
As mentioned above, previous research findings and articles on the
web seem to suggest that (i) climate issue is politicized, and (ii) political
framing in general by the media can influence public understanding and
participation. However any concrete evidence on the media effects of politi-
cization of the climate change issue over an extended time period is absent.
In this study, we fill this major gap by investigating whether and how the
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collective behaviour of the audience of a reputed news outlet pay atten-
tion and respond to politicization of climate change articles published by
the news organization.
Using articles related to climate change from the Guardian, we infer
the time-invariant nature of effects of politicization by using (the best
possible) time-invariant measures of treatments for estimations, setting
up quasi-experimental conditions for measuring treatment effects prior
to statistical estimations, and using time fixed effects during estimations.
We find a positive impact of politicization on various variables describ-
ing collective discussion/response to the articles. We investigate politi-
cization due to positioning of articles related to climate change in the
‘Politics’ section of Guardian and due to mentions of politically inclined
named entities within the articles. The estimates are robust to time fixed
effects, authors, and potential confounders. In the case of influence from
named entities mentioned within articles, we provide results for two
cases of readers’ behaviour depending on whether or not they might per-
ceive the political inclinations of entities due to past association as they
read a current article. In addition, we investigate the mechanisms be-
hind the effects of politicization on user participation and other discus-
sion characteristics. In both cases we show how politicized perception
channels the effects of politicization on collective attention and engage-
ments. The main results from these investigations described above are
summarized in Figure 14.
We also conduct an investigation on the potential intent of authors
to make their articles more politically oriented in order to drive collec-
tive attention and increased participation on the discussion of articles.
For this, we use the risk averseness of authors as the estimate of such
intent. We find that authors are risk averse instead of risk preferring,
i.e., they are not likely to bet on extremely politicized content to drive at-
tention. Although there is no issue of reverse-causality in the estimated
effects of politicization on various characteristics of participation because
of temporal separability of publication and discussion, this result on risk
averseness says something about their intentions to politicize in future
periods after seeing the effects in a certain period of time. Overall, we do
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Figure 14: COLLECTIVE DISCUSSION
  
                    POLITICS
Climate Change News
Readers of an article who join the discussion can be influenced by various characteristics
of the article, past articles related to the current article, and current state of the discussion.
We find that positioning an article in ‘Politics’ section drives higher collective attention
and response to the article when compared to positioning in any other section. We find
that at least 65% of users’ participation in discussion due to politicization (via politically
oriented textual entities is article’s main text) is driven via users’ collective recollection of
past political contexts related to the current article. Users influenced politically in such a
manner also drive at least 40% of the impact of politicization (as above) on total
comments, social feedbacks, and users’ engagement in the discussion.
not expect the authors, in general, to politicize climate change articles in
expectation of higher collective attention to their articles.
In the following section, we discuss the data collected from Guardain
and some descriptive statistics. Next, we provide details about the con-
cepts and measures used to understand politicization in the articles. Next,
we investigate the impact of politicization of various dimensions of col-
lective attention. Next, we investigate whether authors are likely to in-
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crease the mentions of politically oriented entities in articles in response
to how readers respond to it.
4.2 Data
We use data on all articles related to climate change and the comments re-
ceived in their discussion sections published in the Guardian upto Septem-
ber 2018. (Data was collected during the last week of the month.) The
articles’ texts and other metadata were retrieved from Guardian’s open
API service, and the comments were scrapped from the website using
robots.
The metadata of articles’ text consists of characteristics of the arti-
cles like publication date, author, title, section allocated to the article (Ta-
ble 3), whether the article is commentable or not, and others (which are
not relevant for this study). Each retrieved comment contains informa-
tion on full text, its user name, time of comment, whether it is a reply
to another comment, likes received on the comment, and page number.
Replies are organised as a nested tree-like structure in the discussion sec-
tion, as shown in Figure 15.
There are a total of 51,874 articles with text, of which only 28,570 are
open for receiving comments (as decided by authors or publisher due to
reasons not available in articles’ metadata). The total number of com-
ments in all the articles over the entire duration is 7,751,740 of which
7,748,575 had their texts intact at the time of data retrieval. (In other
comments, the original text was removed, and replaced with a message
describing so.) There are 5,046,325 replies, i.e., about 65% of the com-
ments are replies to other comments. Rest 35% are root comments. A
total of 293,330 unique users have participated in the discussion on all
articles in aggregate.
As described later in Section 4.3.2, due to the nature of analysis of
(joint effects of) politicization, we use certain categories of named enti-
ties as the storehouse of politicization in various articles. We keep only
those articles which have at least one such entity that has appeared more
than 2000 times in the entire dataset. The distribution of appearance of
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named entities in the aggregate dataset contains an extremely high num-
ber of entities with almost zero frequency, compared to the remaining
distribution. With this we retain 48,684 articles of which 26,737 are com-
mentable. Among these articles open for comments, 22,171 have actually
received comments.
Table 3: SECTION SPLITS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE RELATED ARTICLES
Entity Meaning
Environment 14357
Opinion 6550
Politics 3700
World news 3042
Business 2734
Guardian Sustainable Business 2183
US news 1706
Australia news 1631
UK news 1331
Society 1318
Science 1219
Global development 1078
Books 925
Media 859
Education 775
Money 693
News 619
Global 527
Life and style 516
Film 384
Sport 383
Travel 350
Technology 346
Music 339
Football 294
From the Guardian 293
Stage 289
Public Leaders Network 286
Working in development 281
Art and design 259
There are a total of 128 sections in the Guardian. Each article is allocated to one particular
section. The table shows a list of the top section names, ordered according to the number
of articles on climate change contained in the respective sections.
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Figure 15: SAMPLE DISCUSSION
Illustration of a portion of a discussion on a particular article in the Guardian.
4.3 Politicization of climate change
In this section we formalize the notion of politicization that we shall use
in our empirical analysis later. In doing so, our goal is to use intuitive
measures that reflect human behaviour, and that can be applied to large
scale datasets and other contexts.
Politicization of a topic by a news organization is a broad notion that
encompasses several aspects of how authors write articles for the topic
over a certain time period. It encompasses the ways of presentation for
promoting the topic and the ways of presentation for informing events
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and happenings related to the topic in order to create a desired influence
in the readers. Such manners of presentation have been discussed widely
in media communication as framing [160, 161]. Politicization therefore
can be understood as political framing by the usage of available choices
that can create a political influence on readers.
Detecting politicization or political frames in articles is therefore a
subjective issue because several factors can contribute towards framing.
In order to understand framing in a meaningful way, several studies
have measured different aspects of of framing. Broadly, such factors in-
clude language construction by the media, and identifiable components
of texts which people may perceive differently or with a different empha-
sis. Studies have identified frames using manual or human detection of
frames. While manual approach is highly reliable due to the subjective
nature of framing, it becomes a challenge when facing large sample size.
Due to the nature of our dataset, we therefore rely on computer-assisted
methods that are relevant to detect framing in large samples.
One strand of literature uses cluster analysis [162, 163] like topic mod-
els to capture framing. However the datasets used contain different top-
ics, and so using this approach gives a fair advantage in separating dif-
ferent topics in the first attempt. Usually this is also assisted by manual
annotations to improve the quality of detected frames. This approach of
automated detection using LDA and similar models [164] for the data
in this study can pose a challenge since the topic of this study is largely
about climate change. (Indeed as expected, using the LDA model, we
did not find substantial hints for distinguishing one topic from the other.)
Although several sophisticated versions of clustering models exist in the
literature, we do not use this approach because the basic LDA model
does not seem to suit the data set we have and the objective we want to
achieve (distinguishing potential political influences on readers).
Another strand of literature identifies factors that affect framing and
attempts to measure such factors. This approach has the potential to sep-
arate different framing types even within a particular topic like climate
change, as in this study. Framing does not directly alter the importance
of the issue, unlike agenda setting [165]. However it can leave open the
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door to subjectivity with potential to change individual beliefs about cli-
mate change and collective beliefs as people interact and discuss. Using
a recent study, we find the following features to be the determinants of
framing [166]: (i) sentence complexity representing overall organization
and presentation of facts and opinions, (ii) presence of named entities,
(iii) presence of phrases or sentences in quotes for emphasis, (iv) usage
of images, and (v) catch phrases including headlines and tricky words.
Most of these features can be identifiable using automated techniques.
We emphasize the first two features for political framing in our analysis.
Politicization of articles in the Guardian can therefore arise from var-
ious choices made by authors in their articles in order to produce a de-
sired way of presentation. In this study we investigate two choices of
authors that can provide political contexts to (climate change) articles:
(i) macro attribute determined by the categorization of articles in to dif-
ferent sections, and (ii) micro attributes composed of politically oriented
entities. Both these factors are very intuitive in why they have the poten-
tial to impose different perceptions on readers. The macro attributes are
more likely to encompass the tone and complexity of sentences readers
might be expecting from articles in ‘Politics’ section, and especially the
subtle differences experienced or new readers might feel when reading
articles in the two categories: ‘Politics’, ‘Others’. The micro attributes
on the other hand are identifiable named entities. We believe these en-
tities project political inclinations very well on to the readers if they are
political terms. However such entities, even if are not precise political
terms, might be susceptible to acquire political inclinations due to several
contextual factors, one of them being their repeated presence/mentions
in other articles which have high density of politically inclined terms.
Quotes are recognizable and easily distinguishable aspects of text. Usu-
ally in newspapers, it contains statement made by different personal-
ities/organizations, or points of emphasis. However we believe they
carry a different notion than the presence of named entities and hence
we prefer to keep this as a control variable in our analysis in next sec-
tions. In the Guardian, each article usually has a image or a few. We do
not have precise information in our dataset about this, however we can
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expect less variance in the number of images from one article to another
and hence it may not be that useful to explain variances in discussion
outcomes. Headlines usually contain named entities and we can expect
these to appear again in the main text text of the article (already captured
by micro attributes). Apart from this aspect, headlines usually are writ-
ten in a way to capture attention, and this is true for all articles’ headlines.
Therefore we don’t see any reason to use headlines as a main instrument
of politicization.
Based on the understanding so far, we adopt the following general
formulation for the measure of politicization.
Politicization = Ũ
(
Ã1(Macro features), Ã2(Micro features)
)
(4.1)
We express politicization of an article as a function of the choices made
by its author with respect to macro and micro attributes of the article and
how readers perceive the political inclinations of such choices as they
read the article. When readers decide whether to participate or not, it is
based on their final perception of authors’ choices. In (4.1), Ũ is a func-
tion that shapes an article’s interpretation by combining various macro
and micro factors and interactions among them. At this stage we do not
propose an exact formulation for Ũ , however we would like our readers
to know that any joint effects between macro and micro attributes that
we test in later sections is to be understood as a part of the Ũ function.
4.3.1 Macro attributes
The information on the section in which an article is published forms
the macro attribute of politicization. Each article (about climate change)
in Guardian belongs to exactly one section, the names of which are de-
scribed in Table 3. We group the information about articles’ sections into
two relevant categories. As shown in Table 4, we have split all section
names into two categories - ‘Politics’ and ‘Others’.
What goes in to Ã1? At this stage, we have defined the macro at-
tribute to be the category of an article - ‘Politics’ or ‘Others’. Ã is sup-
posed to capture all the complex phenomena that goes in to making one
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category more politically inclined over the other category. Trying to pro-
vide a formulation for Ã1 would be beyond the scope of this study. What
the formulation in (4.1) is instead saying is that the entire complex phe-
nomena that can be attributed to Ã1 is a simple function of the category
assigned to an article.
At this stage it is an untested assumption whether readers’ broader
perception and hence follow-up responses in discussion depend on the
article’s category or not. With the current formulation we are able to
be in a position to only test in the later sections whether or not there
is at least one (unknown or unquantifiable) factor that shapes political
perception of article in a broader sense which can be characterized by
the categorization of article.
It is important too understand that Ã1 does not look in to the content
of articles. What it captures are those aspects of articles that are common
across all articles in a given section/category. For instance, it can cap-
ture users’ expectations from an article in the ‘Politics’ section because
seasoned readers might have been habituated with the use of language
construction by authors when writing for this section.
Table 4: CATEGORIES FOR ARTICLES
Category Number of Articles
Politics 3700
Others 48174
The section ‘Politics’ is assigned to ‘Politics’ category and all remaining sections are
assigned to ‘Others’ category. Refer Table 3 for the frequencies of climate change articles
under each section.
So to summarize, in this study, we do not make any assumptions
about the formulation of Ã1, mostly because we believe it is complex
enough and beyond the scope of this research. That said, we also encour-
age future studies to investigate more on these aspects, especially using
techniques from computational linguistics and psychology that can dif-
ferentiate and quantify why different sections might be associated with
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differing sense of perception, especially for articles related to same topic.
We shall later investigate empirically whether such unknown factors
that shape interpretation of articles in ‘Politics’ section is different from
that in other sections in the Guardian.
4.3.2 Micro attributes
As mentioned previously, we are looking at political inclinations of named
entities in an article as the micro attributes for politicization. Inclusion of
such entities are the choices of authors (and random to readers). There
can be a lot of heterogeneity across how readers perceive different micro
attributes. In this study, we base our analysis using minimal and impor-
tant assumptions about temporal effect of perception which is facilitated
by the memory of human minds and their ability to perceive contextual
associations.
Political orientations of named entities form the gateway to politi-
cization stemming from micro attributes of an article. We assume that
political orientation of a particular named entity in a given article de-
rives from two sources: (i) the direct political inclination captured by
the entity and reflected to the readers which, on average, would hold
without any past context about it mentioned in the Guardian, and (ii)
the indirect political orientation of the entity perceived by readers as-
suming that entity has had a political context prior to being mentioned
in the current article. An example for the first case can be the scenario in
which “climate-change” is mentioned in an article of Guardian purely for
the first time. An example for the second case can be a scenario where
‘climate-change” is mentioned in its 101st publication (considering all
articles) where the “climate-change” entity may have appeared multiple
times in the past 100 publications along with named entities like “Repub-
licans” and “Democrats”.1 The indirect effect on perceived politicization
is what we refer to as the temporal effect of perception.
The rationale for a temporal effect of perception is motivated from a
psychological perspective which encompasses various complex factors
1The entities used for this example is solely for illustration and does not reflect any
pre-conceived notions to influence the results of this study.
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why a reader might perceive indirect political inclinations. While a non-
political entity by itself may not carry any political orientation, it how-
ever may carry political notions due to its association or co-occurence
with political terms in the past. In a sense, the indirect political inclina-
tion may be understood as a kind of “network effect” on perception of
readers when they come across named entities while reading an article.
A simple illustration of this notion is shown in Figure 16.
To formalize a measure, we define the micro attribute of politicization
of an article At published at time t as
PImicro(At) = D ·
∑
j∈E(A−t ∩ i)
wj PI(j) +
∑
i∈E(At)
PI(i), (4.2)
where At represents an article published at time t,
D is a binary variable (0/1),
E(At′) is the set of unique named entities in an article At′ published at a
time t′,
PI(e) is the absolute political inclination of a named entity e,
A−t = {At−1, At−2, ...} is the set of all articles published prior to time t,
E(A−t ∩ i) = { j | j ∈ E(At′), i ∈ E(At′) ∀ At′ ∈ A−t} is the set of all
entities that co-occurred with entity i in articles published prior to time
t, and
wj is a weight given by the cardinality of the previous co-occurrences of
the (i, j) pair and normalized by the sum of all cardinalities of previous
co-occurrences with the entity i.
Based on the value of D, we classify micro attribute into two types as
mentioned below.
• Direct type: D = 0 for this type, which represents that micro at-
tribute of politicization of an article is derived only from the abso-
lute political inclinations of all named entities in the article. Refer-
ring to Ã2 in (4.1), it suggests that the political perception derived
from the named entities relies solely within the article and depends
on each entity’s political inclination.
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• Indirect type: D = 1 for this type, which represents that micro
attribute of politicization derives not only from the sum of abso-
lute political inclinations of each entity, but also from the politi-
cal inclination of each entity that is inheritable from that of pre-
vious entities with whom it co-occurred. Various formulations of
inheritance are possible; for this study we choose a simple formu-
lation that weights these inheritances by a normalized frequency
of co-occurrences as shown in (4.2). Referring to Ã2 in (4.1), it
suggests that readers’ perceived politicization due to named en-
tities in an article, as chosen by authors is a function of past con-
textual named entities. The contexts refer to all aspects of sim-
ilarities/dependencies with past articles which readers perceive,
and (speaking mathematically) is a function of the co-occurrences
among entities, which we have quantified in (4.2).
Table 5: TYPES OF NAMED ENTITIES
Entity Type∗∗ Meaning Total number of appearances∗
PERSON: People, including fictional1 928407
NORP: Nationalities or religious or political groups2 280839
ORG: Companies, agencies, institutions, etc.3 912840
EVENT: Named hurricanes, battles, wars, sports events, etc.4 18641
LAW: Named documents made into laws5 9840
∗∗ The text analysis tool Spacy is capable of recognizing these entities, and others,
based on its trained model.
∗ In the entire dataset, not just in the sample used for analysing this study
1 For example, Obama, Cameron, Clinton, Trump, Abbott, Al Gore, etc.
2 For example, Conservatives, Chinese, Democrats, Canadian, Syrian, Muslim, etc.
3 For example, EU, Labour, Senate, White House, Google, World Bank, etc.
4 For example, Hurricane Katrina, Hurricane Sandy, World War II, etc.
5 For example, Kyoto Protocol, Climate Change Act, etc.
The only missing piece in (4.2) is a measure for the absolute political
inclination of an entity. We find that there is a clear separation of enti-
ties’ appearances across the two categories: 30,566 (unique) entities have
appeared only in articles of the ‘Politics’ category, 432,332 named enti-
ties have appeared only in articles of ‘Others’ category, and 33,833 enti-
ties have appeared in articles of both categories. Using this information,
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we define a simple measure of political inclination of an entity, irrespec-
tive of the time instances of its appearances in articles, as the number of
times the entity has appeared in distinct articles of ‘Politics’ category in
the entire dataset. Figure 16 illustrates the use of this measure towards
computation of PImicro(At).
Figure 16: POLITICIZATION FROM POLITICAL INCLINATIONS OF ENTITIES
  
An article at time t
ent-1 (0)
ent-2 (9)
Articles prior to time t
  ent-1 (0)
p-ent-1 (4)
 ent-1 (0)
 ent-2 (9)
 ent-4 (0)
  ent-2 (9)
p-ent-1 (4)
  ent-3 (6)
Appearances (in entire dataset) :             Politics category only                     Others category only
                                      Both categories
The figure shows entities from appearances across various categories in current article (the
right box) and prior articles. The left box contains only those articles from the past which
have co-occurred with entities of the current article at time t. The number inside brackets
next to each entity is its absolute political inclination, i.e., the total number of times it has
appeared in the Politics category in the entire dataset. Even if ent-1 never appeared in
Politics category, it still contributes towards politicization (only in case of indirect type of
micro attribute) because of its previous co-occurrences with p-ent-1 and ent-2. Next, ent-2
will contribute towards total politicization due to its own absolute inclination and also
due to the inclinations from its previous associations with p-ent-1 and ent-3.
We make two choices for practical reasons in order to make the
PImicro(At) measure defined in (4.2) more meaningful and less compu-
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tationally intensive. First, out of the various types of identifiable named
entities that exist in the dataset, the ones we consider for the analysis are
shown in Table 5. The reason is that these entities are more vulnerable to
contain political inclinations. To explain with counter examples, named
entity types like mountains, countries, products, etc. appears in many
articles however including them in the measure for micro attribute of
politicization is mostly irrelevant. For instance, we do not expect read-
ers to perceive anything of political context as they come across vari-
ous names of countries while reading an article. Second, to allow for
computational efficiency while simultaneously maintaining a reasonable
ground for audience’s ability to relate an article they are currently read-
ing with previous articles, we restrict the set of past articles where we
search for co-occurrences among entities to have been published within
60 days prior to the current article for which PImicro(At) is being calcu-
lated.
4.4 Consumption perspective: Impact on collec-
tive discussion
In this section, we examine the influence of politicizing climate change
articles on aggregate statistics of collective discussions is response to
such articles. The identification of the impact of politicization in a com-
plex discussion environment is largely possible due to the fact that named
entities, storehouse of micro political inclinations, and category of a given
article which decide the amount of political framing (or politicization)
to which users are exposed to are exogenous to users because these are
pre-determined and published prior to the discussion on the article. We
also propose and show the statistical validity of two mechanisms that
plausibly underlie the qualities of politicized discussions in response to
politicized articles.
We have 22,171 observations after filtering the dataset for articles
which are open for receiving comments and have actually received com-
ments, as described in Section 4.2. (Of these, 1218 articles did not receive
any comments.) The observations contain articles’ text, category infor-
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mation, and their discussions for the climate change topic during 2006 to
2018.
Tables 18, 19, 20, & 21 show the consistency of the significance of co-
efficients estimated by regressing the aggregate outcomes of discussion
on macro and micro attributes of politicization using different specifica-
tions. The models are estimated using the least squares method and het-
eroskedasticity robust standard errors. The macro and micro attributes
are normalized2 so that it can be ensured that the observed effects stem
from relative changes within these attributes and not from their absolute
magnitudes (which does not have an established conceptual meaning).
The estimated coefficients of politicization attributes therefore should be
interpreted only for their statistical significance and signs (positive or
negative).
The estimates in Model 1 (across all the above tables) suggest that
both macro and micro attributes significantly affect the discussion out-
comes. These effects hold for both indirect and direct types of micro
attributes, i.e., whether or not we might assume readers to be influenced
by the political inclinations of previous articles.
Model 2 (across all the above tables) shows significant interaction ef-
fects between the macro and micro attributes. This suggests that, as ex-
pected, due to complex nature of framing, macro and micro attributes
have significant joint roles in forming the perceptions of politicization
that affect discussion outcomes.
Model 3 improves the reliability of estimates in Model 2 by control-
ling for the major potential confounders. As discussed previously in Sec-
tion 4.3, three primary determinants of (political) framing include named
entities, quotes, and sentence complexity. While named entities and sen-
tence complexity are baked into the measures used for micro and macro
attributes respectively, we control for quotes explicitly in two ways - the
number of quotes used in articles, the length of all quotes measured by
the number of words in all quotes. We also control for length of articles
because this can affect both the perception of politicization and the con-
tent for discussion. On this note, we would like to mention that we have
2xI , the ith observation of a variable x becomes xi =
xi−xmin
xmax−xmin
when x is normalized.
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used only those variables as confounders which, by definition, have po-
tential to affect both the discussion outcomes and the variables describ-
ing politicization.3 The key takeaways from the above analysis done so
far include the positive impacts of macro and micro attributes, and the
significance of the interaction between macro and micro attributes.
Time (quarters of years) fixed effects are included in model estimates
to eliminate bias from unobservables stemming from various character-
istics of the time that are common across all articles within the time pe-
riod. This makes the interpretation of the estimates less susceptible to
time-specific events that happen within each period and can cause vari-
ations in authors’ writeup of articles and in readers’ attention from one
time period to another.
Authors have objectives (e.g., agenda setting over a time period), use
resources (e.g., named entities) and face constraints (e.g., article length)
when they write articles. Therefore the choices of named entities across
various articles might represent assignment of politicizations due to the
authors. (In a treatment effects setting, this can be thought of assign-
ment of treatments, the micro attributes, in clusters of articles grouped
by authors.). This also allows to ensure robustness of estimates due to
authors that are dropped out of the dataset used for regressions due sev-
eral articles being not open for comments. Clustering standard errors
by authors is statistically feasible because there are 6659 unique authors
in the dataset. (There should be, ideally, large number of clusters.) For
robustness, we also show standard errors clustered by authors for coeffi-
cient of macro attribute and interaction effect. In Tables 18, 19, 20, & 21,
we see that the macro attribute may not be significant, especially with ro-
bust standard errors clustered by authors. The micro attribute (for both
indirect and direct types) and the interaction effect remain significant.
So far, no discussion has been made about treatment effects exclu-
sively. Estimates in Tables 18, 19, 20, & 21 do not allow for interpretation
of counter-factual scenarios where one would be interested in under-
standing the impact of changing either the macro or the micro attribute.
3Do not control for post-treatment variables(Mostly harmless econometrics, Imai, An-
drew Gelman pdf), peer influence paper
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The reason these estimates do not allow for such causal interpretations
are primarily because of the significance of the joint effects of macro and
micro attributes which, according to framing theory and simple intuition,
point towards the complexities in perception that can arise due to both
positioning and mentioning articles with political orientations. Hence,
the statistical significance of the impact on discussion outcomes arising
solely due to a change in macro (or micro) attribute is unclear at this
stage. However, expecting a positive impact (from both macro and micro
attributes) seems to be plausible. We improve the causal interpretations
of such impacts in the following sections, with a focus on justifying the
conditional independence assumption.
Before proceeding, let us understand that there is no violation of the
SUTVA, the stable unit treatment value assumption, in our analysis. For
each article, we have the article’s platform for publication on the web,
there is an author who posts the content of the article, and there is a col-
lective group of readers who join gradually to discuss the article. Each
article, published at a given time, forms one unit (or one observation)
in the statistical analysis. The author, the content, and the readers of
an article are essentially features of the article about which we want to
determine how one feature affects another. The treatment is the politi-
cization of the article, either as a macro attribute or in the form of micro
attribute. Hence treatment to an article is fully determined once its au-
thor has published it on the web, and strictly precedes any discussion
on the article (thereby ruling out opportunities for reverse-causalities).
Various aggregate characteristics summarizing the collective discussion
of the article form potential outcome variables in our analysis.
SUTVA is least likely to violated because of several reasons. First,
politicization of an article, published by its author at a given time tmight
be related to the macro or micro attribute of politicization of articles pub-
lished in the past and/or with other unpublished articles in the near fu-
ture. There can be various reasons, for example, strategies by the author.
However, this does not directly guarantee, and is least likely, that the
treatment at t causes (or spills over to) politicization of future articles, or
is influenced by that of past articles. To account for any similarities in
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ideas by the author, we always ensure to use clustered standard errors as
an additional layer of robustness check during estimations. This cluster-
ing is relevant if authors have been pre-determined at random as to how
much each would politicize, and also if the audience has a habit in how
they perceive the content of different authors.
Second, although an author’s choices about macro and micro attributes
of an article at time t are exogenous to new viewers, nothing stops them
from potentially spilling over their thoughtful responses on discussion
sections of other articles, either of past articles since time t− or of future
articles upto time t+. Plausible reasons for this can be that readers are
usually exposed to a group of articles when they visit a site and they may
be involved in driving comments across several articles. So what can be a
good approximation for a duration for [t−, t+] during which politicization
of one article might be, if any at all, driving discussions on other articles due
to readers’ activities? By including quarterly fixed effects in regression
models, we rule out event-specific and time-specific variations (includ-
ing any common propaganda) so that any observed treatment effect of
article at a time t can be ascribed to its own idiosyncratic politicization
and not due to common shocks of politicization during the time period.
Our estimates, to be seen later, suggest that the nature of inference of
analysis does not change upon inclusion of time fixed effects, and hence
further clustering is not necessary [167].
Lastly, it is noteworthy to mention that contextual associations with
past articles to which readers might be responding to during discussions
(as defined by temporal effect of perception) is conceptually different
from violation of SUTVA, which requires that a large fraction of users
should be writing their comments on engaging in discussion in other ar-
ticles’ discussions after they have perceived politicization by reading a
particular article.
4.4.1 Impact of macro attributes
In this section we aim to detect if macro attributes play a role in affecting
discussion outcomes by providing a causal analysis and interpretation.
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An article may be written for a particular pre-determined section or
the article may be assigned to a section after it has been written. In trying
to investigate the impact of macro attributes, it is the later which forms
the treatment. The correct interpretation is therefore a scenario where
micro attributes are pre determined prior to such allocation of section. In
this section, treatment refers to a what-if scenario of positioning an article
from ‘Others’ category to the ‘Politics’ category, treated group refers to
articles in the ‘Politics’ category, control group refers to articles in the
‘Others’ category, and treatment effect refers to the average treatment
effect as in the Rubin Causal Model.
In order to improve model independence,4 we use matching to pre
process the dataset. This will ensure estimated treatment effects are not
sensitive to the model specifications used in the regressions and will
minimize any potential violation of the conditional independence as-
sumption to a large extent. This ensures that, on average, assignment
of treatment to the control group is not accompanied by changes in con-
founders due to their correlations with the treatment. Exact matching can
provide extremely unbiased estimates. In our attempt, we found a final
dataset of only 72 observations, split equally between treatment and con-
trol groups. While 72 observations with high significance for treatment
effect definitely provides reasons why estimates in previous section are
not reliable (largely due to bias arising from correlations between macro
and micro attributes which is now zero), it does not paint the full picture,
especially about the authors. Unfortunately only 17 out of 6659 authors
were retained in the reduced/matched dataset.5
We therefore choose coarsened exact matching (CEM) for reducing
model dependence. CEM [168] is a monotonoic imbalance bounding
matching method that balances treated and control groups in a way that
avoids the usual manual discovery of balanced dataset in which adjust-
ing imbalance on one variable has no effect on the maximum imbalance
of any other. Also, common empirical support, and robustness to mea-
4Model independence means that inferences made from any statistical estimation re-
veal underlying nature of the data, and that model specifications are not the the cause of
observed estimates.
517 is the case for matching micro attribute of indirect type.
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Table 6: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS OF MACRO ATTRIBUTE
Treatment: Macro attribute of politicization
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Effects (positive/negative/conditional) on various discussion characteristics
Discussion Size (Total Comments) positive? positive?
Agreements/Feedbacks (Total Likes) positive? positive?
Users’ Engagement (Total Replies) positive? positive?
Total Unique Users positive? positive?
? Estimates are significant with p-value less than 0.001.
Estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity, author clusters, time fixed effects, and potential confounders.
For complete details, refer Tables 28, 29, 30, & 31.
surement error are guaranteed within the CEM methodology.
While a post-CEM dataset may reiterate the significance of the treat-
ment effect as seen in previous section (and as seen with an exactly matched
dataset, not shown here), it allows for more variation and hence the re-
liance of the estimates to be generalizable. Indeed, as shown in Table
22, there are 20,272 observations in the matched dataset; so we can ex-
pect much better unbiased estimates without having them to have high
variance (as in the case of exact matching with only 72 observations).
Also 6413 and 6323 authors out of 6659 are retained in the dataset when
matched separately using micro attributes of indirect and direct types
respectively; this helps enormously by making it feasible to cluster stan-
dard errors by authors during regression estimations. Overall, as shown
in Table 22, a 98.6% mean improvement (considering all variables) in the
mean difference across treated and control groups is obtained using the
matching strategy. The estimates of treatment effect on various outcomes
are briefly described in Table 6.
Tables 28, 29, 30, and 31 show the details of treatment effect of macro
attribute of politicization on discussion size, social feedbacks, users’ en-
gagement, and unique users respectively. In Models 1, 2 (across all ta-
bles), we see that the estimates are consistent, and statistically signifi-
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cant with positive impacts. The estimates are robust to heteroskedas-
ticity, confounders, time fixed effects, and standard errors clustered by
authors. It is sufficient to interpret the sign and significance since the
numeric value of treatment effect estimate.
In Model 3 (for all collective outcomes), we see that there is hetero-
geneity in treatment effect. Hence the the effect of positioning an article
in ‘Politics’ section on collective attention of readers would be higher if
the article contains more mentions of politically oriented named entities.
How does the treatment channel? The macro attribute essentially
captures organised patterns of writing, many aspects of readers’ percep-
tions, and probably a general influence of being political. It is difficult
and beyond the scope of this investigation to propose how this might be
happening. In any case, we can always assume it is for the same chan-
nel of perceptions for which political news are usually sensational on the
media.
4.4.2 Impact of micro attributes
Since micro attributes (indirect and direct types) are continuous vari-
ables, we use a linear model to estimate their average treatment effects on
discussion outcomes for each additional unit of change in the attribute of
each type.
To improve model-independent estimates we use the Covariate Bal-
ancing Generalized Propensity Score (CBGPS) methodology [169], which
is an extension of the covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS) method-
ology [170] to a continuous treatment. For a continuous treatment, CBGPS
works by weighting observations to reduce the association between the
treatment variable and covariates, so that a causal interpretation of the
treatment effects is highly probable. CBGPS avoids the dichotomization
of treatment variable, as one would do in propensity score matching,
that can result in the loss of information [169]. We emphasize this con-
cern since 22,171 observations may not be sufficient to test the robustness
of dichotomization by varying the the threshold for the dichotomiza-
tion. This would also risk splitting the already pre-matching unbalanced
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macro attribute (1,165 and 21,006 observations in ‘Politics’ and ‘Others’
categories respectively) even further post-matching. More so, CBGPS
comes with additional advantages which are not ignorable. Fong et al.
[169] show that weighting observations derived from exactly identified
CBGPS is more robust to misspecification compared to weights derived
from recent alternative methods [171] and produces better balance of
post-matched dataset.
Using the parametric estimation methodology for CBGPS (which per-
forms equally well as the non-parametric version and is computation-
ally faster), the correlations between treatment and macro attribute (and
potential confounders) could be brought down to near zero values, as
shown in Table 27. This definitely allows for better causal interpreta-
tions about the treatment effects on the discussion outcomes. As a part
of the methodology, Box-Cox transformations of the treatments were per-
formed before matching estimation in order to make their distributions
closest to normal. (The optimal values for λ in the transformation were
found to be -2 for both indirect and direct types.) The post-matched
contains 22,171 observations with weights assigned to each observations
from the CBGPS estimation. The estimates of impact of micro attributes
is summarized in Table 7.
Direct treatment effects are not significant on total comments, social
feedback and users’ engagement (Model 1 in Tables 28, 29, 30). These
estimates are however significant under assumption of homoskedastic-
ity (which is of less interest). The above treatment effects are however
significant and also robust to clustered errors when macro attribute is
included in regression (Model 2, 3 in Tables 28, 29, 30).
Direct impact of micro attribute, estimates in Model 1 of Table 31,
is significant on the total users participating is the discussion. These
estimates are significant irrespective of whether the macro attribute is
controlled in the regression. Estimated coefficients are robust to het-
eroskedasticity, confounders, time fixed effects, and standard errors clus-
tered by authors.
Identical estimates are observed for both indirect and direct types
across all discussion outcomes. (This can be due to correlations between
99
Table 7: AVERAGE TREATMENT EFFECTS OF MICRO ATTRIBUTES
Treatment: Micro attributes of politicization
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Effects (positive/negative/conditional) on various discussion characteristics
Discussion Size (Total Comments) conditional†† conditional††
Agreements/Feedbacks (Total Likes) conditional†† conditional††
Users’ Engagement (Total Replies) conditional†† conditional††
Total Unique Users positive†? positive†?
? Estimates are significant with p-value less than 0.001.
All estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity, and errors clustered by authors.
† Estimates are consistent only after accounting for potential confounders and time fixed effects.
†† Estimates are positive, consistent and significant only after accounting for potential confounders
and time fixed effects.
For complete details, refer Tables 28, 29, 30, & 31.
indirect and direct types of micro attributes.)
There are no robust confirmations, especially with clustered errors,
for the heterogeneity of treatment effects across macro attribute (Model
3).
Due to entities-based approach to understand politicization in arti-
cles’ main text, we are in a position to test two channels which we think
might be the underlying mechanisms for collective discussion outcomes
in response to micro attributes of politicization in the articles. (1) We saw
above that the treatment effect on total users participating is significant.
How many of them participate because they recognize political entities
in comments? (2) How much of the total discussion outcomes for com-
ments, social feedbacks, and users’ engagement is driven by users who
join with political influence? We investigate these two mechanisms in
the following section.
4.4.3 Mechanisms of politicized discussions
We begin with providing a description of the evolution of collective dis-
cussions, as illustrated in Figure 17, when users see an article.
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Before that, let us take a quick note on why the estimates of the im-
pact of micro attributes on various discussion outcomes had identical
estimates. We find that indirect and direct types are actually positively
correlated, which can be a potential reason. Also post CBGPS match-
ing, with the requirement of Box-Cox transformation, we find that both
these variables end up being highly correlated due to the nature of the
transformation itself. The transformation requires both variables to be
maximally correlated with the QQ plot, and at their optimal transformed
versions, both were correlated with the QQ plot with a correlation coef-
ficient of more than 0.9. While such a high value is indeed statistically
desirable for the matching process, and hence having correct treatment
effects for each type, it does not help to logically infer which of the two
types might be a dominant factor that shapes readers’ perception.
Let us understand the challenge in disentangling the source of ef-
fects (indirect vs. direct) with an example alongside the illustration in
Figure 17. Suppose, as investigators, we see that the entity “blue” has
appeared both in the current article and its discussion section, we might
guess that the comments were influenced by the presence of such entities
in the main text. When we perform treatment effects, as done in previ-
ous sections, we do it with the treatment being the political inclination
of the “blue” entity for the direct type and the sum of political inclina-
tions of the “blue” entity of current article along with the inclinations
of “blue” and “green” entities derived from previous co-occurrences for
the indirect type. (The “green” entity does not appear in the current arti-
cle.) After the Box-Cox transformations performed as a part of matching
methodology, it becomes difficult to distinguish from the identical esti-
mates for indirect and direct types whether the effects arise from “blue”
entities alone or from both “blue” and “green” entities. Logically, these
two different sources of effects signify very different aspects of human
behaviour, the later being the fact that there are effects coming from the
memory because readers are able to form connections of the the current
article with the past articles.
So, is there an actual effect from the memory? In order to answer
this by distinguishing between the indirect and direct types of micro at-
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Figure 17: MECHANISMS FOR COLLECTIVE ATTENTION & DISCUSSION
  
Articles prior to time t      Article at time t
Comments
Replies
Feedback
     ACTIVE USERS
       Passive Users
The dots represent named entities, carrying political inclinations. The green dots are of
most interest because they appear in the discussion even if they are not present in the
article at time t. Although absent in current article, the green dots have previously
appeared in other articles along with blue dots, which are present in the current article.
Some readers who are influenced by the politicization of the current article directly decide
to comment about these by becoming active users (blue channel). A few other readers are
reminded about green dots (either from their memory or by seeing the existing discussion
- the green channel) and decide to become active users. At least 65% of readers turning
into active users (and hence participating in discussion) due to micro attributes of
politicization in the current article follow the green channel.
The green-type users, who join the discussion due to political influence from outside
contexts (green dots), drive at least a conservative estimate of 40% of the impact of micro
attributes in current article on its total comments, agreements/feedback, and active users’
replies to other’s comments.
tributes, we extract the “green” entities from the combined set of “blue”
and “green” entities that co-occurred in previous articles. We define po-
litical inclination of the discussions, PID, as the sum of political incli-
nations of entities that co-occurred (in previous articles) with entities of
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current articles, are absent in the current article, and are present in the
discussion of the current article. Thus, in reference to Figure 17, PID
captures the political inclinations of only the “green” entities in the dis-
cussion section leaving out the political inclinations of the “blue” and
“pink” entities in discussion.
Higher values of PID therefore not only suggest discussions becom-
ing politicized, but also identify the source of such politically inclined
entities to be strictly from previous articles that contain entities from cur-
rent articles whose associations are perceivable by the readers. What
are the chances that “green” entities appear in the discussion section?
Well, they may appear by chance with some probability. This probabil-
ity (of being random events) further decreases because these are not just
some random entities from arbitrary articles in the past; instead these
have precisely co-occurred with entities of current articles in previous
articles, thereby suggesting indirect contextual associations between pre-
vious and current article via the common entities. (Such associations can
manifest in discussions only if some readers actually perceive such con-
texts and discuss them in the comments.) More so, repeated appearances
of “green” entities in articles over a dataset that spans over a decade
definitely suggests that these occurrences are not random and definitely
point towards readers’ ability to relate current article with the past. It
is therefore better to investigate in the data whether statistically it has a
role in shaping the collective discussion.
To summarize the measures for clarity, indirect micro attributes con-
tain political inclinations of entities from both the current and past ar-
ticles (“blue”, “pink”, “green”), direct micro attributes contain political
inclinations of entities from current article (“blue”, “pink”), and PID
contains political inclinations of only “green” entities. (Refer Figure 17.)
In previous section we saw that micro attributes of politicization sig-
nificantly affect the number of unique users participating in the discus-
sion. Users can have various reasons to actively join the discussion after
being influenced by micro attributes of politicization (but before decid-
ing whether to actively comment about it). In reference to Figure 17, the
green channel is our interest of investigation.
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• After a user is influenced by micro attributes, he may recollect “green”
entities and decide to become an active user and comment about it,
or he may see comments in the discussion section on “green” enti-
ties and decide to join the discussion. (The green channel does not
distinguish between these two cases. Essentially it is an influence
arising from “green” entities; either a user recollected from his own
memory or saw it in discussion.)
• After a user is influenced by micro attributes, he may actively join
the discussion to speak about “blue” or “pink” entities, or for any
other reason from the set of unbounded number of possibilities.
This is the blue channel.
Active users are therefore composed of two types depending on whether
they decided to become active (i.e., to comment in discussion) via the
green channel or the blue channel. What proportion of such users’ partic-
ipation can be accounted to be catalysed by discussions becoming politi-
cized (i.e., catalysed via the green channel)? In the language of causal
mediation analysis, micro attributes form the treatment, politicized dis-
cussions as measured by PID forms the mediator, and total unique ac-
tive users is the outcome variable. The average causal mediation effect
(ACME) captures the treatment effect that mediates via discussions be-
coming politicized. The average direct effect (ADE) captures the treat-
ment effect that mediates for all other reasons apart from discussions
becoming politicized (i.e., via the blue channel discussed above).
Table 32 shows the estimates of ACME simulated using quasi-Bayesian
Monte-Carlo method [172, 173], and White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent
estimator. Estimates have been done for both indirect and direct types of
micro attributes. We see that in Model 1, estimates of ACME are positive
and highly significant for both types and suggest a value of 65% as the
lower bound for the proportion of treatment effects mediated via discus-
sions becoming politicized. Models 2 and 3 shows estimates of ACME
conditional on the ‘Others’ category. The moderated mediation test is
highly significant, suggesting that ACME estimates are substantially dif-
ferent across different categories (‘Politics’, ‘Others’). The ‘Others’ cate-
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gory is more interesting since it shows that users tend to be influenced
by politicized discussions (the green channel) even if the article is devoid
of the potential political framing under ‘Politics’ category. The ACME
estimates are quite consistent across model specifications of inclusion of
confounders and interaction variables. Due to previously known joint ef-
fects between macro and micro attributes, this variable is controlled for.
The confounders include all variables as used during estimating treat-
ment effect of micro attribute (Refer Table 31).
All the above estimates undergo sensitivity tests [173] in order to as-
sess the validity of the estimates under potential violation of the sequen-
tial ignorability assumption. As shown in Table 32, all estimations have
0.6 for the value of ρ, the sensitivity parameter which suggests the re-
quired correlation between error terms in mediator and outcome models
before the causal mediation effect becomes zero. Indeed, 0.6 is a suffi-
ciently high value and so the estimates are not sensitive to potential vi-
olation of the sequential ignorability assumption. (Refer Figures 24 and
25 for a visual understanding of the sensitivity analysis.) Also, the con-
fidence intervals for the mediation effects in all models do not contain
zero.
Therefore, based on above estimates, it seems that readers do indeed
perceive “green” entities and a large fraction of users who are influenced
by the micro attributes of politicization join the discussion after being
further influenced by existing state of politicized discussions. While the
magnitude of ACME estimates may not be directly interpretable, we at
least known with high statistical accuracy that a substantial fraction of
users, as large as 65%, join discussions being influenced by political in-
clinations of contexts (understood via entities) that were strictly not men-
tioned in the main text.
In Section 4.4.2, we saw that micro attributes do not directly affect
the total comments, total social feedbacks, and users’ engagement. (Al-
though these effects were significant under homoskedastic assumptions.)
Since a user’s decision to participate in discussion follows after an arti-
cle is published and before the user participates (actively or passively),
it can be a potential reason why the treatment effects might not be di-
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rectly significant. Hence users’ participation seems to be an important
mediating channel, and ideally we can expect the entire discussion to be
mediated by this channel. (How else can a discussion emerge without
users’ participation?)
We therefore investigate how much of the discussion outcomes (com-
ments, feedbacks, users’ engagement) are mediated by users’ participa-
tion, in particular by those users who are strictly influenced by political
contexts not mentioned in the main article. We approximate the number
of such politically influenced users by the predicted values of the regres-
sion of total (active) users’ participation on PID. (Approximation us-
ing predictions from regressions is more sensible than directly assuming
65% of users as politically influenced users because previously discov-
ered proportion of 65% speaks about distribution of the channelling of
treatment effects. However the outcomes may be confounded by other
variables, for e.g., the macro attribute, as we saw in the significance of
moderated mediation test.) In the regression, we also control for macro
attribute because this can affect both PID and total users. We also in-
clude squared terms for PID in order to control for potential non-linear
effects.
Table 33 shows the ACME estimates for the effect of micro attributes
on discussion outcomes mediated via participation of politically influ-
enced users. We find that the most conservative estimate, without using
matched dataset, have an average proportion (across various discussion
outcomes) of at least 37% and 45% of mediation via such users for treat-
ments of indirect and direct types respectively. Estimates from matched
dataset in Models 2 & 3 suggest a highly significant mediation effect
with non-significant direct treatment effects (ADE). The significance of
these estimates suggest that the effect of micro attributes of politicization
does indeed provide other politically oriented contexts to which users re-
spond by participating actively, and such participation further drives the
subsequent stages of evolution of discussion outcomes (comments, pas-
sive participation via feedbacks, engagement among users). Such con-
texts can be assumed to be coming from existing state of discussions for
the treatment of direct type and from either past recollection or existing
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discussion for the indirect type of micro attribute. (This deduction can
be made using the definitions of direct and indirect types. For example,
the direct type assumes readers to be influenced only by the political in-
clination of the current article and so any influence from outside contexts
is more likely due to the existing discussions when such readers read an
article. The types of micro attributes, indirect vs. direct, were not dis-
tinguishable in their impact on total users, as discussed previously using
Table 26, but are now clearly distinguishable because of differing esti-
mates of ACME, as seen in Table 33.) This also validates the assumption
Ã2 in the sense that different mechanisms are in place when we assume
different behaviours for readers with respect to their perception of politi-
cal inclinations of entities they encounter in main article. (The difference
in mechanisms arises from the probable source from which they recol-
lect outside contexts to become politically influenced - own memory vs.
collective imprints in discussions.)
4.5 Production perspective: Risk preference of
authors
From authors’ perspective, the total attention each article receives is ran-
dom. Let us assume that if an author’s article receives higher attention
in terms of comments and participating users in its discussion, the au-
thor gets marginally higher satisfaction and that the marginal jump in
satisfaction would be more during the initial moments of receiving read-
ers’ responses and their discussions. The author definitely did not pick
all the politically oriented named entities in his article at random. The
investigation in this section is to understand how sensitive is the author
to choose micro attributes of politicization, holding other choices fixed,
in a way that he is satisfied with the collective attention his article re-
ceives amid high uncertainty in collective participation. We do that by
estimating the aggregate risk averseness of all authors.
We use an widely used model specification for estimating risk aver-
sion in presence of risks to the factors driving satisfaction (collective at-
tention in our case) [174], and use an alternative strategy that allows to
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estimate the risk averseness coefficient without any assumption of the
functional form of how satisfaction varies with collective attention. Also,
there is no distributional assumption on the error term in model specifi-
cation, as described below.
Suppose the satisfaction or utility U for an author from collective at-
tention A to his article follows the assumptions as discussed above. We
saw in previous sections that micro attributes of politicization positively
impacts various outcomes of collection attention, however the extent of
attention that would be received is uncertain. This uncertainty may vary
depending on the level of micro politicization. (This is the reason why
heteroskedasticity consistent estimates were reported during previous
estimations of treatment effects using regression models.) Now, we as-
sume that the collective attention A has the distribution
D(f(P, x), g̃(P, x))
where D is an unknown functional form, and for convenience can be
characterized by its mean f(·) and variance g̃(·), both of which depend
on the level of micro attribute of politicization P chosen in the article and
a vector of other attributes x. For estimation, we specify the following
model
A = f(P, x) + g(P, x)ε, E[ε] = 0,Var(ε) = 1,
where f is the mean attention function and g is the variance function
which changes the uncertainty in attention for different levels of politi-
cization P . The author would then maximize his expected utility from
attention level A, E[U(A)], by choosing the optimal level of P . The opti-
mal level of P is determined by the first order condition of maximization
δf
δP
+
E[U ′ε]
E[U ′]
· δg
δP
= 0, (4.3)
where Θ = E[U
′ε]
E[U ′] is the risk preference function. Negative, zero, and
positive values of Θ would suggest risk-averse, risk-neutral, and risk-
preferring attitudes on the author. (However, the magnitude of Θ does
not convey information about the intensity of risk-aversion. Only the
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Figure 18: RISK AVERSION COEFFICIENTS: QUARTERLY ESTIMATES
  
  
The figure shows risk preference, estimated in quarterly windows, of authors in the Guardian for
choosing politically oriented named entities in their articles in order to drive higher collective attention
to their article on various outcomes. Missing points on the graph are due to insufficient data points or
due to insufficient variations on values within the quarterly window to estimate the risk aversion. For
all outcomes (across rows), we see that that the estimates are below zero, suggesting that the authors
are risk averse instead of risk-preferring to politicize climate change articles (for respective collective
outcome, shown in each row). Across the columns, estimates are shown for indirect (or strong
assumption) and direct (or weak assumption) types of micro attributes of politicization.
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Figure 19: RISK AVERSION COEFFICIENTS: MONTHLY ESTIMATES
  
  
The figure shows risk preference, estimated in monthly windows, of authors in the Guardian for
choosing politically oriented named entities in their articles in order to drive higher collective attention
to their article on various outcomes. Missing points on the graph are due to insufficient data points or
due to insufficient variations on values within the quarterly window to estimate the risk aversion. For
all outcomes (across rows), we see that that the estimates are below zero, suggesting that the authors
are risk averse instead of risk-preferring to politicize climate change articles (for respective collective
outcome, shown in each row). Across the columns, estimates are shown for indirect (or strong
assumption) and direct (or weak assumption) types of micro attributes of politicization.
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sign of Θ is supposed to be inferred. The intensity can be inferred using
further computations of absolute risk aversion, which is not necessary
here.) Using this and equation 4.3, the risk preference function can be
rewritten as
Θ = −δf/δP
δg/δP
. (4.4)
We estimate Θ in different time windows (quarterly and monthly)
along the time. Within each time window, we construct uniformly sep-
arated bins for the micro politicization P , and estimate the mean f and
variance g of attention A (various outcome characteristics) within each
bin. δfδP and
δg
δP are estimated using slopes of the regressions of values
of f from bins on the mean values P in bins. This piecewise approxima-
tion helps us capture the means and variances conditional on values of
P and then the regression slopes estimate how they change with changes
in P . The results are shown in Figures 18 and 19 for estimations of risk
averseness using quarterly and monthly windows respectively. We see
that authors are risk averse instead of risk loving to include more mi-
cro attributes in their articles and derive utility out of the total attention
they receive on their articles. The conclusion is same for all variables that
can hint at obtaining utility from online attention - total comments, total
unique users, total social feedbacks, and users’ engagement. So overall,
the authors of the articles in Guardian have a risk averse behaviour.
4.6 Discussion
Politicization is an effect created due to authors’ choices about articles’
content and positioning, and readers’ susceptibility to such choices whose
effects are observed in how readers participate and engage in discus-
sions. We saw that users are influenced by articles of climate change if
those are politically framed, and it affects several key dimensions of col-
lective discussions. We also saw that authors are not likely to politicize
climate change articles for receiving more attention.
Comments and discussions are everywhere in digital spaces. Espe-
cially in the news media, it is important that public responds to the ob-
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jective reality rather than how media presents the news. The collective
perception on climate change (and any other issue in general) is what will
drive participation and social actions leading to future policies. Hence
we believe the results would be helpful for journalists, and the public in
general.
Limitations & Interpretations. Since the study is based on observational
data, users self select the articles they read and want to comment on.
Although this would not affect the treatment (politicization of articles),
there can be potential spillovers of treatments effects on other articles. We
saw that the analysis is not sensitive to time-fixed effects (quarterly), and
hence there is no need for further clustering. Hence we can assume that
users mostly respond to politicization in by commenting on the articles
where they discover it, and less likely on other articles.
Users may have different reasons to write or join discussion: articu-
lation of personal opinions, reinforcement of or controversy with prior
beliefs, promotion of agenda, emotional response, etc. In this study, we
did not study the details of characteristics of comments which may help
in revealing such motivations or other underlying mechanisms.
Our choice of named entities as the basic unit of framing is reason-
able. This has been previously suggested in the literature and is also
intuitive. Named entities form the least subjective factor among others
like sentence complexity, existence of quotes, and others. Also named
entities allow for understanding the links of a given article with articles
published previously, not in a correlation manner but by being able to
exactly point out the entities. Therefore, politicization of climate change
due to micro attributes, as in this study, should be objectively understood
as the effect on perception of climate change articles due to the presence
of named entities of political orientation.
The choice of section name as a factor of politicization is also reason-
able. Although finer details of underlying mechanisms are difficult to
propose here, it definitely provides an overall sense of how the ‘Politics’
section distinctly differs from all other sections combined.
We believe that the results are less biased because we first showed
the results using naive regressions, and then used better strategies for in-
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vestigating a causal effect. Unobserved confounders which vary hetero-
geneously across different treatment levels are an obvious threat to the
estimates, as in any non-experimental setting. However, in this study,
sensitivity estimates in mediation analysis provides indirect ground for
reliance on the estimates.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Summary of Results
Human societies (i) carry a vast amount of information and make indi-
vidual and group decisions, (ii) are highly connected for carrying out
various activities, and (iii) are motivated for various complex reasons to
do or not to do a particular activity. We may be less skilled, but after be-
ing influenced by our friends’ skills, we may learn to become productive.
We may be seeing tons of things on social media, but we may not be be-
lieving everything that we see. We may join to participate in a discussion
not only because what the context is, but also how the context has been
presented to us. It is a chaos, but the regularities within it are a won-
der indeed. Understanding such regularities can help us build better
societies, safeguard the environment, and improve economic activities.
Digital platforms with social structures are a wonderful opportunity in
today’s age to attempt to infer such behaviour.
In this dissertation, we investigated some of such collective behaviour,
each in a different digital society. We tried to understand effects on col-
lective behaviour, and the mechanisms behind them. The main results of
the contributions of this thesis are mentioned below.
• Peer influence of production popularity exists in the educational
platform Scratch. Scratchers are influenced by their peers’ produc-
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tion popularity to create new projects which in turn increase their
popularity. Such influence however is absent for Scratchers’ con-
sumption patterns. The causal effects of peer influence and media-
tion effects have been performed under quasi-experimental condi-
tions with minimal behavioural assumptions in order to allow for
generalizing the results to other platforms. Compared to the exist-
ing literature, it presents results on a widely adopted educational
platforms and uses observational data over a long duration com-
pared to live experiments, which may miss out on various com-
plexities of users’ behaviours that change over time.
• Credibility of fake information is shown to be an important factor
which interacts with homophily in communication to create polar-
ization of beliefs in a networked society. In the particular case of cli-
mate change sceptic messages in the social media Twitter, we found
that such messages do not carry substantial credibility to polarize
the beliefs of the society about the reality of climate change. Com-
pared to the existing literature, it tries to emphasize the credibility
of information, which has not been usually investigated in empiri-
cal studies on fake news and its propagation. Change of credibility
can be a change of regime in how collective interactions and com-
munications matter.
• Political framing, or politicization, of articles related to climate change
in the news media Guardian is shown to influence the collective
attention and participation of readers. Compared to existing litera-
ture, various underlying mechanisms have been shown with statis-
tical validity, and the impacts have been estimated for articles from
a single organization using its full historical data, thereby show-
ing ways into detection of framing within a particular issue and
within a given organization which using traditional methods, like
improvements along the lines of topic models, may not sufficient.
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5.2 Data is King & Context is Queen. They Dance
Together!
I provide a short description of my perspective on experiments. Experi-
ments and randomized controlled trials have been known to be the gold
standards for causal inference. However, its applicability and generaliz-
ability need further judgements depending on the contexts.
If we are talking about a clinical trial, a particular drug tested in one
part of the world has a high likelihood to work well across other societies
and through time. If the trial is really experimental, this is exactly what is
supposed to be inferred. If we are talking about a controlled or field trial
to understand human behaviour, we can probably predict what is being
written in the following lines. Yes, indeed. Individual behaviour and in-
teractions among individuals leading to aggregate patterns of collective
behaviour is a challenging thing to simulate in controlled environments.
Field trials definitely project insights, however guaranteeing the results
for different societies and in different times can be challenging unless the
contexts and mechanisms are well understood. Unfortunately, human
societies are highly evolved and complex, and so trying to infer some-
thing about us by experimenting on social behaviour among mice may
not be useful. With monkeys, potentially yes!
It is all about the balance between bias and variance. Data collec-
tion and replication of results is one way, and being able to design meth-
ods for a new context and a new time is another way. Both of these
should be encouraged in social science. Without a context and under-
lying insights on the collective behaviour, results may not be meaning-
ful. To this end, observational data from digital societies (which pool
in behaviour from several human societies) have advantages and disad-
vantages. Compared to the experiments, they can pose serious method-
ological challenges depending on the nature of data, have potential to
answer more questions about complexities in collective behaviour, data
collection can be expensive in certain situations, results can be inferred
to be unbiased depending on how methods are employed, results may
not be less biased than that in a controlled environment, and can have
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greater scope for being generalized to unknown complex societies.
Nothing is without a fault, and nothing comes free (neither the data,
nor the context). So depending on one’s resources, one must choose be-
tween repeating randomized controlled trials in different contexts and
conducting observational inferences in different contexts. Lastly, ethics
matter. Whether it is experimental or observational, things like revela-
tion of identities or conducting data extraction in secret ways are issues
that bother humans. So we should be careful here. People may like to
buy products advertised (and targeted) to them using partial identities
revealed from collective behaviour, and they may consider to conduct
clinical trials on mice to ensure their own safety, but they may not like to
hear that their own government knowns ‘something’ about them. I told
you, human behaviour is complex!
5.3 Looking Ahead
There are several areas of opportunities to develop methods for analysing
such behavioural data, and to analyse to understand collective behaviour
that can help in improving social and economic policies in both physical
and digital societies. Below is a list comprising a few potential areas for
future research.
• Digital privacy and ethics. AI has provided several useful applica-
tions for the society. However, in the process of using large scale
social data for such applications, issues like privacy breach and de-
anonymization have raised concerns.
• Roles of media. Media is modern times, with massive participation
of netizens, is playing several important roles in our societies like
allocation of attention to particular topics, raising voice for justice
in real time, making democracy more transparent, and others.
• Epidemiology. The coronavirus pandemic that started in 2020 has
shown the importance of understanding disease spread in social
networks, economies and their resilience, and proper communica-
tion during such disasters to be critical preparedness tools.
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• Future Technologies & Open Innovation. Open source softwares in AI
and big data age have shown that there is higher potential to inno-
vate by recombining creativity, knowledge, experts, and commu-
nities. Transparent participation in digital innovation, creation of
jobs, and effects on social and income equality need to understood
better. Health, agriculture, and education are promising areas to
investigate further.
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Appendix A
Peer Influence in Scratch
A.1 Producer Types
Figure 20: TYPES OF PRODUCERS
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(A) The distribution of remix fraction, i.e., percentage of remixed projects out of all
projects created. There are 304,793 users who created at least one project. 202,018 users
have zero remix fraction, and are not shown is the plot. The distribution is segmented into
three types of producers: innovators, free-style producers, and developers. (B) The
average remix fraction during each month for the three types of producers.
Here we provide a manual labelling of Scratchers as producers of
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projects. Labels are based on their intensity to create remixed projects.
Remixing is a key feature of the Scratch community; it allows cre-
ation of projects based on existing ones. Fig. 20A shows the incentive of
Scratchers to remix over the entire time duration; it is a distribution of the
fraction of remixed projects among all projects created by a Scratcher. We
use this distribution to understand if Scratchers lying in different parts of
this distribution differ in certain behaviours. We create three definitions,
based on the nature to remix projects: (i) developers: producers with
remix fraction greater than 75 %. The value of 75 is chosen to increase
the number of users in developers category; most of these users are in
the top 10 percentile of the distribution. (ii) innovators: producers who
mostly create new projects – producers with remix fraction less than 35
%, (iii) free-style producers: producers who do both. These users are the
residuals of segmenting producers as developers and innovators. The
value of 35 is chosen such that free-style producers, on aggregate, have
50% new projects and 50% remixed projects. Changes around the cut-off
values of 75 and 35 does not affect the number of users in the interval
very much. Innovators and developers have contributed to about 87%
and 9% of new projects (non-remix projects) respectively.
The definitions are based on aggregate projects (and remixes) created
in the entire duration. Users join the community over time, and they fall
into one of these producer types (excluding non-producers) as defined
by us by looking at the data of entire duration. To see if the labelling
of producers based on production in the entire duration also holds in
shorter intervals, we calculate the average remix fraction within each
type in monthly windows as shown in Fig. 20B. It shows the average
remix fraction of each producer type over time. We see that the group
of producers categorized as developers (based on aggregate activity in
5 years) is of type developer in almost every month: in each month, the
group produced projects that are mostly remixes. Developers did not
behave as free-style type or innovator type in any month, except during
the very early period. This suggests that the nature of producers is not
volatile, and can be interpreted as a time-invariant behaviour. The distri-
bution of the time spent on the platform by each of these types is almost
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same, with an average of about 22 months and a standard deviation of
14 months.
The volatility of free-style producers and developers in the early pe-
riod can be explained by the fact that these producers need existing projects
to remix. In the initial periods, since the online community was launched
in 2007, there were less projects on board for these producer types to act
by their nature. These types show a sharp deviation in favour of their
nature, which is due to the availability of more projects in the platform
due to passage of time.
Fig. 20A considers only non-zero remix fractions; users with exactly
zero remix fraction are not shown. It forms a large fraction of all produc-
ers, however, we are not sure if such producers really did not remix at
all. This is because we found some of these users to have produced large
numbers of projects in comparison to others (outliers); such a situation
might arise by copying projects [175]. Copying projects is legal, however
it is unethical; copying is a situation in which a Scratcher modifies a non-
substantial part of a project and then posts it as a new project and not
as a remixed project (which references the original creator). Although
copying can arise in other sections of the distribution in Fig. 20A as well,
we did not find evidence of outlier cases for free-style producers and de-
velopers. In later analysis and discussions, we therefore study only these
producer types: free-style producers, developers.
A.2 Consumption Behaviour
Here we investigate if Scratchers, as consumers of projects, have pref-
erence to consume certain kind of projects. First we look for major con-
sumption groups and next we investigate Scratchers’ consumption speci-
ficity for such groups. Of the various forms in which users consume
projects, only favorites and comments are non-anonymous records, i.e,
in the available data, we can know the user who favorited or commented
on a project. On the platform, favorites and comments are private and
public information respectively.
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Figure 21: CONSUMPTION COMMUNITIES
The communities in Pfavorites network, obtained by projecting users [u] on projects [p]
nodes in the bipartite network where an edge u→ p represents u favorited p. Grids along
the circumferences represent communities, and grid size is proportional to community
size. Projects within each community are favorited together with high density. Projects of
different communities are also favorited together but have low densities d, as shown by
the edges between communities. Plots (a), (b), (c) have inter-community density d values
higher than 0 (i.e., shows all links), 0.001, and 0.01 respectively.
A.2.1 Consumption Baskets
We consider a bipartite network of favoriting behaviour in which the
nodes are users and projects, and edges are directed from each user to
the projects which he has favorited. This is an aggregate network con-
sisting of all favorites interactions in the 5 years. To see which projects
are favorited together we obtain a bipartite projection on all projects; in
the resulting network, an edge between two nodes (projects) has a weight
equal to the number of Scratchers who favorited both the nodes. In the
projected network, Pfavorites, there are 326,975 nodes and 162,611,378
edges with varying weights (ranging from 1 to 442). In the subset of
Pfavorites with edge weights more than 21, we found 145 communities
in the network by implementing the Louvain algorithm [176]. (We per-
formed communities detection using other algorithms as well, for exam-
ple, we found 171 communities using fast greedy algorithm [177]. The
1This is done for computational simplicity and is inconsequential for analysis that fol-
lows.
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Figure 22: POLARIZED CONSUMPTION: EVIDENCE OF CONSUMPTION
SPECIFICITY
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Main plots show distribution of entropyH for consumption of types favoriting and
commenting. In each case, there is a high fraction ofH = 0, meaning most users
consumed projects exactly from a particular community. Insets show the distribution of
users’ maximal consumption group during 2007-12; for example, the inset in (A) shows
that more than 20,000 users favorited projects from the c2 community in Pfavorites the
maximum time. (A), (B) show distributions for Pfavorites and (C), (D) show that for
Pcomments network.
main results that we discuss below is independent of the choice of algo-
rithm.) 5 among the above 145 communities are of large sizes than others
and the inter-community edge densities are low, as shown in Fig. 21. We
perform a similar community detection on the bipartite network of com-
menting behaviour. In its projected network,Pcomments, there are 878,811
nodes and 1,097,722,712 edges, with edge weights ranging from 1 to 323.
We found 4 large sized communities, using edge weights greater than 3.
We checked the tags of projects in each community to see if the projects
across communities differ by particular topics. We found all communi-
ties have similar set of tags – game, simulation, animation, art, music,
mario etc. – which are indeed very common tags on the Scratch platform.
So the joint consumption of projects does not seem to be segregated by
themes (as inferred by tags). We conjecture that the communities are
formed by Scratchers’ initial positioning in the friendship network upon
joining the platform, and Scratchers in different segments of the network
consume projects of similar themes.
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A.2.2 Consumption Specificity
We examine whether each Scratcher tends (intentionally or unintention-
ally) to consume projects only from specific communities found in previ-
ously.
We consider Scratchers who consumed (favorites, comments) projects
from at least one of the 5 big communities, labelled c1, ..., c5, found in
Pfavorites. For each of these Scratchers, consider the distribution of con-
sumption across c0, c1, ..., c5 where c0 is the residual community of all
projects not included in c1, ..., c5. We measure a Scratcher’s consumption
polarization by an entropy-alike measure
H = −p0 log(f(p0))−
n∑
i=1
pi log(pi), n = 5;
f(p0) =
{
0.5 if p0 = 1,
p0 if p0 6= 1
where pi, i = 0, ..., 5, is the fraction of consumption from community ci
during the entire duration of five years. It is easy to verify that, with at
least one positive pi, the value ofH is 0 if and only if exactly one value of
pi, i = 1, ..., 5 is 1. So if H = 0 for a Scratcher, he has consumed projects
from exactly one of the 5 big communities. Fig. 22A and Fig. 22B show
the distribution ofH values of all Scratchers for consumption of types fa-
voriting and commenting respectively. About 60% of Scratchers favorite
projects from only one community (Fig. 22A), and same is the case for
commenting behaviour (Fig. 22B). We repeat this analysis considering
the 4 big communities (n = 4) found in Pcomments. As shown in Fig.
22C and Fig. 22D, we find evidence of polarization similar to the case for
Pfavorites.
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A.3 Tables & Figures
Figure 23: SCRATCH PLATFORM
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Users produce projects by creating and sharing on the platform. Projects are of two types – new and
remixed. Users consume projects by commenting, favoriting, viewing, loving, and downloading them.
Views, love-its, and downloads are anonymous. Users can follow each other, and form a friendship
network. Projects can be included in galleries, created by shared users. Projects and galleries can be
selected to appear on the front page.
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Table 8: VARIABLES DESCRIPTION
Short Name Desciption of Variable†
Love-its Total love-its received on all projects created upto t
Views Total views on all projects created upto t
Projects Total projects created upto t
Galleries Total galleries created upto t
Remixes Total remixes (among all projects) created upto t
Age Prior to t, number of months in which ego
interacted on the platform*
Active True if ego interacted* > 1 month, prior to t
Favorited By Total projects (of others) favorited by
the ego (as a consumer) upto t
Comments (P) By Total comments made by ego on (own
and others’) projects upto t
Comments (G) By Total comments by ego on galleries upto t
Is Remixed Of all projects created upto t, total projects which
have been remixed at least once (at any time)
Projects in Galleries Total projects (of ego) appearances in various
galleries created as of t
Front Page Projects Total projects that appeared in front page upto t
Featured Galleries Total galleries created by ego that were
featured on the front page upto t
Studio Galleries Total galleries of ego that appeared in
studio design section upto t
Downloads Total downloads (by others) of projects
created by ego upto t
Favorites On Total favorites (by others) of projects
created by ego upto t
Comments On Total comments received on projects created upto t
continued on next page..
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Table 9: VARIABLES DESCRIPTION (..CONTINUED..)
Short Name Desciption of Variable†
Featured Projects Total projects that were featured
on the front page upto t
Following Total users the ego is following as of t
Followers Total users who follow the ego as of t
Reciprocation Total users who follow ego and are also
followed by ego as of t
Peers Love–its Total love–its received by all peers’ projects upto t
Peers Views Total views received by all peers’ projects upto t
Peers Projects Total projects created by all peers upto t
Peers Galleries Total galleries created by all peers upto t
Peers Remixes Total remixed projects created by all peers upto t
Peers Active Total peers who have interacted* more than
one month prior to t
Peers Fav By Total favorites clicked by all peers upto t
Peers Is Remixed Total projects of all peers upto t which
have been remixed at least once (at any time)
Peers Proj in Gall Total projects (by all peers) appearances in
various galleries upto t
Peers Fpage Proj Total projects created by all peers which
appeared in front page as of t
Peers Following Total users all peers are following as of t
Peers Followers Total users who follow any peer of the ego as of t
(†) t refers to a given point in time
(*) Recorded forms of interactions only; does not include views, love-its, downloads be-
cause these interactions are anonymous. So if an ego stayed on the platform for only 1
month and downloaded many projects, his age evaluated at any future time is 0.
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Table 10: MODEL VARIABLES, CONFOUNDERS
Objective: Determine Model Variables Determine Confounders
Dependent variable: Change in Production Popularity† Treatment (1/0)††
[OLS Regression] [Logistic Regression]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Peers Love-its (Trt) 0.341∗∗∗ 0.296∗∗∗
Love-its 0.077∗∗∗ 0.075∗∗∗ 0.011∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗∗
Views −0.003∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.001∗∗∗
Projects 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
Galleries −0.061∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ −0.051∗
Remixes −0.022∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −0.001
Age −0.024∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ −0.005∗
Active 0.353∗∗∗ 0.128∗ 0.549∗∗∗ 0.150∗∗
Favorited By 0.011∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗ 0.026∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
Comments (P) By 0.003∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Comments (G) By −0.0004∗∗∗ −0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0001 −0.0002
Is Remixed 0.021∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −0.006∗∗ −0.009
Projects in Galleries −0.0005 0.001
Front Page Projects 0.286∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.047
Following 0.005∗∗∗ −0.041∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗
Followers −0.026∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.009∗∗∗ −0.008∗
Reciprocation 0.190∗∗∗ 0.237∗∗∗ −0.695∗∗∗ −0.186∗∗∗
Peers Views 0.00002∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
Peers Projects −0.001∗∗∗ −0.010∗∗∗
Peers Galleries 0.001
Peers Remixes −0.0002
Peers Active 0.081∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗
Peers Fav By 0.001∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗
Peers Is Remixed 0.0001∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
Peers Proj in Gall −0.0003∗∗∗ 0.002∗∗∗
Peers Fpage Proj 0.007∗∗∗ −0.008
Peers Following −0.0001∗∗∗ 0.00005
Peers Followers −0.001∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
Constant −0.115∗ −0.106 −1.165∗∗∗ −4.381∗∗∗
Observations 73,510 73,510 73,510 73,510
R2 0.296 0.307
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.307
Log Likelihood −39,693.690 −7,285.876
Akaike Inf. Crit. 79,419.380 14,621.750
Residual Std. Error 7.365 7.304
F Statistic 1,815.397∗∗∗ 1,164.492∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows regression results for t = Dec 2010, j = 1.
† Production Popularity: Love-its, †† Treatment: Peers Love-its
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Table 11: BALANCE OF COVARIATES
Raw Sample P. Score Match (a) Exact Match (X) (b) Exact Match (X,N)
Panel 1
Love-its 17.65 17.65 0 0
Views 364.69 365.25 0.03 -3.23
Projects 13.42 13.42 0 -0.93
Galleries 0.8 0.8 0 0.01
Remixes 4.39 4.39 0 -0.24
Age 6.4 6.41 0 0.69
Active 0.22 0.22 0 -0.06
Favorited By 11.49 11.49 0 0.29
Comments (P) By 101.68 101.68 0 1.13
Comments (G) By 42.69 42.69 0.12 0.89
Is Remixed 3.69 3.7 0 -0.15
Projects in Galleries 12.11 12.12 -0.02 -0.11
Front Page Projects 0.27 0.27 0 -0.03
Following 17.04 17.09 0 -1.36
Followers 14.43 14.47 0 -1.09
Reciprocation -0.08 -0.08 0 -0.13
Peers Views 107508.14 107507.79 16051.33 1757.93
Peers Projects 1454.85 1454.91 168.59 -6.92
Peers Galleries 68.34 68.41 7.1 0.12
Peers Remixes 453.48 453.48 52.26 -5.18
Peers Active 17.08 17.09 0.56 -1
Peers Fav By 1508.62 1508.61 160.76 18.2
Peers Is Remixed 1241.27 1241.28 163.41 0
Peers Proj in Gall 2108.5 2108.5 300.93 62.99
Peers Fpage Proj 68.73 68.73 9.59 0.93
Peers Following 2568.72 2569.78 296.73 0
Peers Followers 3326.23 3327.05 406.33 50.86
Panel 2
Featured Galleries 0 0 0 0
Studio Galleries 0 0 0 0
Downloads 51.56 51.66 0 -0.55
Favorites On 12.77 12.78 0 -0.05
Comments On 103.69 103.73 0.05 -0.19
Featured Projects 0.02 0.02 0 0
Panel 3
Treated Group 36697 36697 4502 2380
Control Group 36813 36697 11873 17570
Total Obs. 73510 73394 16375 19950
First panel contains variables used during regressions. Second panel contains variables
that were not used for analysis due to one of these reasons: (i) correlated to love–its and
carry similar information of a project’s popularity, or (ii) multicolinearity detected during
regression. Third panel contains count statistics.
Columns (in order) show the balance of covariates for t = Dec 2010 before matching, after
propensity score matching, after exact matching using X–type variables only, and after
exact matching using X– and N– type variables. In (a), all variables are used for matching
and in (b) only a subset of all variables is used (Exact matching on N–type variables is
expensive.). Balance of an attribute is the difference of (weighted) means of the attribute
between treated and control groups; weights are created in (a) and (b) when one user in
treated group is matched to many users in control group.
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Table 12: PEER/NETWORK EFFECT
Dependent variable: Change in Popularity (Love-its) of Projects
Matched sample used: (a) Matched on X (b) Matched on X, N
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 1) (Model 2)
Peers Love-its (Trt) 0.017∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗
Love-its 0.013 0.040∗∗∗
Views 0.0003 −0.0003∗
Projects −0.001 −0.001
Galleries 0.001 −0.029∗∗∗
Remixes 0.031∗∗∗ 0.014∗∗∗
Age −0.002∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗
Active 0.022∗∗∗ 0.035∗∗∗
Favorited By −0.001 −0.003∗∗∗
Comments (P) By 0.003∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗
Comments (G) By −0.0001 0.0002
Is Remixed −0.032 −0.002
Projects in Galleries −0.011 0.004∗∗∗
Front Page Projects 0.013 −0.012∗
Following 0.002 0.002
Followers −0.004∗∗ −0.001
Reciprocation 0.016∗∗∗ 0.010
Peers Views 0 0 −0.00001∗∗∗ −0.00000
Peers Projects −0.00001 −0.00001 −0.0001 −0.0001
Peers Galleries −0.0001 −0.0001 0.004∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗∗
Peers Remixes −0.00000 −0.00000 0.0002 0.0002
Peers Active −0.0004 −0.001 0.002 0.0003
Peers Fav By 0 0 0.0002∗∗∗ 0.0002∗∗∗
Peers Is Remixed −0.00000 −0.00000 0.001 0.001
Peers Proj in Gall −0.00001 −0.00001 0.0001∗∗∗ 0.0001∗∗
Peers Fpage Proj −0.00003 −0.00004 −0.003∗∗ −0.002
Peers Following −0.00000 −0.00000 −0.0002∗∗∗ −0.0001
Peers Followers −0.00001 −0.00000 −0.0001∗∗ −0.0001∗∗∗
Constant 0.004 −0.005 0.018∗∗∗ −0.021∗∗∗
Observations 16,375 16,375 19,950 19,950
R2 0.001 0.005 0.004 0.052
Adjusted R2 0.0003 0.004 0.004 0.051
Residual Std. Error 0.205 0.204 0.393 0.383
F Statistic 1.363 3.057∗∗∗ 7.255∗∗∗ 38.969∗∗∗
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
This table shows regression results for t = Dec 2010, j = 1.
130
Appendix B
Polarization in Twitter
B.1 Cointegration Test
We have two time series processes during 2007-2017: polarization of be-
liefs and homophily in communication. Table 13 presents a naive look at
the effect of homophily on polarization without adjusting the time series.
In the models, homophily and lagged polarization are significant. Al-
Table 13: NAIVE LOOK AT RELATIONSHIPS IN TIME SERIES
Dependent variable: Polarization Pt
(1) (2) (3)
Homophily Ht −0.202∗∗∗ −0.153∗∗∗ −0.162∗∗∗
Ht−1 −0.007 −0.040
Ht−2 0.051
Pt−1 0.304∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
Ht−2 0.084
Constant 0.525∗∗∗ 0.381∗∗∗ 0.359∗∗∗
Significance: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
though polarization and homophily seem to follow a pattern, as shown
in Figure 1 in the main text, infering a relationship at this stage, as in
Table 13, would be spurious due to autocorrelation in the curves.
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We perform ADF test (using 2 lags) for checking presence of unit root;
the null hypothesis of ADF test is that the corresponding time series is a
I(1) process, i.e., it has unit root and hence is a non-stationary process.
We find, as shown in Table 14, that polarization and homophily are in-
tegrated of order 1, while the residuals are stationary. We also perform
Elliot, Rothenberg and Stock Unit Root test to arrive at the same conclu-
sion. First difference of polarization, and first difference of homophily
have ADF test statistics values of -13.55 and -15.1 respectively; this con-
firms that the differenced series are I(0).
ADF test results can be sensitive to the number of lags used in the
regression to obtain the residuals. Therefore, for a robustness check, we
conduct Phillips-Ouliaris test using the P̂z statistic [178] which is not sen-
sitive to the regression specification. The critical values for this test are
available in Table IVa of Phillips and Ouliaris [178]. The critical values
for P̂z statistic at 2.5% and 1% significance levels are 47.245 and 55.191
respectively. The P̂z statistic for the regression of polarization on ho-
mophily was found to be 53.9631; based on this evidence we reject the
absence of cointegration at 2.5% level.
All the statistical tests conducted above suggest that polarization and
homophily are I(1) processes while the residual of the regression of po-
larization on homophily is a I(0) process, thereby suggesting that polar-
ization and homophily are cointegrated.
Table 14: ADF TEST STATISTIC ESTIMATES
Type: None Type: With Trend
Polarization −0.1284 −3.2527∗
Homophily −0.0004 −2.6399
Residual −3.9682∗∗∗ −4.1087∗∗∗
Critical values (Trend): -3.99, -3.43, -3.13 (1%, 5%, 10%)
Critical values (None): -2.58, -1.95, -1.62 (1%, 5%, 10%)
Significance: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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B.2 Estimation using Vector Error Correction Mo-
del
With substantial evidence of the presence of cointegration, it becomes
natural to model polarization and homophily jointly in a vector error cor-
rection (VEC) model [111, 112]. VEC models are a special class of mod-
els derived from vector autoregression (VAR) models with an additional
term, called error correction term (ECT), to account for the cointegration
and use first differenced variables instead of variables in levels as in a
stationary VAR.
A lag length of p = 3 was found to be optimum for a VAR model in
levels based on the Akaike Information Criteria. Hence the lag length
used for VECM model is 2 (one less than 3). The following equations (in
vector form) are therefore specified as the VEC model for the investiga-
tion henceforth:
∆xt =
( µ1
µ2
)
+
(
α1
α2
)
β′xt−K +
2∑
i=1
Γi∆xt−i + εt, (B.1)
xt =
(
Pt
Ht
)
, Γi =
(
γiPP γ
i
PH
γiHP γ
i
HH
)
.
In equation (B.1), the term β′xt−K = Pt−K+β̃Ht−K is the error correction
term, which is the signature variable of a VEC model. The specification
of VEC model in (B.1) are of two forms: long-run form and transitory
form, which correspond to the cases where the values of K are 3 and 1
respectively.
Pfaff [179] provides an elegant demonstration of the steps to estimate
VEC model. The first step in estimating the model (B.1) using the Jo-
hansen procedure [180, 181] consists of the Johansen trace test to deter-
mine the cointegrating rank r of the system. As shown in Table 15, r is
found to be 1, i.e., there is one cointegrating relation, which is the maxi-
mum possible value for a system of two variables. (This also conforms to
our previous conclusion about the presence of cointegration.) Next we
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estimate the cointegrating vector β, and parameters in the VEC model
by specifying cointegration rank of 1. The parameter estimates of model
(B.1) are reported in Table 16.
Table 15: JOHANSEN COINTEGRATION TEST
Null Hypothesis Trace statistic Critical Values†
r = 0 18.77 (15.66, 17.95, 23.52)
r ≤ 1 3.67 (6.50, 8.18, 11.65)
†Values in parantheses correspond to values of test statistic at 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels of significance respectively.
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Table 16: ESTIMATES OF VEC MODELS
Transitory form Long-run form
Dependent variable: ∆Pt
µ1 0.15836∗∗∗ 0.15836∗∗∗
(0.05280) (0.05280)
α1 (ECT) -0.28037∗∗∗ -0.28037∗∗∗
(0.09372) (0.09372)
γ1PP -0.32833
∗∗∗ -0.60870∗∗∗
(0.09981) (0.09280)
γ1PH 0.00846 -0.06246
∗
(0.02809) (0.03217)
γ2PP -0.31197
∗∗∗ -0.59234∗∗∗
(0.08962) (0.10715)
γ2PH -0.03162 -0.10254
∗∗∗
(0.02725) (0.03734)
Dependent variable: ∆Ht
µ2 0.31848∗∗ 0.31848∗∗
(0.12997) (0.12997)
α2 (ECT) -0.55540∗∗ -0.55540∗∗
(0.23067) (0.22841)
γ1HP 0.18988 -0.36552
(0.24566) (0.22841)
γ1HH -0.62945
∗∗∗ -0.76994∗∗∗
(0.06913) (0.07919)
γ2HP 0.21555 -0.33985
(0.22059) (0.26372)
γ2HH -0.14554
∗∗ -0.28603∗∗∗
(0.06706) (0.09191)
Significance: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Note: Values in parentheses are standard errors of estimates.
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It is a recommended practice [182] to test whether the cointegrating
vector satisfies either the restriction β′ = (0 1) or β′ = (1 0); these addi-
tional tests reduce the chances of spuriously concluding that near inte-
grated variables are cointegrated. The likelihood ratio test statistic [179]
for this hypothesis test has a χ distribution with 1 degree of freedom in
this case. The results of the test are given in Table 17 and, as can be seen,
both restrictions β′ = (0 1) and β′ = (1 0) are rejected safely. Hence
the conclusion about polarization and homophily being cointegrated re-
mains valid and a long-run equilibrium relationship between them needs
to be examined.
Table 17: HYPOTHESIS TESTS ON COINTEGRATING VECTOR β
Restriction (Null Hypothesis) Test statistic
β′ = (0 1) 11.42***
β′ = (1 0) 6.01***
Significance: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
B.2.1 Granger-Causality Tests
A stationary time series nt is said to have a causal influence on another
stationary time series mt if the prediction of mt can be improved by us-
ing lagged values of both mt and nt instead of using the lagged values
of only mt. The null hypothesis for Granger causality is that no explana-
tory power is added by jointly considering the lagged values of mt and
nt as predictors. The null hypothesis that nt does not Granger-cause mt
is rejected if coefficients of lagged values of nt are significant, after hav-
ing accounted for lagged values of mt. For testing Granger-causality, the
Wald test statistic follows the asymptotic chi-square distribution under
the null. Since in our case, the the time series of polarization and ho-
mophily are non-stationary (as seen before), the Wald test statistic does
not follow the usual distribution.
To overcome the above constraint to use Wald statistic directly, we
use the method suggested by Toda and Yamamoto [114]. According to
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this method, additional lags (equal to the maximum integrating order
in the system) are incorporated before conducting Wald test for Granger
causality. Following this, we use a VAR model in levels (without differ-
encing) using 4 lags. An additional lag (polarization and homophily are
both integrated of order 1) is used on top of the optimal lag length of
p = 3 (determined previously using Akaike Information Criteria).
Testing homophily does not Granger cause polarization (null hypoth-
esis) is performed using a Wald test where only the first 3 lags of ho-
mophily are restricted to zero. The Wald statistic follows a χ2 distribu-
tion with 3 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis. As shown
in Table 1 in the main text, the null hypothesis is rejected (test statistic
value = 12.3, p-value < 0.01). Testing polarization does not Granger
cause homophily is performed by restricting the first 3 lags of polariza-
tion, and the test statistic is not sufficient to reject the hypothesis (test
statistic value = 4.0, p-value > 0.1).
Hence the conclusion that emerges is that only homophily Granger-
causes polarization with a negative effect, and the causality in the other
direction is absent, i.e., polarization does not Granger cause homophily.
Since the causality holds only in one direction, it is appropriate to inter-
pret short term dynamics (γi in VEC model, (B.1)) only when evolution
of polarization is the dependent variable. From Table 16 we see that the
estimates of γ1PH and γ
2
PH are significant only in the long-run form of
VEC model. Hence, homophily negatively affects polarization several
months ahead.
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B.3 A Model of Polarization in Social Networks
Consider a social network with a uniform topology where each agent
in the network (as a listener) has k speakers, neighbours from whom
he receives information on a given topic (e.g., reality of climate change).
An unobserved fundamental θ ⊂ R describes the accuracy of the be-
lief held by an agent regarding the topic: higher the θ of an agent, the
farther is the agent’s belief away from the truth.1 Suppose, at a time t,
the agents in the social network are of two types - θl, θr - informed and
misinformed, and the network has a homophily coefficient of hk with re-
spect to this property, i.e., h speakers of an agent of type θi, i ∈ {l, r},
are of the same θi type. Agents of types θl and θr represent two dis-
tinct sub-populations whose prior beliefs at time t are different: to for-
malize, we assume the former type have a prior belief about the fun-
damental θ given by θl ∼ N (θ0, δ−1l ) while the later type have a prior
θr = θl + ξ ∼ N (θ0 + ξ, δ−1r ) which reflects the fact that they are mis-
informed. (Agents’ prior beliefs are modelled as distributions [183], i.e.,
contain noise, to allow for heterogeneity of information sources based on
which the beliefs are formed.) The population belief at t is composed of
beliefs of the two sub-populations and is given by the mixture distribu-
tion
θpopt ∼ fl · θl + fr · θr, fr = 1− fl,
where fl and fr are the fractions of the sub-populations of types θl and
θr respectively. We define the belief of the population (social network) at
time t to be polarized if the distribution θpopt has two modes. Mathemati-
cally, θpopt has either one mode or two modes [184].
Now we introduce communication among agents [185]. In the period
between t and a future time t+ 1, suppose each agent communicates his
belief using a message (e.g., retweet a post to followers or mention to an-
other user via a tweet), and all agents update their beliefs at t + 1 after
incorporating beliefs about the fundamental expressed in their speakers’
messages. We assume that the credibility of communicated messages de-
1The choice of left or right side for denoting higher truth values does not affect the
nature of results.
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pends on the type of the speaker, i.e., in the social network, truthful and
fake information propagate with different credibilities: listeners obtain
an independent signal xl|θl ∼ N (θl, β−1l ) from each speaker of type θl
and an independent signal xr|θr(θl) ∼ N (θr, β−1r ) from each speaker of
type θr. We assume that the messages from θl type agents carry minimal
credibility, i.e., βl is strictly positive. (In our context of the reality about
climate change, this is a reasonable assumption.)
Lemma 1 characterizes the posterior beliefs of the two types of agents
- θl, θr - at time t+ 1.
Lemma 1. The posterior belief of type θl agents becomes
θl | Il ∼ N
(
µl(Il),
1
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr
)
such that
E (µl(Il)) =
hβl
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr
θ0 +
(k − h)βr
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr
(θ0 + ξ)
and that for type θr agents becomes
θr | Ir ∼ N
(
µr(Ir),
1
δr + hβr + (k − h)βl
)
such that
E (µr(Ir)) =
hβr
δr + hβr + (k − h)βl
(θ0 + ξ) +
(k − h)βl
δr + hβr + (k − h)βl
θ0,
where Il and Ir are the information sets comprising signals from neighbours for
agents of types θl and θr respectively.
Proof. Below we sketch the proof for the distribution of θl | Il, the proof
for θr | Ir is similar. Consider a listener of type l who updates be-
liefs from two types of speakers, l and r. There are k neighbours of the
speaker and among them h are of type l (homophily). We build the pos-
terior for the listener in the following manner: he first updates informa-
tion from speakers of type l, and then from speakers of type r. (This is
same as obtaining the posterior using all signals at once.) With a prior
θl ∼ N (θ0, δ−1l ), the posterior obtained after updating with h signals xl|θl
distributed N (θl, β−1l ) becomes
N
(
1
δl + hβl
(
θ0δl + βl
h∑
i=1
xl,i
)
,
1
δl + hβl
)
.
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This becomes the prior for the next updates of k − h signals xr|θl dis-
tributed N (θl + ξ, β−1r ). Hence the final posterior θl | Il becomes
N
(
1
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr
(
θ0δl + βl
h∑
i=1
xl,i + βr
k−h∑
i=1
xr,i
)
,
1
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr
)
.
In the case when δl → 0, this becomes
N
(
1
hβl + (k − h)βr
(
βl
h∑
i=1
xl,i + βr
k−h∑
i=1
xr,i
)
,
1
hβl + (k − h)βr
)
.
The expression for E (µl(Il)) follows from the fact that E(xl,i) = E(E(xl,i|θl)) =
E(θl) = θ0 and similarly E(xr,i) = θ0 + ξ.
Lemma 2. The population is said to be polarized according to beliefs if the
distribution of θpopt+1 has two modes. Let
σ =
(
V ar(θr | Ir)
V ar(θl | Il)
)1/2
=
(
δr + hβr + (k − h)βl
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr
)1/2
, and
µ = (E (µr(Ir))− E (µl(Il))) ·
√
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr .
Then fl, σ, and µ together determine whether the distribution of asymptotic
population belief given by θpopt+1 has one mode or two modes. In particular, if
µ ≥ 3
2
√
3 min(1, σ), (B.2)
then the probability that the distribution of θpopt+1 has two modes increases. If
µ ≤ 2 min(1, σ), (B.3)
then the distribution of θpopt+1 has exactly one mode.
Proof. This follows directly from Robertson and Fryer’s Theorem on Modal-
ity [184]. The nature of the condition for polarization, as mentioned in
(B.2), is probabilistic because additional conditions of large enough sub-
population fractions fl and fr(= 1− fl) also need to be satisfied.
Proposition 3. In a random communication network with diffuse prior beliefs
of both types of agents, polarization can not increase at time t+ 1.
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Proof. (i) Using Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, when δl → 0 and δr → 0 (diffuse
priors), we have
µ = ξ
βrβl (2kh− k2)
(hβr + (k − h)βl) (hβl + (k − h)βr)
√
hβl + (k − h)βr . (B.4)
When the network is random, we can assume that on average each agent
has equal number of speakers of the two types, i.e., h = k2 . In this case, µ
is 0. Hence it follows from Lemma 2 that there is no polarization.
Proposition 4. If marginal increase in homophily at t does not positively affect
the probability of polarization at t + 1, then the messages received from speak-
ers of type θr do not have a minimal level of credibility (i.e., a positive level of
precision).
Proof. For mathematical simplicity, we assume θ0 = 0. As we can see
from the expressions of E (µl(Il)) and E (µr(Ir)) in Lemma 1, the mean
shift in the posterior belief from prior (e.g., E (µl(Il)) − θ0 for l type
agents) depends only on ξ, i.e., to the extent of shift of mean belief, and
does not depend on θ, the mean of original belief.
Case 1: We first solve for the case when the priors are diffuse: we have
µ as given in (B.4). Using (B.2) and (B.3), we see that there is a higher
probability for polarization to occur as µ increases. If µ does not increase
when h increases (i.e., for fixed k, homophily increases), then there is
no chance of polarization to grow since µ has to be above a threshold
for polarization ((B.2)) to happen. Hence, we use µ as the parameter
to gauge the probability of occurrence of polarization. Solving for the
condition when homophily does not positively affect the probability of
polarization, i.e., ∂µ∂h ≤ 0, we have
2
2kβlβrξ√
βr(k − h) + βlh(βl(k − h) + βrh)
−
βlβrξ(βl − βr)(2hk − k2)
2(βr(k − h) + βlh)3/2(βl(k − h) + βrh)
(B.5)
−
βlβrξ(βr − βl)(2hk − k2)√
βr(k − h) + βlh(βl(k − h) + βrh)2
≤ 0
For any positive distance away from the mean belief held by agents of
informed type ξ > 0, for any positive number of speakers k > 0, for any
non-trivial3 level of homophily h ∈ (0, k), and for any positive level of
2For easy replication, readers may use WolframAlpha online for solving.
3Trivial scenarios include cases where a listener has either all speakers of his own type
or all speakers of opposite type. This is a purely mathematical restriction to avoid division
by zero.
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precision βl > 04 of informed messages, the only solution for (B.5) is βr
is 0.
Case 2: Now we solve for the general case when δl and δr are positive.
In this case we have
µ = ξ
βrh(δl + δr) − δrβrk + βrβl (2kh− k2)
(δr + hβr + (k − h)βl) (δl + hβl + (k − h)βr)
√
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr,
and
∂µ
∂h
=
ξ(δl + δr)βr + 2ξβlβrk√
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr (δr + (k − h)βl + hβr)
−
(βl − βr)(ξ(δl + δr)hβr − ξδrkβr + ξβlβr(2kh− k2))
2(δl + hβl + (k − h)βr)3/2 (δr + (k − h)βl + hβr)
−
(βr − βl)(ξ(δl + δr)hβr − ξδrkβr + ξβlβr(2kh− k2))√
δl + hβl + (k − h)βr (δr + (k − h)βl + hβr)2
.
(B.6)
We can directly see that ∂µ∂h is 0 when we plug the solution from Case
1, i.e., βr = 0. So even if the distribution already begins with some de-
gree of separation of two peaks at t (since δl and δr are strictly positive in
this case), the peaks do not further distance away at t + 1, i.e., irrespec-
tive of prior beliefs of agents, the credibility of fake information alone
determines ∂µ∂h . Now if βr becomes positive, it is natural to expect that
the beliefs of θr type agents will be further reinforced, thereby strictly
decreasing the spread of the right peak (i.e., increasing probability for
polarization).
Indeed, looking for all solutions5 of ∂µ∂h ≤ 0, under same restrictions
as in previous case including δl > 0 and δr > 0, we find that the only
feasible solution is βr = 0. Hence, ∂µ∂h can not be strictly negative or zero
when βr is strictly positive.
So, in any case (Case 1, Case 2), a scenario where the increasing ho-
mophily does not increase the probability of polarization can only be ex-
plained when messages from type θr speakers are not credible. (In other
4For the messages in favour of climate change, we assume that they carry a positive
credibility.
5Verification is also possible by simulations. Using (B.6), it is easy to see that the sign of
∂µ
∂h
depends on βr − βl which is basically the relative credibility of fake information with
respect to true information. So with fixed values of ξ, δl, δr, k, βl, we varied h from 0 to k
and βr from 0 to a very large value. We find that, irrespective of value of h, the value of
∂µ
∂h
is strictly positive for βr > 0 and is 0 for βr = 0. The code for this is available together
with the code for empirical analysis, as mentioned in Data availability in the main text.
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words, if fake information is at least slightly credible, the probability of
polarization will always increase with increasing levels of homophily in
communication.)
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Appendix C
Politicization in Guardian
C.1 Tables & Figures
C.1.1 Joint effects of macro and micro attributes
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Table 18: EFFECT ON DISCUSSION SIZE
Dependent variable: Total comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3?? Model 1 Model 2 Model 3??
Understanding perception of politicization via
(i) effect of macro attribute, (ii) effect of micro attribute, (iii) interaction effect
Constant 18.043 146.960∗∗∗ -50.435∗∗∗ 76.104∗∗∗ 181.598∗∗∗ -54.303∗∗∗
Macro 612.487∗∗∗ -753.338∗∗∗ -240.345∗ 612.434∗∗∗ -1057.355∗∗∗ -383.101∗∗∗
(i) (69.098) (161.992) (128.144) (68.538) (169.781) (126.609)
Micro 2384.583∗∗∗ 1043.316∗∗∗ 247.249∗∗ 1693.002∗∗∗ 649.378∗∗∗ 294.560∗∗∗
(ii) (208.443) (81.765) (105.126) (142.478) (50.104) (60.448)
Micro×Macro 4966.745∗∗∗ 3060.553∗∗∗ 4548.865∗∗∗ 2567.453∗∗∗
(iii) (719.268) (581.453) (573.077) (440.710)
Potential confounders, Robustness of estimates for politicization
Article Length 0.217∗∗∗ 0.217∗∗∗
Total Quotes -15.265∗∗∗ -15.114∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.2441∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗
Time FE × × YES × × YES
Author CSE (i) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 0.397 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.165
Author CSE (ii) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.072∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.017∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.010
R2 0.112 0.150 0.341 0.105 0.154 0.343
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.150 0.339 0.105 0.154 0.341
F Statistic 71.66 107.9 120.5 73.65 108.2 120.8
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the estimates.
Micro attributes for politicization are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports only the p-value and significance of corresponding estimate when
model is re-estimated using robust errors clustered by author names.
Total observations: 22171 (21906 in models with Author CSE)
(265 observations have missing author names)
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis
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Table 19: EFFECT ON SOCIAL AGREEMENTS DURING DISCUSSIONS
Dependent variable: Total likes on all comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3?? Model 1 Model 2 Model 3??
Understanding perception of politicization via
(i) effect of macro attribute, (ii) effect of micro attribute, (iii) interaction effect
Constant 109.417 689.413∗∗∗ -257.735∗∗∗ 336.045∗∗∗ 812.694∗∗∗ -291.539∗∗∗
Macro 3221.590∗∗∗ -2923.226∗∗∗ -336.055 3080.951∗∗∗ -4463.576∗∗∗ -1116.422∗
(i) (340.925) (732.968) (583.578) (336.851) (779.225) (598.620)
Micro 1.1×104 ∗∗∗ 4961.886∗∗∗ 1672.092∗∗∗ 8213.798∗∗∗ 3498.443∗∗∗ 2169.658∗∗∗
(ii) (928.139) (387.997) (467.232) (654.496) (283.726) (314.563)
Micro×Macro 4966.745∗∗∗ 2990.953∗∗∗ 2.055×104 ∗∗∗ 1.088×104 ∗∗∗
(iii) (719.268) (593.688) (2586.193) (2021.607)
Potential confounders, Robustness of estimates for politicization
Article Length 1.023∗∗∗ 1.007∗∗∗
Total Quotes -78.061∗∗∗ -77.806∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -1.112∗∗∗ -1.098∗∗∗
Time FE × × YES × × YES
Author CSE (i) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.075∗ 0.817 0.000∗∗∗ 0.003∗∗∗ 0.382
Author CSE (ii) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗
R2 0.105 0.136 0.348 0.103 0.143 0.352
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.136 0.347 0.103 0.143 0.350
F Statistic 81.11 113.0 79.19 85.20 108.4 80.58
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the estimates.
Micro attributes for politicization are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports only the p-value and significance of corresponding estimate when
model is re-estimated using robust errors clustered by author names.
Total observations: 22171 (21906 in models with Author CSE)
(265 observations have missing author names)
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis
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Table 20: EFFECT ON ENGAGEMENT IN DISCUSSION AMONG USERS
Dependent variable: Total replies to all comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3?? Model 1 Model 2 Model 3??
Understanding perception of politicization via
(i) effect of macro attribute, (ii) effect of micro attribute, (iii) interaction effect
Constant 2.699 94.251∗∗∗ -34.743∗∗∗ 41.481∗∗∗ 116.639∗∗∗ -37.321∗∗∗
Macro 446.750∗∗∗ -523.196∗∗∗ -163.109∗ 444.650∗∗∗ -744.973∗∗∗ -273.054∗∗∗
(i) (50.022) (116.028) (92.480) (49.590) (120.494) (90.740)
Micro 1617.570∗∗∗ 665.063∗∗∗ 175.561∗∗ 1154.419∗∗∗ 410.901∗∗∗ 206.341∗∗∗
(ii) (148.357) (58.887) (70.616) (101.237) (36.593) (41.458)
Micro×Macro 3527.157∗∗∗ 2210.192∗∗∗ 3240.790∗∗∗ 1873.800∗∗∗
(iii) (512.756) (416.640) (406.575) (315.159)
Potential confounders, Robustness of estimates for politicization
Article Length 0.149∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
Total Quotes -11.746∗∗∗ -11.623∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.173∗∗∗ -0.170∗∗∗
Time FE × × YES × × YES
Author CSE (i) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗ 0.433 0.000∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.165
Author CSE (ii) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) 0.001∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗
R2 0.105 0.143 0.338 0.100 0.148 0.340
Adjusted R2 0.105 0.143 0.336 0.100 0.148 0.339
F Statistic 67.71 93.63 94.32 69.56 91.67 95.13
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the estimates.
Micro attributes for politicization are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports only the p-value and significance of corresponding estimate when
model is re-estimated using robust errors clustered by author names.
Total observations: 22171 (21906 in models with Author CSE)
(265 observations have missing author names)
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis
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Table 21: EFFECT ON TOTAL UNIQUE USERS IN DISCUSSION
Dependent variable: Total unique users
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3?? Model 1 Model 2 Model 3??
Understanding perception of politicization via
(i) effect of macro attribute, (ii) effect of micro attribute, (iii) interaction effect
Constant 45.855 64.163∗∗∗ -17.589∗∗∗ 56.354∗∗∗ 72.155∗∗∗ -17.427∗∗∗
Macro 124.080∗∗∗ -69.884∗∗ 32.401 115.809∗∗∗ -134.282∗∗∗ -0.012
(i) (14.423) (29.237) (23.803) (14.210) (30.208) (23.434)
Micro 530.557∗∗∗ 340.080∗∗∗ 270.306∗∗∗ 400.611∗∗∗ 244.304∗∗∗ 222.784∗∗∗
(ii) (36.826) (23.001) (23.979) (25.583) (15.759) (15.917 )
Micro×Macro 705.341∗∗∗ 315.046∗∗∗ 681.300∗∗∗ 283.951∗∗∗
(iii) (120.120) (97.008) (95.648) (73.948)
Potential confounders, Robustness of estimates for politicization
Article Length 0.0352∗∗∗ 0.036∗∗∗
Total Quotes -2.415∗∗∗ -2.363∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.043∗∗∗ -0.043∗∗∗
Time FE × × YES × × YES
Author CSE (i) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.266 0.473 0.000∗∗∗ 0.018∗∗ 0.967
Author CSE (ii) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) 0.005∗∗∗ 0.140 0.000∗∗∗ 0.086∗
R2 0.107 0.123 0.319 0.106 0.128 0.323
Adjusted R2 0.107 0.123 0.317 0.105 0.128 0.321
F Statistic 120.2 143.9 194.2 132.0 151.3 195.1
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors are reported in parantheses below the estimates.
Micro attributes for politicization are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports only the p-value and significance of corresponding estimate when
model is re-estimated using robust errors clustered by author names.
Total observations: 22171 (21906 in models with Author CSE)
(265 observations have missing author names)
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis
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C.1.2 Impact of macro attributes
This section contains statistical tables showing the effect of macro at-
tribute of politicization, the category assigned to articles (‘Politics’ or
‘Others’), on collective attention/response.
Table 22: BALANCE OF COVARIATES, SAMPLE SIZE, AUTHORS RETAINED
Before Matching After Matching
Micro-attribute Type: Strong
∆ Micro (normalized) 0.2451 0.0038
∆ Article Length 2617.0275 -5.8598
∆ Total Quotes 8.5677 0.7739
∆ #Words in Quotes 357.8501 11.5506
Mean improvement of covariates in their difference across treated and control groups: 98.43%
Sample size of Treated group 1165 882
Sample size of Control group 21006 20272
Number of unique authors in dataset 6659 6413
Micro-attribute Type: Weak
∆ Micro (normalized) 0.3452 0.005
∆ Article Length 2617.0275 -16.5518
∆ Total Quotes 8.5677 0.867
∆ #Words in Quotes 357.8501 21.2678
Mean improvement of covariates in their difference across treated and control groups: 98.6%
Sample size of Treated group 1165 834
Sample size of Control group 21006 20025
Number of unique authors in dataset 6659 6323
Matching method: Coarsened Exact Matching
Treated group: Articles in ‘Politics’ category.
Control group: Articles in ‘Others’ category.
∆ refers to mean difference of the covariate across treated and control groups.
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Table 23: EFFECT ON DISCUSSION SIZE
Dependent variable: Total comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Macro attributes
Constant 344.8∗∗∗∗ -36.6∗∗∗∗ -32.84∗∗∗∗ 397.07∗∗∗∗ -51.4∗∗∗∗ -51.05∗∗∗∗
Macro 477.8∗∗∗∗ 467.0∗∗∗∗ -44.46 318.17∗∗∗∗ 333.62∗∗∗∗ 3.64
(i) (71.9) (58.9) (110.63) (93.97) (56.8) (122.2)
Micro 367.9∗∗ 279.75∗ 636.64∗∗∗∗ 597.74∗∗∗∗
(ii) (167.4) (160.38) (117.52) (125.9)
Micro×Macro 2013.9∗∗∗∗ 998.21∗∗
(iii) (585.34) (490.94)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
Total Quotes -6.57∗∗∗∗ -6.71∗∗∗∗ -7.56∗∗∗ -7.58∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.045 -0.039 -0.06 -0.06
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (241.6)∗∗ (156.85)∗∗∗ (125.83) (205.49) (117.87)∗∗∗ (140.96)
Author CSE (ii) (177.28)∗∗ (181.32) (129.6)∗∗∗∗ (139.53)∗∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (856.6)∗∗ (668.24)
R2 0.0137 0.335 0.340 0.005 0.426 0.428
Adjusted R2 0.0136 0.333 0.338 0.005 0.424 0.426
F Statistic 294.4 176.9 178.2 114.4 257.3 254.9
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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Table 24: EFFECT ON SOCIAL AGREEMENTS DURING DISCUSSIONS
Dependent variable: Total likes on all comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Macro attributes
Constant 1491.9∗∗∗∗ -154.9∗∗∗∗ -132.4∗∗∗∗ 1786.0∗∗∗∗ -225.1∗∗∗∗ -211.4∗∗∗∗
Macro 2843.6∗∗∗∗ 2785.1∗∗∗∗ -310.5 1970.8∗∗∗∗ 2018.4∗∗∗∗ -185.26
(i) (371.15) (312.21) (551.7) (374.51) (282.04) (516.46)
Micro 2285.2∗∗∗ 1751.6∗∗ 3854.39∗∗∗∗ 3594.6∗∗∗∗
(ii) (786.34) (764.65) (497.12) (520.16)
Micro×Macro 12189.6∗∗∗∗ 6666.2∗∗∗
(iii) (2906.9) (2086.04)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.33∗ 0.33∗ 0.21∗ 0.20∗
Total Quotes -18.32∗∗ -19.13∗∗ -17.81∗∗ -17.97∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.25 -0.21 -0.34 -0.33
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (1258.0)∗∗ (905.84)∗∗∗ (696.4) (1045.42)∗ (722.16)∗∗∗ (775.69)
Author CSE (ii) (894.39)∗∗ (932.16)∗ (587.4)∗∗∗∗ (633.39)∗∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (4875.9)∗∗ (3916.36)∗
R2 0.017 0.287 0.294 0.008 0.3194 0.322
Adjusted R2 0.017 0.285 0.292 0.008 0.3175 0.320
F Statistic 364.6 141.7 144.0 163.6 162.7 162.2
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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Table 25: EFFECT ON ENGAGEMENT IN DISCUSSION AMONG USERS
Dependent variable: Total replies to all comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Macro attributes
Constant 216.2∗∗∗∗ -23.09∗∗∗∗ -20.3∗∗∗∗ 257.1∗∗∗∗ -36.4∗∗∗∗ -34.83∗∗∗∗
Macro 350.89∗∗∗∗ 347.68∗∗∗∗ -35.47 233.28∗∗∗∗ 250.76∗∗∗∗ 13.24
(i) (52.08) (42.87) (77.84) (70.51) (42.17) (91.47)
Micro 199.16∗ 133.11 402.99∗∗∗∗ 375.0∗∗∗∗
(ii) (107.51) (106.37) (86.56) (93.14)
Micro×Macro 1508.78∗∗∗∗ 718.5∗
(iii) (413.91) (367.10)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.08∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
Total Quotes -4.61∗∗∗∗ -4.71∗∗∗∗ -5.63∗∗∗ -5.65∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (176.77)∗∗ (116.2)∗∗∗ (89.63) (150.34) (84.43)∗∗∗ (103.31)
Author CSE (ii) (111.91)∗ (116.46) (91.5)∗∗∗∗ (99.0)∗∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (626.55)∗∗ (486.26)
R2 0.015 0.351 0.357 0.005 0.441 0.442
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.349 0.355 0.005 0.439 0.440
F Statistic 313.8 190.3 192.1 109.4 272.9 270.2
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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Table 26: EFFECT ON TOTAL UNIQUE USERS IN DISCUSSION
Dependent variable: Total unique users
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Macro attributes
Constant 139.51∗∗∗∗ -14.12∗∗∗∗ -13.83∗∗∗∗ 155.6∗∗∗∗ -17.5∗∗∗∗ -17.4∗∗∗∗
Macro 107.55∗∗∗∗ 102.29∗∗∗∗ 62.53∗∗ 72.07∗∗∗ 73.8∗∗∗∗ 58.78∗∗
(i) (17.49) (13.19) (29.48) (22.51) (12.9) (27.7)
Micro 230.31∗∗∗∗ 233.45∗∗∗∗ 274.8∗∗∗∗ 273.1∗∗∗∗
(ii) (54.29) (52.48) (32.8) (34.6)
Micro×Macro 156.56 45.4
(iii) (139.3) (102.67)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.025∗∗ 0.0257∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.023∗∗
Total Quotes -1.79∗∗∗ -1.79∗∗∗ -1.68∗∗ -1.68∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (49.67)∗∗ (26.56)∗∗∗∗ (32.34)∗ (44.6) (21.66)∗∗∗∗ (30.46)∗
Author CSE (ii) (62.14)∗∗∗∗ (61.41)∗∗∗∗ (41.31)∗∗∗∗ (43.04)∗∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (171.71) (123.39)
R2 0.007 0.329 0.329 0.003 0.398 0.3982
Adjusted R2 0.007 0.327 0.3272 0.003 0.396 0.3964
F Statistic 151.9 172.3 169.7 64.92 229.3 225.6
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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C.1.3 Impact of micro attributes
This section contains statistical tables showing the effect of micro at-
tributes of politicization on collective attention/response.
We begin with CBPS matching.. all authors are retained..
Table 27: BREAKING CORRELATIONS WITH CONFOUNDERS
Before Matching After Matching
Treatment: Micro attribute (INDIRECT Type)
?Macro attribute 0.4517656 0.053593957
? Article Length 0.4772347 0.014060672
? Total Quotes 0.2745572 -0.003579448
? #Words in Quotes 0.2352519 0.017305180
Treatment: Micro attribute (DIRECT Type)
?Macro attribute 0.4649682 0.05504194
? Article Length 0.3932794 -0.01314866
? Total Quotes 0.2452330 0.01315509
? #Words in Quotes 0.2048853 0.02138863
Matching method: Covariate balancing propensity score (CBPS)
Treatment: Micro attributes (Strong type, Weak type)
Total observations: 22171
? refers to Pearson correlation between treatment and the covariate
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Table 28: EFFECT ON DISCUSSION SIZE
Dependent variable: Total comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Micro attributes
Constant 330.19∗∗∗∗ -60.3∗∗∗∗ -59.45∗∗∗∗ 330.19∗∗∗∗ -60.3∗∗∗ -59.4∗∗∗∗
Macro 189.43∗∗∗∗ 78.43 189.43∗∗∗∗ 78.43
(i) (29.77) (57.42) (29.77) (57.42)
Micro 150.26 718.9∗∗∗∗ 700.78∗∗∗∗ 150.26 718.9∗∗∗∗ 700.79∗∗∗∗
(ii) (389.28) (197.8) (202.21) (389.28) (197.83) (202.21)
Micro×Macro 792.22∗∗ 792.22∗∗
(iii) (358.81) (358.81)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.15∗∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗∗
Total Quotes -3.59∗∗∗ -3.58∗∗∗ -3.59∗∗∗ -3.59∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.14∗∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗∗
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (41.08)∗∗∗∗ (70.99) (41.08)∗∗∗∗ (70.99)
Author CSE (ii) (424.5) (227.16)∗∗∗ (232.3)∗∗∗ (424.52) (227.16)∗∗∗ (232.3)∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (521.66) (521.66)
R2 0.0002 0.505 0.505 0.0022 0.505 0.5052
Adjusted R2 0.0002 0.503 0.503 0.0018 0.503 0.5038
F Statistic 5.038 376.1 370.1 5.038 376.1 370.1
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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Table 29: EFFECT ON SOCIAL AGREEMENTS DURING DISCUSSIONS
Dependent variable: Total likes on all comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Micro attributes
Constant 1595.57∗∗∗∗ -357.9∗∗∗∗ -355.6∗∗∗∗ 1595.57∗∗∗∗ -357.9∗∗∗∗ -355.6∗∗∗∗
Macro 1168.19∗∗∗∗ 857.61∗∗ 1168.19∗∗∗∗ 857.61∗∗
(i) (171.09) (367.99) (171.09) (367.99)
Micro 1391.55 4920.97∗∗∗∗ 4870.3∗∗∗∗ 1391.55 4920.97∗∗∗∗ 4870.3∗∗∗∗
(ii) (1765.26) (1041.55) (1071.13) (1765.26) (1041.55) (1071.13)
Micro×Macro 2216.73 2216.73
(iii) (2211.56) (2211.56)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.73∗∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗∗ 0.73∗∗∗∗
Total Quotes -19.19∗∗∗ -19.19∗∗∗ -19.19∗∗∗ -19.15∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.74∗∗∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗∗ -0.74∗∗∗∗ -0.75∗∗∗∗
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (232.9)∗∗∗∗ (429.81)∗∗ (232.9)∗∗∗∗ (429.81)∗∗
Author CSE (ii) (2090.85) (1314.6)∗∗∗∗ (1348.48)∗∗∗∗ (2090.85) (1314.6)∗∗∗∗ (1348.48)∗∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (3018.1) (3018.1)
R2 0.0006 0.4647 0.4647 0.0006 0.4647 0.4647
Adjusted R2 0.00058 0.4632 0.4632 0.00058 0.4632 0.4632
F Statistic 14.07 319.8 314.6 14.07 319.8 314.6
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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Table 30: EFFECT ON ENGAGEMENT IN DISCUSSION AMONG USERS
Dependent variable: Total replies to all comments
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Micro attributes
Constant 207.37∗∗∗∗ -40.11∗∗∗∗ -39.48∗∗∗∗ 207.37∗∗∗∗ -40.11∗∗∗∗ -39.48∗∗∗∗
Macro 141.12∗∗∗∗ 57.26 142.14∗∗∗∗ 57.26
(i) (20.95) (38.33) (20.95) (38.33)
Micro 90.85 508.75∗∗∗∗ 494.9∗∗∗∗ 90.85 508.75∗∗∗∗ 494.9∗∗∗∗
(ii) (228.7) (115.24) (117.84) (228.7) (115.24) (117.84)
Micro×Macro 605.66∗∗ 605.66∗∗
(iii) (238.82) (238.82)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.09∗∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗∗
Total Quotes -2.49∗∗∗∗ -2.49∗∗∗∗ -2.49∗∗∗∗ -2.49∗∗∗∗
#Words in Quotes -0.08∗∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗∗ -0.08∗∗∗∗
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (27.98)∗∗∗∗ (48.64) (27.98)∗∗∗∗ (48.64)
Author CSE (ii) (253.72) (130.79)∗∗∗∗ (133.62)∗∗∗∗ (253.72) (130.79)∗∗∗∗ (133.62)∗∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (376.3) (376.3)
R2 0.0002 0.4897 0.4899 0.0002 0.4897 0.4899
Adjusted R2 0.00015 0.4883 0.4885 0.00015 0.4883 0.4885
F Statistic 4.381 353.7 348.1 4.381 353.7 348.1
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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Table 31: EFFECT ON TOTAL UNIQUE USERS IN DISCUSSION
Dependent variable: Total unique users
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3 Model 1 Model 2?? Model 3
Treatment: Micro attributes
Constant 88.58∗∗∗∗ -25.39∗∗∗∗ -25.37∗∗∗∗ 88.58∗∗∗∗ -25.39∗∗∗∗ -25.37∗∗∗∗
Macro 54.54∗∗∗∗ 50.89∗∗∗ 54.54∗∗∗∗ 50.89∗∗∗
(i) (9.60) (17.48) (9.60) (17.48)
Micro 287.95∗∗∗∗ 470.34∗∗∗∗ 469.7∗∗∗∗ 287.95∗∗∗∗ 470.34∗∗∗∗ 469.7∗∗∗∗
(ii) (64.5) (39.11) (39.9) (64.5) (39.11) (39.9)
Micro×Macro 26.03 26.03
(iii) (99.38) (99.38)
Potential confounders, Robustness checks for treatment effect
Article Length 0.02∗∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗∗
Total Quotes -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14
#Words in Quotes -0.03∗∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗∗ -0.03∗∗∗∗
Time FE × YES YES × YES YES
Author CSE (i) (13.97)∗∗∗∗ (21.18)∗∗ (13.97)∗∗∗∗ (21.18)∗∗
Author CSE (ii) (81.69)∗∗∗∗ (62.37)∗∗∗∗ (63.68)∗∗∗∗ (81.69)∗∗∗∗ (62.37)∗∗∗∗ (63.68)∗∗∗∗
Author CSE (iii) (139.46) (139.46)
R2 0.0145 0.349 0.3495 0.0145 0.349 0.3495
Adjusted R2 0.0145 0.347 0.3477 0.0145 0.347 0.3477
F Statistic 327.1 198.0 194.8 327.1 198.0 194.8
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001
Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors are reported below the estimates.
Micro attributes are normalized.
Time fixed effects are quarterly fixed effects.
Author CSE reports robust errors clustered by authors (in parenthesis) and
significance for the corresponding estimates.
Total observations in each model: 22171 (265 missing author names),
Total observations when using errors clustered by authors: 21906.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis,
Model 3 only performs test for heterogeneity of the treatment effect.
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C.1.4 Mechanisms of politicized discussions
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Table 32: POLITICIZED COLLECTIVE DISCUSSIONS: MECHANISM 1
Treatment: Politicization of article (Micro attribute)
Mediation channel: Discussion becomes politicized by related but external contexts†
Moderated mediation via: Politicization of articles (Macro attribute)
Outcome: Total unique users in discussion
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1?? Model 2† Model 3†?? Model 1?? Model 2† Model 3†??
Moderation Test 451.54∗∗∗∗ 514.84∗∗∗∗ 296.94∗∗∗∗ 371.01∗∗∗∗
ATE 257.703∗∗∗∗ 250.74∗∗∗∗ 241.53∗∗∗∗ 223.82∗∗∗∗ 214.55∗∗∗∗ 242.532∗∗∗∗
ADE 27.493 11.31 26.482 21.284 5.90 44.795
ACME 230.210∗∗∗∗ 239.43∗∗∗∗ 215.05∗∗∗∗ 202.537∗∗∗∗ 208.65∗∗∗∗ 197.737∗∗∗∗
[165.9, 289.7] [178.9, 304.9] [162.8, 268.2] [156.3, 251.5] [161.6, 253.0] [163.3, 232.8]
Sensitivity Test (0.6, 0.209) (0.6, 0.209) (0.6, 0.209) (0.6, 0.208) (0.6, 0.208) (0.6, 0.208)
Proportion 0.896∗∗∗∗ 0.945∗∗∗∗ 0.88∗∗∗∗ 0.902∗∗∗∗ 0.97∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗∗
[0.65, 1.38] [0.71, 1.52] [0.66, 1.39] [0.65, 1.43] [0.71, 1.53] [0.64, 1.11]
Dataset and Variables Used for Model Specification
Matched Dataset YES YES YES YES YES YES
Micro×Macro YES YES YES YES YES YES
Mediator×Macro × YES YES × YES YES
Confounders × × YES × × YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001. Square brackets report confidence intervals. Total observations in each model: 22171
Models are estimated using quasi-Bayesian approximation and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
Sensitivity Test reports values of ρ and R̃2MR̃
2
Y (in order) within parantheses. R̃
2∗
MR̃
2∗
Y = ρ
2 .
Matched dataset is the one obtained during treatment effect estimation. See Table 27.
Macro variable is a binary variable for article’s category: 1 for ‘Politics’ 0 for ‘Others’.
Confounders used in models are article length, total quotes, and number of words in quotes.
Moderation Test reports difference in ACME values for estimates conditional on category (Macro attribute),
i.e., ACME(‘Others’) - ACME(‘Politics’), and whether the difference is statistically significant.
† Refers to discussion of an article being populated with politically inclined entities which
(i) have appeared in previous articles that co-occurred with entities of the current article
but (ii) have never appeared in the main text of the current article.
† Model 2 and Model 3 show estimates conditional on ‘Others’ category.
?? Final models used in main text for interpretation and further analysis
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Table 33: POLITICIZED COLLECTIVE DISCUSSIONS: MECHANISM 2
Treatment: Politicization of article (Micro attribute)
Mediation channel: Users influenced by related contexts but external to current article†see next page
Outcomes: Comments, Feedbacks, Users’ Engagement
Micro-attribute Type: INDIRECT Micro-attribute Type: DIRECT
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3?? Model 1 Model 2 Model 3??
Outcome: Discussion size (as in Table 18)
ATE 1304.846∗∗∗∗ 206.11 205.88 888.818 235.1 252.05
ADE 822.26∗∗∗∗ -471.41 -471.43 491.398∗∗∗∗ -393.3 -375.15
ACME 482.586∗∗∗∗ 677.52∗∗∗∗ 677.31∗∗∗∗ 397.42∗∗∗∗ 628.4∗∗∗∗ 627.2∗∗∗∗
[424.4, 542.3] [490.3, 876.3] [480.8, 900.5] [354.0, 443.2] [465.8, 803.6] [457.6, 811.0]
Sens. Test (0.4, 0.1133) (0.6, 0.1535) [0.6, 0.1535] (0.4, 0.1124) (0.6, 0.1523) (0.6, 0.1523)
Proportion 0.371∗∗∗∗ 1.18 1.22 0.45∗∗∗∗ 1.4 1.39
Outcome: Social agreements during discussion (as in Table 19)
ATE 6140.5∗∗∗∗ 1252.8 1256.8 4577.1∗∗∗∗ 1881.4 1888.18
ADE 3479.02∗∗∗∗ -2553.7 -2546.9 2408.7∗∗∗∗ -1602.7 -1609.8
ACME 2661.5∗∗∗∗ 3806.6∗∗∗∗ 3803.8∗∗∗∗ 2168.3 3484.1∗∗∗∗ 3498.1∗∗∗∗
[2348.5, 2974.0] [2869.2, 4914.1] [2763.6, 4966.2] [1918.4, 2427.8] [2521.3, 4494.0] [2538.7, 4479.9]
Sens. Test (0.4, 0.1125) (0.4, 0.0743) (0.4, 0.0743) (0.4, 0.1112) (0.4, 0.0738) (0.4, 0.0738)
Proportion 0.434∗∗∗∗ 1.45 1.51 0.475∗∗∗∗ 1.28 1.37
Outcome: Engagement in discussion among users (as in Table 20)
ATE 849.2∗∗∗∗ 98.23 100.39 579.9∗∗∗∗ 139.09 146.16
ADE 515.37∗∗∗∗ -356.5 -354.25 305.9∗∗∗∗ -280.54 -275.37
ACME 333.8∗∗∗∗ 454.72∗∗∗∗ 454.63∗∗∗∗ 274.1∗∗∗∗ 419.63∗∗∗∗ 421.5∗∗∗∗
[289.9, 376.2] [340.3, 582.4] [340.0, 583.1] [243.5, 307.5] [309.0, 530.7] [321.2, 538.6]
Sens. Test (0.4, 0.1152) (0.6, 0.1555) (0.6, 0.1555) (0.4, 0.1141) (0.6, 0.1543) (0.6, 0.1543)
Proportion 0.393∗∗∗∗ 1.59 1.71 0.472∗∗∗∗ 1.56 1.67
Dataset and Variables Used for Model Specification
Matched Data × YES YES × YES YES
Micro×Macro YES YES YES YES YES YES
1Med×Macro YES × YES YES × YES
Confounders × YES YES × YES YES
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01; ∗∗∗∗p<0.001. Square brackets report confidence intervals. Total observations in each model: 22171
Models are estimated using quasi-Bayesian method and heteroscedasticity robust standard errors.
Sens. Test reports sensitivity test values of ρ and R̃2MR̃
2
Y (in order) within parantheses. R̃
2∗
MR̃
2∗
Y = ρ
2 .
1Med refers to the mediator variable.
Matched dataset is the one obtained during treatment effect estimation. See Table 27.
Macro variable is a binary variable for article’s category: 1 for ‘Politics’ 0 for ‘Others’.
Confounders used in models are article length, total quotes, and number of words in quotes.
?? Final model used in main text for interpretation and further analysis
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Additional Note for Table 33:-
† Refers to users who join the discussion due to being influenced by po-
litical inclination of entities (i) which have appeared in previously co-
occurred articles or in the discussion of current article, but (ii) have never
appeared in the main text of current article.
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Figure 24: SAMPLE SENSITIVITY TEST VISUALIZATION: PART 1
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This shows the variation of ACME of Model 2 in Table 32 for the indirect type micro
attribute as a function of the sensitivity parameter ρ, the correlation between the error
terms in the mediator and the outcome models. If small deviations from ρ = 0 create huge
variations in ACME, then our estimates might be sensitive to violation of sequential
ignorability assumption. We see that this is not the case here. The solid line and gray band
represent point estimates of ACME and their 90% confidence intervals, respectively. The
estimated ACME is quite robust because it will turn zero only when ρ is 0.6. The current
estimate of ACME, as shown in Model 2 of Table 32 for indirect type, assumes sequential
ignorability assumption because the estimate has been computed with ρ = 0. What this
figure shows is that our estimates (sign, confidence) can become invalid if ρ is 0.6.
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Figure 25: SAMPLE SENSITIVITY TEST VISUALIZATION: PART 2
  
(A)
(B)
This shows the variation of ACME of Model 2 in Table 32 for the indirect type micro
attribute as functions of (R̃2Y , R̃
2
M ) and (R
2
Y
∗
, R2M
∗
) in panels (A) and (B) respectively.
R̃2 represents the proportion of total variance in the outcome (Y ) or the mediator (M)
variable that could be explained by an unobserved pretreatment confounder. R2∗
represents the proportion of unexplained variance in the outcome (Y ) or the mediator (M)
variable that could be explained by an unobserved pretreatment confounder. The left and
right panes represent negative and positive signs of the product of the coefficients of a
potential unobserved confounder. The contour line of 0, in respective panels, correspond
to pairs of values of (R̃2Y , R̃
2
M ) and (R
2
Y
∗
, R2M
∗
) for which ACME would be zero. We see
that any unobserved confounder would have to explain a large chunk of R̃2 or R2∗ for
both outcome and mediator in order for ACME to be 0. The plots suggest that, under
assumption of sequential ignorability, the estimates are quite robust to a potential
unobserved pretreatment mediator-outcome confounding to a large extent.
164
References
[1] Abhishek Samantray and Massimo Riccaboni. Peer influence in large dy-
namic network: Quasi-experimental evidence from scratch. In Luca Maria
Aiello, Chantal Cherifi, Hocine Cherifi, Renaud Lambiotte, Pietro Lió, and
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